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Preface 
Americans are an unmilitary people who have fought nine major wars 
and have been prepared for none. Peoples of a more martial tempera-
ment have defended their interests with large standing armies backed 
by even larger trained reserves. Americans create their armies after the 
crisis of war is already upon them. Of their military accomplishments, 
the most impressive has been the mobilization for World War II, an 
effort that included some fifty-five draftee divisions of all types. 
Draftee divisions were the products of mass conscription; selec-
tive-service agencies turned over thousands of young men to tiny, 
professional cadres who organized and trained them, then led them 
into battle. These "new divisions" represented yet another chapter in a 
debate, older than the republic itself, concerning the proper constitu-
tion of America's military establishment. They carried forward public 
ventilation of such topics as the respective roles of professional and 
temporary soldiers and the right of a democratic state to require invol-
untary military service of its citizens. The draftee divisions of World 
War II also added a new twist to old arguments. As their name implies, 
the rank and file of these divisions consisted almost exclusively of 
conscripts. Although such divisions had been assembled during World 
War I, World War II provided the first effective test of their actual utility. 
Few of the World War I draftee divisions saw combat as divisions, and 
these were involved only briefly. 
American draftees are the involuntary soldiery of an unmilitary 
people. If institutional means exist to make effective combat units out 
of such unlikely material in a reasonable time, our populace can rest 
somewhat easier in its general indifference to military affairs. America 
may not need to maintain large armies in times of peace in order to field 
enormous armies quickly and efficiently in times of war. Needless to 
say, the relative success of draftee divisions has tremendous implica-
tions for defense planning. 
Surprisingly, draftee divisions as a genre have received relatively 
little scholarly attention. Indeed, most of the working details of World 
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War II mobilization have received little attention outside of discon-
nected and narrowly specialized studies. Serious historians of World 
War II have, for the most part, focused on major battles or on issues, 
decisions, developments, and personalities at the highest levels. 1 
Scholars in the behavioral sciences have addressed the psychological 
and sociological aspects of combat without bridging the gap between 
human behavior and mobilization planning. 2 Scholars in the more 
technical fields are every bit as specialized as their military counter-
parts-no holistic picture there. 3 Finally, the popular literature con-
cerning World War II, of which there is a great deal, concentrates on 
grand tactics or individual adventures. The net result of the foregoing 
is that the casual visitor to a library or bookstore can see a great deal of 
World War II from the cabinet, command post, or foxhole, but not 
much of it from the perspective of intermediate-level supervisors who 
must make personnel, training, and logistics come together on the 
field of battle. 
This study is hardly the complete answer to the vacancy suggested 
above, but it does follow a draftee division through the entire World 
War II experience, relying upon sources drawn largely from the inter-
mediate levels of administration and command. The division was the 
88th Infantry, the first into combat, the longest lived, and perhaps the 
most respected of all World War II draftee divisions. 4 It was also the 
division in which my father served and which my grandfather com-
manded. Elsewhere I have cited sources and acknowledged my par-
ticular indebtedness to the many "Blue Devils" who have been so 
generous with their time and papers. Here it need only be said that this 
is their story, measured against standards appropriate to scholarly 
appraisal and heavily weighted with archival and external evidence. If 
one were given to the penny-chasing descriptive titles popular in the 
nineteenth century, this study might be subtitled "How We Created a 
Division Out of Raw Draftees and Led Them on to Victory Over the 
Most Highly Touted Army of Modern Times." There is much that is 
instructive in their experience. 
Acknowledgments 
I am indebted to benefactors so numerous I risk failing to recognize 
them all. For my shortcomings in that regard, I apologize in advance. 
The veterans of the Blue Devils Association have been incredibly 
generous with respect to time, energy, sources, and advice. My notes 
and bibliographical essay detail the 88th's individual contributors; here 
I need say that this book would have been impossible without them. I 
take great pride in having been made an honorary member of the Blue 
Devils, truly an assembly of kindly and generous men. 
Draftee Division began as a doctoral dissertation, written under the 
painstaking mentorship of Professor John E. Wilz of Indiana Universi-
ty, seconded by an able committee: Professors David Pletcher, George 
Juergens, and John Lovell. These men represent all that higher educa-
tion is supposed to be; under their patient, six-year stewardship I grew 
as much as a person as Draftee Division did as a manuscript. 
The staffs manning a number of archives-The Modern Military 
Records Branch of the National Archives; the U.S. Army Historical 
Research Center in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; the Combined 
Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the U.S. Army 
Armor Center Library at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the U.S. Army Infantry 
School Library at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Library of the Center for 
Military History in Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. Military Academy 
Library at West Point, New York-proved very helpful and proficient. 
In all of my experiences with these several archives, I never posed an 
inquiry that was not cheerfully responded to in a timely manner. We 
are fortunate to be in receipt of such dedicated public service. 
When one is writing a book, someone else inevitably takes up 
one's slack in other areas. This has been the lot of my wife, Mary Beth, 
who has sustained me through what she cheerfully refers to as an 
eight-year pregnancy. My children, Amy and Todd, have also cheer-
fully indulged me in Draftee Division. I do not believe they can remem-
ber the time when I was not yet working on this project. Others 
cheerful in adversity have been the numerous typists who, through 
xii Acknowledgments 
my total of nine military postings, have in turn laid hands on the 
manuscript. I might particularly note Susie McCloy of Bloomington, 
Indiana, who started me out; Debbie Biddle of West Point, New York, 
who typed the final draft of the dissertation; and Darla Rutledge of 
Leavenworth, Kansas, who carried Draftee Division through its final 
submission. 
My notes and bibliographical essay detail my intellectual indebted-
ness and suggest my personal indebtedness to the many individual 
contributors who became the basis of this manuscript. Here I might 
add that I had assistance with respect to maps and photographs as well. 
Col. Dixie Beggs, former 88th Infantry Division G-3, loaned me maps 
actually used when planning for Operation Diadem. These became the 
basis for the maps in this book. Insofar as photographs are concerned, I 
am indebted to the U.S. Army Signal Corps, the American Battle 
Monuments Commission, John P. Delaney's The Blue Devils in Italy 
(Infantry Journal and Association of U.S. Army), Colonel Beggs, and 
Messrs. Ovid U. Bay (captain, 337th FA Battalion, and author of the 
337th's history, We Left Home), William E. Carnahan, and Edwin 
Gibreath, who reproduced them for the book. 
My closest collaborator throughout the authorship of Draftee Divi-
sion has been my father, Col. Horace M. Brown. He has encouraged 
me, secured sources for me, introduced me, advised me, edited me, 
and sustained me in adversity. Upon my assignment to Europe he took 
over the final stages of the project altogether. Truly he deserves to be 
listed as the coauthor, but in his own unassuming way he refused that 
recognition. My mother, Lucia ("Chick") Sloan Brown, indulged the 
both of us in this project, at some expense to the tranquility of her 
household. One's parents can number among one's best friends. 
Finally, I acknowledge the inspiration of my maternal grand-
parents, Maj. Gen. John E. Sloan and his wife, Amy. They died before I 
began this project, yet even a casual reader may recognize their pres-
ence throughout it. I have strained every nerve to maintain scholarly 
objectivity, with what success others must judge. More than a few of 
the ancient historians believed the purpose of history was not just to 
instruct, but also to provide examples worthy of emulation. If so, one 
could do far worse than to emulate the Sloans. 
l _____ _ 
Draftee Divisions: 
The Historical Roots 
H hour was 2300, 11 May 1944. From Cassino to the Gulf of Gaeta, 
artillery barrages broke the stillness of the Italian night as fifteen Allied 
divisions hurled themselves against the Gustav Line, Hitler's string of 
defenses sealing southern Italy from Rome and points north. In the 
American sector infantrymen stormed into German positions seconds 
after carefully coordinated artillery barrages ceased. Mount Damiano, 
a critical point, fell in fifty-one minutes; the scarcely less important 
Mount Rotondo fell the following day. American time-on-target artil-
lery fire annihilated a German battalion surprised in an assembly area, 
and in three days of savage fighting the Americans pushed tenacious 
German defenders out of Santa Maria Infante Village, another critical 
point. 
The fall of Santa Maria, a subsequent push through the village of 
Spigno, and the progress of French Goumiers across the trackless 
Mount Majo area north of the American sector ripped open the vaunt-
ed Gustav Line. Within two weeks the attackers, at times moving so 
quickly that supporting artillery had difficulty keeping them in range, 
linked up with divisions attacking out of the Anzio beachhead fifty 
miles to the north. The Germans soon found themselves struggling to 
extricate their battered Tenth Army from a closing trap. 
The identity of the assaulting units was at first held secret, but 
Americans soon knew that their newly mobilized all-draftee divisions 
had seen their first major combat. The army chief of staff, Gen. George 
C. Marshall, was delighted with the draftees' performance and called it 
"the first confirmation from the battlefield of the soundness of our 
division activation and training program." Many other Americans 
were scarcely less pleased. Headlines in Stars and Stripes read, 
"Something New Has Been Added," while the Washington Post exulted, 
"All-Draft Divisions Chase Nazis 30 Miles." The Muskogee Daily Phoenix 
noted "88th Division Spearheads Yank Smash in Rome Drive" and laid 
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claim to a species of participation by referring to a nearby training camp 
in the sub-headline, "Gruber-Trained Units Make History in 14-Day 
Battle." In an article published a year after the war, the Saturday Evening 
Post concluded, "The Blue Devil's 88th Infantry Division Stumped the 
Experts," forcing a revision of thinking upon "regulars who once 
refused to believe that a draftee could ever be anything but a sad 
sack."1 
Although they may not have been aware of it at the time, the 
soldiers of the 88th Infantry Division provided the nation's first effec-
tive test of conscripted divisions in the conduct of foreign wars. This 
test addressed a controversy as old as the United States itself: whether 
the professional soldier or the "citizen-soldier" is more properly the 
heart of America's military establishment. 
A case study of a World War II draftee division sheds light on this 
important issue and speaks to the assertion of critics that all-draftee 
formations cannot measure up to standards of performance demon-
strated by long-established units. Such a case study also contributes to 
the understanding of America's mobilization and subsequent conduct 
of ground operations in World War II. The 88th Infantry Division-the 
first into combat, the longest-lived, and perhaps the most highly 
regarded of the draftee divisions-seems an ideal subject for this study 
of the draftee divisions as a genre. 2 
Americans won their War for Independence because of the efforts 
of nonprofessional volunteers in state militias or the Continental Army. 
No major American leader and few American soldiers were profession-
al military men. Anglo-Saxon practice had long held that all able bodied 
male citizens had an obligation of military service. This tradition rested 
on the assumption that such service was intended for the defense of 
"home and hearth" -and in reasonable proximity thereto. Most 
post-Revolutionary War Americans opposed the expense of maintain-
ing a professional army-the traditional instrument of monarchs or 
"men on horseback" -in the young republic. National leaders such as 
Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and George Mason were philosophi-
cally opposed to a professional army; Mason even went so far as to 
assert that "when once a standing army is established in any country, 
the people lose their liberty. "3 
Advocates of a strong national government, on the other hand, 
believed an army essential. Alexander Hamilton, a spokesman for 
strong central government, considered federal military forces neces-
sary to suppress such insurrections as Shay's Rebellion in 1786 or the 
Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. George Washington was also dissatisfied 
with the militia system as it stood. He proposed that to guard arsenals 
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and frontiers the country would be better served by a small profession-
al army backed by an improved militia. 4 
The federal convention of 1787 compromised between these op-
posing points of view. Military clauses in the new Constitution bal-
anced congressional prerogatives "to declare war" and "raise and 
support armies" against the president's role as commander in chief. 
Another balance was established between the right of the central 
government to call state militias into federal service and the guarantee 
that states would be liable to this federalization for limited purposes. 
Thus the military instruments in the hands of the commander in chief 
were subject to the largesse of the national legislature, and the states 
retained an independent military capability. In practice, Congress and 
the states assumed an even greater role in the direction of military 
affairs than the Constitution might have suggested. 5 
Legislative openhandedness proved less than the supporters of a 
strong national military establishment had desired. Nevertheless, the 
dismal militia failures of Josiah Harmar (1791) and Arthur St. Clair 
(1793), and subsequently the striking victory of Anthony Wayne's 
highly trained Legion of the United States at Fallen Timbers (10 August 
1794) convinced even the skeptics that a standing army was necessary 
on the frontier. 6 Legislators found this army acceptable if it remained 
small, far away, and preoccupied with Indians rather than politics. 
Whatever the lesson of Fallen Timbers, the government could not 
agree on how best to expand the military to a wartime footing. Wash-
ington had suggested that regulars-"professionals" by virtue of a 
three-year enlistment-could become the cadre of a larger military 
establishment. His critics viewed the regular army as a police force and 
preferred to expand military capability by mobilizing militias. These 
mobilizations would be under state control, whereas an enlarged reg-
ular army would be under federal control. This latter formula, with 
regulars and militia thrown together on the battlefield itself, proved 
adequate for the country's needs prior to 1812. A succession of defeats 
in the War of 1812, however, demonstrated the inadequacy of state 
militias in the face of sophisticated opponents. The British burned 
Washington, for example, after routing a militia force of forty-four 
hundred-stiffened by four hundred regulars and six hundred ma-
rines-at Bladensburg. The militia was so baffled by British fire and 
maneuver that it fled in terror after losing only eight killed and eleven 
wounded. Indignant Washingtonians faulted the secretary of war for 
the disaster. They drove him from their charred city even before he 
could resign and forced him to submit his resignation from Baltimore. 7 
Early in the 1820s Secretary of War John C. Calhoun sought to 
improve upon the discredited mobilization system. He proposed 
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organizing the regular army as a leadership cadre that could be ex-
panded with volunteers as necessary. 8 Under his plan the army would 
ordinarily consist of 6,316 officers and men and would be organized so 
that it could expand to 11,558 without adding a single officer or unit. 
His notion that an established unit could approximately double in size 
without losing efficiency would gain importance in later times. Cal-
houn was the first important American exponent of an expansible 
army. 
Although Calhoun's Jacksonian contemporaries thought his plan 
rooted in a military elitism they found abhorrent, Calhoun did succeed 
in providing the army with a reservoir of leaders through increased 
professionalism of West Point under Superintendent Sylvanus Thayer. 
This leadership proved invaluable in the Mexican War. In 1846 Con-
gress expanded the regular army as Calhoun had recommended, and it 
performed well throughout the war. The record of nonprofessional 
volunteer formations during the war was more uneven. Some, such as 
the 1st Missouri Regiment, did well, whereas others, such as the 2nd 
Indiana, did poorly. The concept of an expansible regular army supple-
mented, if necessary, by volunteer formations seemed vindicated dur-
ing the Mexican War. <J 
The post-Mexican War expansible regular army probably would 
have proven adequate for the limited international needs of nine-
teenth-century America. Unfortunately, the contingency with which 
the regular army was next called upon to deal was neither limited nor 
international. The fratricidal warfare that followed the attack on Fort 
Sumter was on a scale far greater than that for which the regular army 
had been prepared. Regular formations were swamped early in the 
Civil War; the strength of the Federal army climbed from 16,000 in 
1861, 637,000 in 1862, and 900,000 in 1863. 10 
In 1861 some military men suggested that the regulars might best 
be used if scattered as cadre among the numerous volunteer forma-
tions being raised by the states. General in Chief Winfield Scott re-
jected such proposals. The regular army expanded but remained small 
and intact while the states organized volunteers with their own re-
sources. Except for a few veterans and West Pointers in civil life, the 
resources available to the northern states did not include many men 
with military experience. The southern states were only somewhat 
better off. The presence of the regular army itself was not much felt 
during the mobilization of volunteer forces on either side, although 
West Pointers did ultimately come to dominate the military leadership 
on both sides. 11 
The Civil War forced a change in recruitment philosophy. Prior to 
the Civil War military thinkers thought in terms of volunteers when 
they anticipated sustained or distant operations. Washington blandly 
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asserted that there was a sufficient proportion of ablebodied young 
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five who had "a natural 
fondness for military parade (which passion is almost ever prevalent at 
that period of life). "12 Young men with such a passion proved sufficient 
for military needs prior to 1861, but the manpower demands of the 
Civil War greatly exceeded this supply of enthusiasts. Faced with total 
war, first the Confederacy and then the United States resorted to 
conscription. 13 
European nations had frequently resorted to military drafts, and 
the mass warfare of the Napoleonic era brought conscription on an 
enormous scale. In the United States and the Confederacy, however, 
conscription proved a divisive issue, requiring as it did posing the 
rights of the individual against the rights of the state. Recognizing this 
implication, both the North and South avoided the universal applica-
tion of the draft. Ever-increasing bounties were offered to encourage 
enlistment. In both the North and the South, a drafted man could hire a 
substitute. In the North a drafted man could purchase commutation 
with three hundred dollars. In the South one slaveholder or overseer 
was exempt for every twenty slaves owned or supervised. Individuals 
in "essential" occupations were also exempted. 
Since conscription was conducted under the auspices of the indi-
vidual states, inconsistencies inevitably invited abuse and evasion. 
One-third of the South's manpower under arms was the product of 
conscription, but this fraction comprised not so much newly drafted 
men as previous volunteers forced by new laws to extend terms of 
service. Similarly, only 6 percent of the two and one-half million who 
served the United States from 1861 to 1865 were conscripts. The extent 
to which the threat of conscription encouraged volunteering remains 
unknown. There were no separate conscript formations. Conscripts 
remained in or joined existing units or newly organized volunteer 
formations. 14 
The United States government never gained effective control of its 
military manpower, and it directly recruited relatively few units: the 
tiny Regular Army, the United States Colored Troops, two regiments of 
sharpshooters, the Invalid Corps, and six regiments of Confederate 
prisoners (the last used for Indian duty only). Each state was sovereign 
when raising its own units. Until 186~ all states save Wisconsin met 
new manpower quotas by organizing new units rather than by provid-
ing replacements to older ones. Postitions thus created may have 
contributed to political patronage, but the system did little to enhance 
military efficiency. Throughout the war new regiments went into ac-
tion under inexperienced leadership, despite War Department efforts 
to standardize recruitment and training. Insofar as manpower mobi-
lization and training were concerned, the Civil War was ambitiously, 
6 Draftee Division 
yet inefficiently, waged. This influenced the thinking of later military 
theorists. 15 
America's seminal military theorist, Emory Upton, wrote in the 
1880s that the Civil War had been a bloodbath simply because "instead 
of expanding the Regular Army and making it the chief instrument in 
executing the national will ... [Congress] violated the practice of every 
civilized nation by calling into existence an army of a million untrained 
officers and men." The failure to train troops properly was, in Upton's 
view, negligent homicide. 16 
Upton had commanded a division in the Civil War and had trav-
eled widely after the war. During his travels he was much impressed by 
what he saw of the German army. In his great work, The Military Policy 
of the United States (published in 1904, long after his death but also long 
after his ideas had been publicized by others), he proposed a major 
reworking of America's military. He thought that the chaotic man-
power mobilization employed in the Civil War should be replaced with 
a fully federalized draft. He further thought that the army should 
abandon the prewar militia system, professionalize leadership at all 
levels, develop a military educational system to improve and stan-
dardize training, and enlist troops for not less than three years. The 
army, he argued, should expand to wartime footing along the lines of 
"the expansive principle." Inductees, whether drafted or volunteer, 
should be assigned to established units. 
Another former Union general took issue with Upton's somewhat 
elitist outlook. John A. Logan's The Volunteer Soldier of America (1887) 
was a testimonial to the citizen-soldier rather than the professional. 
Logan thought the "effect of the West Point system ... had been to 
manacle and even to crush ... the volunteer and his aspirations for 
recognition. "17 He did not propose to do away with the Regular Army 
altogether; he believed it necessary on the frontier and suitable as a 
repository of specialized skills (such as artillery ballistics). Logan's 
point was that in an emergency the Regular Army would-and 
should-be swamped in a mobilization so vast as to make the "expan-
sive principle" meaningless. The idea of enlarging the Regular Army to 
anticipate such demands, an idea favored by Upton, was repugnant to 
Logan. In Logan's view, such a decision would mean enlarging, at 
considerable expense, an inbred elitist institution that would stifle the 
talents of volunteer citizen-soldiers. 
Rumination concerning "Uptonian" ideas remained academic 
through the late nineteenth century. Congressional parsimony and the 
absence of a serious military threat from abroad-as well as the 
strength of the militia cum volunteer tradition and the states' prefer-
ence for using "organized" militia (by then increasingly called "National 
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Guard") to suppress disturbances-all dictated against radical revi-
sions. 
Americans saw no particular reason to "tinker" with existing mili-
tary arrangements prior to their embarrassingly disorderly mobiliza-
tion for the Spanish-Amerian War in 1898. The Regular Army, even 
when expanded, proved too small to undertake the full burden of the 
war, yet volunteer and National Guard units were too poorly prepared 
initially to deploy overseas. Although of shorter duration, the mobi-
lization effort in 1898 was as confused and inefficient as that of the Civil 
War. After the war, revelations and scandals, including the testimony 
of the commanding general of the army against his own commissary 
general, kept the memory of wartime confusion in the public mind. 
Among other miscarriages, the commissary general stood accused of 
serving the hastily mobilized troops "embalmed beef. "18 It may be the 
nature of armies to complain about their food. 
The Spanish-American War experience was sufficiently sobering to 
give the new secretary of war, Elihu Root, support for thoroughgoing-
if tactfully executed-reforms. Root borrowed heavily from Upton's 
Military Policy of the United States when he professionalized the school-
ing and staff structure of the Regular Army. Requirements overseas 
justified the enlargement of the Regular Army to about seventy thou-
sand men in 1903, 19 thus assuring that growth along the lines of the 
expansive principle could generate a substantial force in a reasonable 
time. State "militias" reorganized and standardized under effective 
federal control as the National Guard. The Dick Act of 1903 identified 
the National Guard as a trained, equipped, and expansible supplement 
to the Regular Army. 20 When World War I broke out in Europe, the 
United States possessed an enlarged military establishment organized 
along Uptonian lines. Military writers foresaw that mobilization might 
require organizing additional units outside this existing structure, but 
they left little doubt that such "new" divisions would be accorded 
third-rate status. 21 
The Uptonian defense posture assumed with the adoption of 
Root's Reforms was not without its critics. Although these generally 
approved the changed staff structure, schooling, and the size of the 
Regular Army and the National Guard, they considered it unwise to 
depend entirely on established formations to sustain national defense. 
As World War I threatened to engulf the United States, some advocates 
of military preparedness combined the Uptonian notion of a federally 
supervised draft with an egalitarian notion of a levee en masse. Their 
proposals featured "new" divisions added on to those established by 
the Dick Act. Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, a recent army chief of staff and 
a self-appointed spokesman for preparedness, advocated the "Platts-
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burg Idea" of summer training for college students, businessmen, 
politicians, and others to disseminate military knowledge. Wood re-
peatedly insisted that a small cadre of professionals could train recruits 
"from the ground up" within six months. 22 In truth, Wood found 
himself in an ambivalent position, defending Upton's proposals for 
conscription in the face of the passive Wilson administration while at 
the same time attacking such Uptonian notions as long terms of serv-
ice, lengthy training cycles, and limitations on the use of new forma-
tions. 
After prolonged controversy and considerable introspection, an 
effective decision on conscription emerged with the Selective Service 
Act of 18 May 1917. This act established that citizens would be drafted 
as necessary to meet military requirements. The availability of draHed 
manpower did not, however, resolve disagreements between Upto-
nians and egalitarians as to how drafted manpower might best be used. 
The War College Division of the General Staff, impressed by the 
manpower demands of the Western Front, recommended that the 
Regular Army and the National Guard be given over altogether to 
training an army of sufficient strength to decide the war in Europe 
quickly. This recommendation was anathema to the Uptonians, who 
continued to favor an orderly, amoebalike growth, whereby estab-
lished formations would double in size and then train and go into 
battle, possibly doubling again at some later date when the recruits 
themselves had become "veterans." The War Department compro-
mised. Faced with the deteriorating situation of the Western Allies, it 
hastily dispatched to France established regiments that were organized 
into divisions and fleshed out with recruits. Meanwhile, tiny cadres of 
regulars trained the conscripted "new" divisions of the "national 
army."23 
By November 1918 the American Expeditionary Forces had re-
ceived eight Regular Army, seventeen National Guard, and eighteen 
National Army divisions; the presence of the conscripted divisions did 
not necessarily represent a victory for their advocates, however. Gen. 
John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, 
was so Uptonian in his thinking that he sought lengthy in-theater 
training programs even for the Regular Army divisions, and more for 
the draftee divisions. He also favored the established divisions over 
these new ones. Of eighteen National Army divisions, he summarily 
broke up six before they experienced combat and sent their men into 
veteran units as individual replacements. Three other divisions served 
as replacement training centers rather than as combat units. Two divi-
sions went to the front but never saw serious combat, and one was 
turned over piecemeal to the French in detached regiments. Of the 
remaining six divisions, the first into combat did not see action until11 
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August 1918. Although the draftee divisions that did experience com-
bat in World War I performed creditably, the treatment they received 
clearly accorded them third-rate status. They were, first, a source of 
replacements for veteran divisions, second, a stopgap for holding 
quiet sectors, and only third, combat divisions in their own right. 24 
World War I firmly established the principle of the federally super-
vised draft. The expansible principle had already been established. In 
an emergency the Regular Army and the National Guard were to 
provide the nucleus of forces approximately double their peacetime 
size. Expansions would be by virtue of draftees if sufficient numbers of 
volunteers were not available to meet a crisis. What was not yet clear 
was whether further growth should feature a host of draftee divisions or 
the more gradual development of units envisioned by the Uptonians. 
In the aftermath of World War I, professional officers regarded the 
draftee more favorably than they had before. General Pershing, Chief 
of Staff Peyton C. March, and other leaders had been impressed by 
what they had seen of him as an individual soldier on the Western 
Front. Egalitarian theorists such as John McAuley Palmer advocated 
increased reliance on this "citizen-soldier." Palmer thought the expan-
sive principle should be abandoned altogether; when war broke out 
the United States should raise new divisions to supplement those 
already deployed. In Palmer's view, the advantage of a regular army 
was not that it formed a nucleus (other than small training cadres) but 
rather that it was immediately available for deployment. 25 
Congress included some of Palmer's recommendations in the Na-
tional Defense Act of 1920. This act authorized nine Regular Army 
divisions, nine "training corps" to absorb recruits and organize them 
into divisions, improvements in the National Guard, and the creation 
of the Army Reserve, a species of "organized militia" independent of 
the states. Interwar economic conditions and congressional frugality 
undermined the effectiveness of this act, however. The National Guard 
and the Army Reserve withered in numbers and effectiveness. The 
Regular Army dwindled to 134,957 in 1932, well below the size neces-
sary to cope with a major overseas crisis. Palmer advocated reducing 
the number of divisions to a point where those on hand were combat-
ready and thus could fight effectively until the training corps gener-
ated new divisions. Instead, the War Department liquidated the train-
ing corps, retained nine skeletal divisions, and made plans to expand 
in accord with the expansible principle. 26 
As World War II approached, disagreements between Uptonians 
and egalitarians continued to surface. The army chief of staff, Gen. 
George C. Marshall, sought unit reorganizations and a massive recruit-
ing program that would have greatly increased the size of the expansi-
ble Regular Army. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, a longtime 
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egalitarian in military matters and a member of the National Associa-
tion for Universal Military Training, recognized and countered this 
Uptonian strategem. The Selective Service Act of 1940, passed in 
peacetime, became the basis for military manpower procurement. The 
prewar expansible army reached its limits in the autumn of 1941. At that 
time, after a year of growth along Uptonian lines, the personnel 
composition of the Army stood at Regular Army, 503,000; Regular 
Army Reserve, 17,500; federalized National Guard, 256,000; and draf-
tees, 712,000. The established formations had absorbed as many draf-
tees as they could integrate at the time. If a need developed for further 
expansion in the next year or so, it would have to be accomplished by 
all-draftee divisions. 27 
As World War II dragged on, distinctions between the "new" 
draftee divisions and the "old"-Regular Army and National Guard-
divisions faded. Combat replacements were almost exclusively draf-
tees, particularly after the midwar suspension of voluntary enlist-
ment. 28 A number of old divisions were virtually destroyed in order to 
provide individual replacements for divisions deploying overseas. 
When reconstructed, these divisions were draftee divisions in all but 
name. By 1944 the demography of all divisions was pretty much the 
same: a thin crust of regulars, supplemented by graduates of the 
Reserve Officers' Training Corps and officer candidate schools, leading 
formations manned by draftees. 
In the early days of mobilization this fading of distinctions had not 
occurred, however. The "old" and "new" divisions had important 
differences in their genesis. Old divisions had organizational con-
tinuities stretching across years or decades; new divisions did not. The 
old divisions that deployed early in the war went overseas with much of 
their prewar cadre intact, whereas new divisions organized their cadre 
and activated at virtually the same time. War Department policies 
directed volunteers through replacement training centers into the old 
divisions, whereas the new divisions formed up with draftees alone in 
their enlisted ranks. The organizing principles of the old divisions 
were Uptonian: standing units, modest expansion to accept enlisted 
"fillers," and the consciously faced integration of replacements into the 
veterans. The new divisions were the antithesis of all this. Gen. George 
C. Marshall clearly understood that his draftee divisions represented 
an unproven concept. 29 
In the century and a half separating the federal convention from 
World War II, Americans crossed three thresholds in mobilization 
planning. First, they resolved the question of whether to have a stand-
ing professional army or to rely exclusively on militia formations for 
defense. They opted for a professional army, albeit a small one, as well 
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as militias. Even the most committed idealists could not escape the 
rude facts of frontier warfare and international politics. Second, during 
the Civil War the United States decided to require involuntary military 
service of citizens in times of national crisis, thus abandoning volun-
teers as the sole source of military manpower. Popular acceptance of 
the draft developed over time; the public regarded it with some hos-
tility during the Civil War, generally supported it during World War I, 
and strongly supported it during World War II. Third, Americans came 
to rely on the national government to direct a centrally managed 
mobilization in time of war. State-based recruiting and an easy fluidity 
between civil and military life gave way to federal mobilization firmly in 
the hands of military professionals. 
A fourth threshold, not yet fully crossed in 1942, was a commit-
ment to the rapid transformation of ordinary citizens into twentieth-
century soldiers. If Uptonians were right, American draftees could be 
efficiently used in modern warfare only after extensive training in 
established units. Such a proposition suggested that war with the Axis 
nations would be a drawn-out enterprise. What was more, America 
might thenceforth, in the aftermath of the war, be saddled with a 
standing army whose numbers represented a major fraction of war-
time needs. If, on the other hand, small cadres of professionals could 
quickly shape a mass of conscripts into combat-ready divisions, the 
time required for mobilization and war could be shortened. America 
could batter its Axis opponents into defeat, perhaps in a couple of 
years, then quickly return to its preoccupation with peaceful pursuits. 
Crossing each of these thresholds had important implications for 
Americans. A national army, a draft, and a federally supervised mobi-
lization all required individuals, local governments, and state govern-
ments to surrender some measure of their autonomy. If these sacrifices 
were to be minimized, Americans would have to convert draftees into 
combat-ready units quickly and efficiently. Otherwise, the war effort 
would needlessly squander human and material resources; if it went 
on too long it could dangerously disrupt the life and fabric of the 
American nation. 
The experience of the 88th Infantry Division, the first of the draftee 
divisions into combat in World War II, illustrates the means whereby 
draftees could, in fact, be quickly and efficiently converted into com-
bat-ready units. Uptonian and egalitarian notions would become rec-
onciled as cadres of professionals made effective fighters from 
thousands of laymen without endangering the "amateur status" cher-
ished by the nation that had produced them. The 88th Infantry Divi-
sion would mobilize, organize, train, and fight without unduly 
militarizing the soldiers from which it was made-a genuinely Amer-
ican response to the crisis of war. 
2 _____ _ 
Personnel and 
Personnel Utilization: 
Bureaucratic Roulette 
Of the ninety divisions with which the United States Army fought 
World War II, the 88th Infantry Division-the "Blue Devil Division"-
was the forty-ninth activated. It was, however, the twenty-fourth into 
combat. In its training cycle it passed all previously activated draftee 
divisions, and three regular army and six National Guard divisions as 
well. The 88th Infantry Division went from activation to embarkation in 
sixteen months. This was a record in 1943 and, despite the subsequent 
shortening of division training cycles, only one division surpassed and 
three others equaled that record during World War II. 1 
Ideally, all divisions should have progressed from activation to 
embarkation as quickly as did the 88th. A report by Lt. Gen. Lesley J. 
McNair, the chief of staff of General Headquarters, to the War Depart-
ment on 20 December 1941 identified seventeen divisions as combat-
ready and seventeen others as to be ready by 1 April1942. Divisions 
activated after Pearl Harbor were to undergo a fifty-two-week training 
cycle prior to embarkation. Allowing the wartime average of four 
months for administrative requirements, large-scale maneuvers, and 
travel time, the army should have had all its divisions available for 
embarkation within sixteen months of activation. Thus, divisions 
should have been prepared for combat at a rate corresponding to the 
solid line in Figure 1 rather than at the actual rate, shown by the dashed 
line. 2 
Army Ground Forces, the headquarters responsible for organizing 
and training ground combat troops, blamed the slow preparation of 
combat divisions on shortages of equipment, "fluctuation and deple-
tions" of enlisted personnel, irregularities in cadre selection, scarcity 
and inexperience of officers, administrative burdens caused by non-
divisional units, and initial deficiencies in its own (Army Ground 
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Forces) supervision. Of these six obstacles, three represented person-
nel problems. The 88th Infantry Division had the good fortune to avoid 
the worst effects of these personnel difficulties. Had the division been 
activated much before or much after its actual date of 15 July 1942, it 
might have fared worse than it did in a turbulent personnel situation as 
full of chance as a game of roulette. 3 
The army's most obvious wartime personnel problems were its 
fluctuations and depletions in numbers of enlisted personnel. Of these 
irregularities, the issue that most preoccupied Army Ground Forces 
seems to have been its competition with the Army Service Forces and 
the Army Air Forces, not to mention the navy and the marines, for its 
legitimate share of the nation's manpower. 4 The services vied for 
manpower, particularly for men who had achieved high scores on the 
Army General Classification Test (AGCT). The army rightly considered 
this test a measure of "usable" (rather than "raw") intelligence, thus 
giving the best indication then available of a recruit's "trainability." 
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The Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces received dispropor-
tionately large numbers of men who registered high AGCT scores 
throughout 1942 and 1943. This was because of the emphasis the War 
Department placed upon undertaking an early strategic air offensive in 
Europe and because of the technical complexities the Army Service 
Forces seemed to face. Percentile test distributions for the three major 
commands in 1943 were as follows: 5 
Classes I & II Class III Classes IV & V 
Army Ground Forces 29.7 33.3 37.0 
Army Air Forces 36.5 28.5 35.0 
Army Service Forces 41.7 31.3 27.0 
Officer candidates were drawn only from classes I and II. Army 
Ground Forces planners believed that the preferred treatment of the air 
forces and the service forces hampered their own efforts to train and pro-
vide officers for units--a formidable task in view of the War Department's 
vision of deploying an army of 140 combat divisions by the end of 1943.6 
The 88th Infantry Division reflected the test profiles of 1942 for 
infantry personnel (5.3 percent Class I, 22.1 percent Class II, 29.0 
percent Class III, and 43.6 percent Classes IV and V). The evidence 
suggests that this somewhat asymmetric profile did not significantly 
inhibit the 88th's training. Infantry divisions seem not to have needed 
as many high-scoring men as did units from other services. Certainly 
their tables of organization, dominated by infantry and artillery bat-
talions, called for lower proportions of leaders or specialists. In truth, 
the significant damage resulting from the use of the Army General 
Classification Test was not that infantry divisions received too few 
high-scorers. Rather, it resulted when AGCT scores became the basis 
for diversions into special programs after divisional training cycles 
were already in progress. 7 
When the army perceived a need to concentrate high-scoring men 
into priority programs, it usually reassigned men from units that were 
already partly trained. This represented a qualitative loss of talent 
more damaging than quantities alone might suggest. 8 Within the new 
units undergoing training, men in AGCT Classes I and II often rose 
quickly to leadership or administrative positions. Although the 
"raiding" of ground units for high-scoring personnel was a continuing 
problem, there were two great surges of such raiding. The 88th Infan-
try Division escaped one of these because it was activated too late; it 
missed the second because it completed its training so early. 
One surge of AGCT raiding resulted from the runaway expansion 
of officer candidate schools, which were intended to meet mobilization 
demands for junior officers. Ultimately 300 thousand men left the 
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enlisted ranks and went through officer candidate school (OCS). To be 
eligible for OCS, an enlisted man needed an AGCT score of 110 or 
higher, a good record, and time in service of at least six months. The 
draftees of the 88th first became eligible for OCS in January 1943. In 
November 1942 the War Department reconsidered mobilization plans 
and eliminated fourteen divisions. Whereas commanders were re-
lieved for failing to fill OCS quotas in 1942, in early 1943 the army found 
itself with a surplus of junior officers. Twelve additional divisions were 
cut in June 1943, resulting in a further increase of the officer surplus. 
Another ten thousand officers became redundant later in the war when 
the antiaircraft units for which they had been designated proved 
unnecessary. Units activated during the summer of 1942-such as the 
88th-lost few men to OCS programs. 9 
The second great surge of AGCT raiding was associated with the 
Army Special Training Program (ASTP). The ASTP was, in fact, a 
college deferment within the army, whereby inductees were permitted 
civil schooling rather than immediate military service. The purpose of 
the program was, in the event of an extended war, to assure the steady 
flow of college-trained men into the armed forces. It was further hoped 
that the program, a benefit to the colleges and universities involved, 
might encourage a more positive attitude toward the War Department 
in the academic community. Commanders had few good things to say 
about diverting trained troops to a program whose "payoff," if any, 
would be so far in the future. They were even less pleased with the 
notion of courting academicians, whom they characteristically viewed 
as the most unstable of allies. 10 
The ASTP was to go into full operation in the spring of 1943. 
Commanders were to designate as eligible those enlisted men with 
AGCT scores greater than 115 who had completed high school, basic 
training, and, if over age twenty-one, one year of college. Unit com-
manders were so dilatory in designating men, however, that Gen. 
George C. Marshall, army chief of staff, issued a stinging memoran-
dum on 1 April1943, insisting that commanders support the program. 
Under such pressure, Army Ground Forces released 3,096 men for a 
cycle starting in May, 5,079 men for a cycle starting in June, and 12,626 
for a cycle starting in July. By 1944 the ASTP involved 150 thousand 
men of military age. II 
Recognizing the damage such personnel turbulence was causing 
units in training, in autumn of 1943 the War Department began draw-
ing ASTP candidates exclusively from the ranks of inductees rather 
than from divisions. New divisions were under effective pressure to 
deliver up ASTP candidates only during the period May through 
October, 1943; units on major maneuvers or already alerted for over-
seas movement were exempted from the program. The 88th Infantry 
16 Draftee Division 
Division departed for maneuvers in June 1943 and was alerted for 
overseas movement shortly thereafter, thus the division commander 
never came under serious pressure to provide ASTP candidates. 12 
Interestingly, in February 1944 General Marshall himself had sec-
ond thoughts about the ASTP. Anticipating the invasion of France and 
lamenting "the number of non-commissioned officers who are below 
satisfactory standards of intelligence and qualities of leadership," Mar-
shall reversed his position and cut the ASTP program by 80 percent in 
three months. 13 
Given the relative disadvantages with respect to AGCT scores and 
the dangers posed by AGCT raiding, Army Ground Forces nev-
ertheless tried to deal equably with subordinate branches in the matter 
of distributing enlisted men of greater and lesser intelligence. Distribu-
tion of AGCT classes to each of the combat branches approximated that 
received by the Army Ground Forces as a whole. Exceptions were 
made for airborne divisions, which had attracted so many low-scoring 
personnel that they were allowed to clear out sufficient numbers of 
Class IV and Class V men to bring themselves up to the average 
intelligence profile .14 
Within the 88th a policy of nonfavoritism continued to apply. If 
there were any special considerations, they were limited to the few 
men identified by the "playing of the needles" during induction. 15 
This was a process whereby component units were allowed to request 
limited numbers of individuals with particular combinations of charac-
teristics-if the units could justify their pressing need for the individu-
als thus requested. As inductees were processed in, each carried a card 
that was punched in different places to represent specific responses or 
items of information generated at the various interviews and stations. 
These cards were later laid over sets of needles arranged in such a 
manner that the cards of inductees with requested combinations ad-
hered and other cards fell away. The information gained from these 
primitive computers went directly to the division adjutant general. 
Some units got what they ordered; others did not. 
Fluctuations in the total number of enlisted personnel available to 
divisions at activation resulted from competing demands upon the 
Selective Service System. A division rarely received all of its draftees, 
or "enlisted fillers," at once; they tended to arrive a few hundred at a 
time over an extended period. The nature of the divisional training 
program prior to its seventeenth week was such that late arrivals could 
integrate into units without disturbing training progress overall. Dur-
ing the first seventeen weeks instruction focused on individual skills; 
latecomers could catch up on these when other troops were reviewing 
skills already learned or enjoying time off. After the seventeenth week 
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the divisional programs moved on to much less flexible unit-training 
phases. The 88th received its final major increment of enlisted fillers in 
October, well within seventeen weeks of the beginning of its training 
on 3 August 1942. Some unfortunate later arrivals missed Christmas 
furloughs, but all caught up without delaying the progress of the 
division. 16 
In at least one respect the piecemeal reception of the fillers seems to 
have worked to the advantage of the division. The first increment of 
troops, drawn mainly from New England, New York, New Jersey, and 
Delaware, had an unusual concentration of technical and admin-
istrative talent. Generally these men filled out the enlisted ranks of the 
division's logistical superstructure, which thus stood intact from an 
early date. Later arrivals, including the second major increment of 
fillers, came from a wide area of the Midwest and Southwest. Loosely 
labeled "Okies," these personnel settled comfortably into less tech-
nical slots. 17 
Once divisions actually began training, the most damaging single 
source of personnel turbulence proved to be the "stripping off" of 
individuals for reassignment to divisions in combat or en route over-
seas. During World War I, draftee divisions often had been broken up 
to provide replacements for other divisions. Replacement training 
depots had existed in 1918, but these had failed to meet the demands of 
combat. Interwar planners hoped to avoid a repetition of this stripping, 
and by September 1941 a system had been developed of replacement 
training centers, which the War Department considered "eminently 
satisfactory." 1 ~'~ 
Unfortunately, the new replacement system was satisfactory only 
during the gradual growth of 1941, and it proved inadequate for the 
massive needs of 1942. Divisions activated so rapidly that their person-
nel requirements dwarfed the capacity of the replacement training 
centers to provide recruits. Rather than sanction further expansion of 
the centers, General Marshall routed draftees directly from reception 
centers to newly created units. 19 The "new" divisions conducted their 
own basic training while "old" divisions continued to receive replace-
ments from the replacement training centers. 
Unfortunately, the replacement centers still could not keep pace 
with mobilization demands and combat losses. Selected divisions un-
derwent stripping in the autumn of 1942 to support the campaign in 
North Africa. Another cycle of almost continuous stripping from Sep-
tember 1943 through September 1944 hampered the training efforts of 
other divisions. One division suffered a cumulative stripping of 22,235 
men. Two divisions, the 76th and 78th infantries, lost their active status 
altogether and served as replacement training centers from September 
18 Draftee Division 
1942 until March 1943. Another twenty-one infantry divisions lost a 
total of 103,244 men to stripping between September 1944 and the end 
of the war. 20 
Again the 88th Infantry Division, its training sandwiched between 
the most hectic period of mobilization and the bloodiest period of 
combat, was fortunate. Its troops had not progressed far enough in 
their training to be considered for the stripping that preceded the 
North African landings. The victims were six National Guard divi-
sions; the 88th subsequently passed five of these in its training cycle. In 
September 1943 the 88th was alerted for overseas movement and thus 
was no longer vulnerable to stripping. That was the very month in 
which the army began its longest and most damaging cycle of person-
nel stripping. Indeed, the 88th itself was filled out with trained replace-
ments stripped from other units. 
Another obstacle to the preparation of ground combat divisions 
originated with "abuses in cadre selection." Draftee divisions were 
organized with the hope that a small cadre of experienced officers and 
enlisted men could train and lead a much larger body of draftees. The 
World War II cadre system was highly structured (see Figure 2). Each 
cadreman had a specific and carefully considered role. A division 
could be as good, and only as good, as its cadre. Unfortunately, new 
divisions did not always receive good cadres. The bulk of a cadre's 
enlisted men usually came from a single parent division. No com-
mander wants to give up good men; the commanders of the parent 
divisions had to balance concern for their own units against loyalty to 
the larger purposes of the army. Too often "the formation of a cadre 
meant a housecleaning." The commanders of several new divisions 
complained that their cadres consisted of rejects from the parent divi-
sion.21 
Insofar as cadre acquisition was concerned, the 88th Infantry Divi-
sion again was fortunate. Maj. Gen. John E. Sloan, the new division 
commander, and Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, commanding general of 
the parent 9th Infantry Division, were longtime friends, and both had 
reputations as perfectionists. Keyes determined to deal fairly with 
Sloan in transferring cadre from his division. Brig. Gen. Stonewall 
Jackson, then the assistant division commander of the 88th, also influ-
enced cadre selection. Jackson had served three tours as an instructor 
in the Infantry School and was personally acquainted with most of 
the officers who commanded in the 9th Infantry Division. The leaders 
of the 9th showed no inclination to shortchange their old friend, 
especially since Jackson traveled to the 9th's cantonment, observed the 
entire cadre selection process, and interviewed most of the candidates. 
An incompetent would have found it difficult to slip past him. 22 
When Sloan himself was called upon for a cadre in February 1943, 
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he gave up men who were as qualified as those he had received. This 
was both proper and wise, for units caught making a housecleaning 
often suffered further turbulence when called upon to replace the 
inadequate cadre they had provided. The commanding general of the 
11th Airborne Division, the division cadred by the 88th, later wrote an 
appreciative letter citing his cadre's quality, which in effect protected 
the 88th from further cadre levies. The 11th Airborne subsequently 
achieved a creditable record of its own, and was the only division to 
surpass the sixteen-month activation-to-embarkation record set by the 
88th. 23 
As he sorted through records reflecting his prospective cadre 
assets-197 cadre officers; 427 OCS officers; and 1,172 enlisted ca-
dremen, of whom most were for "housekeeping" and including fewer 
than two hundred who had been in the army longer than three years-
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in the months before the 88th activated, General Sloan may have 
reflected ruefully back on his own first army assignment. In the hal-
cyon spring of 1911 he had reported to Battery Parrott, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia. The young lieutenant was immediately taken aside by the 
first sergeant, who told him in brogue what a delight it was to see him 
and what a wonderful professional experience Battery Parrott would 
be, provided Sloan observed things from a little distance and didn't get 
in the way of the noncommissioned officers. Lieutenants, said the 
sergeant, were apprentices whose battery-level experiences would be 
wonderful preparation for subsequent positions of high responsibility. 
The NCOs would groom him well and take great pride in his growth 
and achievement. He shouldn't, however, make the mistake of actually 
trying to run things. 24 
Thirty years later, Sloan enjoyed no real counterpart to the tightly 
knit, noncommissioned cadre that ran Battery Parrott. The tiny regular 
army was expanding so rapidly during 1942 that each of the new 
divisions got but a sprinkling of the fabled "leather-lunged" NCOs. At 
best, each company or battery would get one or two, not enough to 
mirror the role of NCOs in the "Old Army." There was no short-term 
solution that could replace the maturity, experience, savvy, and confi-
dence of the older NCOs. 
Most of the NCOs who would lead the draftees of the 88th into 
combat were simply promising young men who moved through the 
ranks a little more quickly than the rest. Many had come from the rank 
and file of the parent 9th Division, and others emerged from the 88th's 
own enlisted filler. There were schools outside the division to train 
technicians, but no formal programs existed for line NCOs. The un-
married NCOs lived, ate, and slept with the men in garrison and in the 
field. They experienced the same training, were about the same age, 
and shared comparable views of their world. They became leaders 
among the men without ever quite being the leadership one step above 
the men. This made them ideal for monitoring health and welfare and 
interceding on behalf of their erstwhile peers, but it could create 
problems with respect to enforcing discipline and pursuing com-
mander's objectives.2s 
Somewhat too much has been made of the fact that draftees, on the 
average, had more education and intellectual "flexibility" than prewar-
vintage NCOs. The old NCOs may have been uneducated, but they 
commanded a specialized body of knowledge that gained them enor-
mous respect given the job at hand. What was more, the asymmetry in 
education may have been true for the army as a whole, but in rifle 
companies the profiles were more nearly equal. At most, a rifle com-
pany contained two or three draftees from AGCT Class I, and first 
sergeants almost invariably snatched them up as company clerks, 
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supply specialists, and the like. These men were protected from ha-
rassment and, in return, they kept company paperwork in order while 
appeasing higher headquarters with morning reports, inventories, 
and other documents. An AGCT Class II was a smart man in an 
infantry platoon, and far more likely than his peers to be considered for 
promotion to corporal or other positions of responsibility. An AGQT 
score proved as good an indicator as any of leadership potential, but 
other factors also caught the eye of senior cadremen: age, social matur-
ity, physical size, energy, and apparent dedication. 26 
It took time and experimentation to identify the best leadership 
selections within a unit. The rude fact is that one cannot accurately 
forecast how an individual will do in a position of responsibility; one 
has to try him out. 27 The 88th was not subject to gross losses of 
personnel, particularly not of high-AGCT personnel, so it was able to 
experiment until it got the best fits possible. Company commanders 
could "bust" any man up to and including their first sergeants, and 
they did so until they got the chain of command they wanted. This led 
to the infamous "blood stripes," rank acquired because some other 
individual had been demoted. It also led to chains of command gener-
ally considered competent. 
The problem remained, nevertheless, that most of the 88th's NCOs 
were engaged in peer leadership. This suggested the need to amend 
traditional officer-NCO relationships. Sloan decided that his officers 
would be more directly involved in matters of discipline and detailed 
guidance than had been the case in the prewar army. He drove himself 
and his subordinates hard, taking an interest in details and conducting 
inspections so closely they were labeled "chicken." On several occa-
sions when he discovered a soldier with field jacket unbuttoned or 
some other minor violation, he called every officer in the offender's 
chain of command-including colonels or brigadier generals-into his 
office. He personally apprehended Pvt. Richard C. Prassel for attempt-
ing to return a library book at an unauthorized time, and again he 
summoned the chain of command. Fortunately for the terrified pri-
vate, as the plot unraveled it turned out that Prassel had been dis-
patched to the library by his own battery commander-who in turn 
took the heat. Sloan's point was that no detail was too minor for an 
officer's attention, and that matters formerly left to NCOs were the 
exclusive province of NCOs no longer. His disciplinary techniques 
were tough, centralized, immediate, and straightforward. He once 
stood an entire battalion at attention in the heat of the day until it came 
up with recompense for watermelons stolen from a farmer's fields. 
There would be no "looting" of civilian property by his division. 2 " 
Sloan viewed the muddying of distinctions between officer and 
NCO roles as a necessity, not a virtue. Officers, however inex-
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perienced, were more distant from the men and thus in a better 
position to enforce discipline. He continued to consider the old divi-
sion of labor-officers responsible for general supervision and tactical 
direction, NCOs responsible for detailed supervision, discipline, 
health, and welfare-as an ideal. As time passed, the division would 
come closer to the old model. In Italy, NCOs who were combat vet-
erans would enjoy a certain prestige over officer and enlisted replace-
ments alike. In practice, each company-grade officer worked out his 
own relationship with his NCOs, approximating the ideal insofar as 
personalities would allow. It took time, and personnel stability, to work 
all this out. It also took considerable attention to officer development. 
One striking aspect of the U.S. Army's World War II growth to a 
strength in excess of eight million was that it was shepherded by a mere 
14,000 professional officers. These eventually were outnumbered forty 
to one by officers drawn from civilian sources: 19,000 from the National 
Guard; 180,000 from the Officers' Reserve Corps and Reserve Officers' 
Training Corps; 100,000 commissioned directly as doctors, dentists, 
chaplains, technicians, and administrators; and 300,000 graduates of 
officer candidate or aviation cadet schools. Most of the National 
Guardsmen and about half of the reserves received a modicum of 
military experience in the limited mobilization preceding Pearl Harbor. 
The rest were as new to the army as the privates they were called upon 
to lead. 2 '! 
The 88th's complement of officers reflected these profiles. Of 197 
cadre officers, about 60 were experienced soldiers. Shortly before 
activation, 427 OCS graduates joined the division. This latter number 
grew by approximately half over the next six months when the War 
Department cut back its proposed total of divisions and found it had an 
excess of junior officers on hand. Some of the young officers proved 
unfit, but most were bright, consumed with a sense of mission, end 
quick to learn. In 1942 the army had the largest and most qualified slice 
of America's junior executive talent that it had ever had. This phe-
nomenon did not go unnoticed by the senior officers, who nev-
ertheless approached the task of training a body of apprentices twelve 
times their number as serious business. 30 The senior officers proved to 
be relentless pedagogues, a characteristic captured in a ditty popular 
among the younger officers: "Swing and sway with Sammy Kaye, I 
Moan and groan with General Sloan." 
Here an examination of General Sloan's background is in order, 
both because of his role in the division and because of the extent to 
which he epitomized soldiers of his vintage. 31 John Emmitt Sloan was 
born into a prosperous Greenville, South Carolina, family in 1887. He 
was a direct descendant of Capt. David Sloan of the American Revolu-
tion. His grandfather, Lt. John B. Sloan, CSA, was killed in 1862 in the 
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Peninsular Campaign. John E. attended public schools and Furman 
University, and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 
1910. Sea duty was not as much to his liking as gunnery, so he 
transferred into the Coast Artillery in 1911. He served in Coast Artil-
lery assignments, including Panama, until July 1917, when the de-
mands of World War I suggested the conversion of coast artillerymen to 
field artillerymen. During World War I he attended Fort Sill's Field 
Artillery School as a student, taught in it as an instructor, and activated 
and commanded the 30th Field Artillery of the lOth Division. This unit 
did not get overseas before the war ended. 
Between the wars Sloan served in the Chesapeake Bay Coast 
Defenses; commanded the 17th Field Artillery at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina; served as executive officer of the 13th Field Artillery and 11th 
Field Artillery Brigade in Hawaii; commanded the 76th Field Artillery 
in Monterey, California; and, as prewar mobilization progressed, suc-
cessively organized and trained the division artilleries of the 7th and 
8th Infantry Divisions. He attended the field artillery advanced course 
in 1924, was a distinguished graduate of the Command and General 
Staff School in 1926, and graduated from the Army War College in 
1932. He also served a tour as professor of military science and tactics at 
Texas A & M College; a tour as instructor in the Command and General 
Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and a tour as professor of 
military science and tactics at Oregon State College. In addition, he 
organized and commanded a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) 
camp. If he had a professional "break," it may have been the recogni-
tion he received organizing and conducting the umpire school for a 
major army field tactical exercise in the summer of 1939.32 
Patterns that emerge in Sloan's biography include appreciable 
troop duty, twelve years as an instructor in army schools or ROTC, and 
the number of occasions in which he created new organizations where 
none had existed. Troop duty, particularly command, is the most 
important experience in any army. Sloan had been among the troops at 
each rank from lieutenant through brigadier general for a total of 
fourteen years. Instructor duty also sharpened professional skills: it is 
almost a tautology that teachers learn more than their students. The 
opportunity military instructors have to reflect on military topics pro-
vides invaluable professional development, and for Sloan, instructor 
duty paid off in other ways. When teaching in the command and 
general staff school from 1932 to 1936, he had the opportunity to meet, 
teach, and size up many of his future subordinates and peers. Duties 
with ROTC exposed him when in his forties to the very generation that 
would make up his OCS contingents. He understood these young men 
and what it took to develop them. He knew the difference between 
training, which is appropriate for units, and education, which is appro-
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priate for one's eventual successors; words like patronage and men-
torship fall under the province of the latter heading. 
Sloan had created an organization out of thin air on five occasions: 
the 30th Field Artillery in World War I, the CCC camp, the Fourth Army 
Umpire School, and the 7th and 8th Infantry Division Artilleries. He 
had never activated and trained an entire division before, but he 
certainly knew something about the process. 
Generals Marshall and McNair considered the selection of cadre 
for new divisions one of their most important missions. 33 Together 
these chiefs of staff picked the division commanders and ruled on 
nominations for regimental commanders and primary staffs. A further 
forty-six officers in each division were chosen by the heads of branches 
and services for such key positions as battalion command. The remain-
ing cadre officers, generally majors or company grade, were less-
experienced men nominated by the parent division or its army head-
quarters. The resulting sixty officers formed the true nucleus of the 
88th's cadre. 
Sloan was fortunate in his immediate subordinates. 34 Brig. Gen. 
Stonewall Jackson had served three tours in the Infantry School and 
had provided invaluable personal insights during the organization of 
the cadre. When Jackson was selected to command the 84th Infantry 
Division, the equally dynamic Paul W. Kendall, "Bull," took his place as 
assistant division commander. Brigadier General Kendall proved an 
ideal alter ego for Sloan. Sloan was a career artilleryman, with all of the 
technical and logistical orientation that implied. Kendall was a veteran 
infantryman who had earned the Distinguished Service Cross while a 
member of the Siberian expedition of 1918-1919. Kendall characterized 
himself as not as smart as Sloan, but he had keen tactical instincts that 
carried him into the thick of the fighting. He would engage in such 
heroism as crossing the Rapido River under fire to extricate 36th 
Infantry Division troops he was supposed to be observing, and he 
characteristically accompanied the flying columns Sloan detached 
from the division. 
At the regimental level one found younger men of a similar stamp. 
The 349th's Col. James A. Landreth, an experienced infantryman, was 
noted for hs systematic, no-nonsense approach and utterly unflappa-
ble nature. Col. Charles P. Lynch took command of the 350th Infantry 
Regiment, the same unit with which he had served in World War I. 
(The World War I 88th Infantry Division, also draftee, had been as-
signed to a quiet sector but had managed to harry the Germans 
through appreciable combat patrolling.) Colonel Lynch's son would 
die commanding a company of the 350th in Italy. The 351st's Col. 
ArthurS. Champeny had won the Distinguished Service Cross leading 
infantry in France during World War I; he would win another leading 
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his regiment in Italy and yet another commanding a regiment in Korea. 
Winning a Distinguished Service Cross in each of three wars is an 
unusual achievement. Colonel Champeny replaced Col. William W. 
Eagles, who commanded the 351st briefly before being promoted out 
of the job. Eagles rose to command of the distinguished 45th Infantry 
Division, a testimony of his caliber. The division artillery commander, 
Brig. Gen. Guy 0. Kurtz, came to the 88th from service on high-level 
staffs. In particular, he had distinguished himself working for the chief 
of field artillery, and he was generally regarded as one of the most 
knowledgeable and current of his generation of artillery officers. 
Chief of Staff Col. Weyland B. Augur, a masterful organizer, pulled 
together the division staff and its logistical establishment. When Au-
gur, a cavalryman, left the division to organize a mechanized cavalry 
brigade, his G-3 (operations and training officer), Col. Robert J. 
McBride, moved up to replace him. McBride was quiet, competent, 
and diligent. He also proved to be an accomplished diplomat-or "flak 
absorber." When Sloan or Kendall flew into one of their occasional 
rages, McBride contrived to defer action until tempers cooled and 
reason prevailed. Conversely, when one of the subordinate comman-
ders felt an impulse to share strong words with the generals, McBride 
preemptively corralled the individual in isolated conversation until he 
himself resolved the problem or at least until he was confident the 
pending exchange would take a moderate tone. In the day-to-day tasks 
of coordinating staff officers and logisticians, patience and firmness 
were McBride's trademarks. McBride was chief of staff from December 
1942 through August 1946; thus, for four years he was an important 
source of stability and the renderer of an invaluable service-keeping 
the division's assertive personalities from bruising each other too 
badly. 
Within the larger body of branch- and service-selected officers 
were even younger versions of the same professional caliber as the 
division's generals and colonels. 35 All of the sixty senior cadremen had 
seen appreciable troop duty, and all had attended the army school 
system insofar as was appropriate to their prewar rank. Most had also 
taught in ROTC and army schools. Thus they knew the generation that 
would provide company-grade officers of World War II, and they had 
polished their professional knowledge while in an academic setting. 
The sixty experienced cadre officers would educate a contingent of 
officers twelve times their number. These would in turn train the 
division. Given time, the senior officers were fully qualified to develop 
the junior officers, shuffle them around a bit, and get the right men in 
the right jobs. Americans may have been unprepared for World War II, 
but in their senior officers they quickly fielded an impressive combina-
tion of qualifierl mentors. 
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World War II U.S. Army personnel policies have been criticized as 
detrimental to the development of discipline, leadership, morale, and 
cohesion. Much of this criticism is misleading because it stems from 
inflated images of the German Wehrmacht, or from sociological and 
psychological analyses that have no foreign counterpart. We simply do 
not know how the attitude, motivation, and aehavior of our soldiers 
compared with those of foreign troops. We do know that our divisions 
had differing personnel experiences, however, and little that has been 
written takes those differences into account. The Army Ground Forces 
divisional training program was a conscious effort at team building, 
designed to enhance morale, cohesion, discipline, and leadership. It 
envisioned a carefully chosen cadre, personnel stability, and about 
twelve months of unmolested training time. We have seen why per-
sonnel turbulence afflicted so many divisions and why the 88th es-
caped the worst of it. The 88th demonstrated the personnel system as it 
was intended to work. So did the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 9th, 29th, 37th, 40th, 
41st, 85th, 91st, and 98th infantry divisions-all highly regarded units. 
Recognizing that too few divisions enjoyed stateside personnel sta-
bility, it should be noted that one that did was able to develop disci-
pline, leadership, morale, and cohesion. 36 
Morale is a slippery word that defies precise definition. One au-
thoritative study suggests it comes in several guises: sense of well-
being, sense of obligation, job satisfaction, and approval or criticism of 
the unit. Insofar as sense of well-being was concerned, the draftees of 
the 88th, summarily off-loaded from trains into Camp Gruber, 
Oklahoma, were no better off than other conscripts. They didn't want 
to be in the army, didn't want to fight overseas, didn't want to risk 
death or injury, didn't want to suffer physical hardship, and didn't 
want someone always telling them what to do-in short, they were true 
to American tradition. What was more, they disliked the food, de-
spised the living accommodations, and were lonely and homesick. 
Fortunately, none of this mattered much because there was a war on 
and neither they nor anybody else expected them to be thoroughly 
happy.37 
Another aspect of morale, sense of obligation, proved more impor-
tant in the 88th. American public support for the war effort was 
unquestioned. However much they might have preferred that some-
one else carry the burden, the draftees thought they were doing the 
right thing. To quote one Pvt. William S. Frederick, "I would like to be 
back home, but the country seems to have a job to do and I guess I 
might as well help as anybody. "3H This sense of purpose was generally 
vague; less than one in seven of the draftees could name three of the 
"Four Freedoms," and few could give a coherent discussion of the 
genesis of the war. Orientation classes and "Why We Fight" films were 
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supposed to redress this lack of information, but troops absorbed such 
formal presentation in bits and pieces, at best. For example, the orienta-
tion program gave considerable attention to Brazil's entry into the war; 
Brazil demonstrated the unanimity of the civilized world in opposing 
Axis aggression. Nevertheless, when the 88th Infantry Division first 
fought alongside the Brazilian Expeditionary Force more than a few 
befuddled Cis wondered who these strange people were, what lan-
guage they were speaking, and why they were drawing on American 
supplies. 39 
General Sloan's cadre could not reverse the draftee's general indif-
ference to formal orientation programs, but over time it could subtly 
reinforce a sense of righteousness. Sloan was straightforward in enlist-
ing the assistance of army chaplains and civilian clergy. He had long 
considered the pulpit an appropriate platform for mobilizing support 
in just causes. In the circumstances of World War II, many clergymen 
agreed with him. 40 Senior officers of the division also diligently pro-
moted the war effort through speaking engagements in front of such 
organizations as local chapters of the American Legion, the Kiwanis 
Club, and the Shriners. They then enlisted these patriotic citizens to do 
such things as have a few soldiers over for dinner. It was a soldier's 
dream come true: a few hours relief from the regimen of camp life, a 
home-cooked meal-generally turkey-and the opportunity to chat 
with the father of the house about how depraved the Axis powers were 
and how badly they were going to be whipped. It didn't hurt at all if a 
few admiring youngsters sat in on the conversation. Army regulation 
insisted that soldiers wear their uniforms off post. In the nearest town, 
Muskogee, Oklahoma, they encountered a supportive atmosphere on 
the streets. This is not to mention the letters, gifts, and boxes of cookies 
from home. Everything the soldiers read, the Saturday Evening Post in 
the dayroom, for example, supported the war effort. 41 Movies, news 
clips, radio broadcasts, and commercial advertising all carried suppor-
tive themes. However vague their understanding of World War II 
might have been, the draftees of the 88th had no doubt who was 
fighting for freedom and justice against tyranny and oppression. 
The sense of purpose that developed in the 88th took time in 
maturing. The drumfire of signals reinforcing attitudes soldiers were 
already disposed to believe influenced different men at different rates. 
Ultimately, veterans of a year at Camp Gruber accepted that they had 
obligations as members of an organization mobilized for a worthy 
purpose. Their sense of virtue could be reinforced by chance. In May 
1943 catastrophic floods inundated the Muskogee area. The 88th's 
313th Engineer Battalion, with attached pontoon companies and boats, 
snatched twelve hundred civilians from the torrent. Other units 
housed, fed, and provided medical support to seventeen hundred 
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others. 42 1t was morale-enhancing to do good in the world-and to find 
an ever more supportive atmosphere among local civilians. 
Then, too, many of the draftees were at a very impressionable age, 
not quite adult. A single encounter could have an enormous effect. 
Private Sam Lepofsky, a medic, was quietly sorting through personal 
gear one day when General Sloan himself walked into his room. 
Lepofsky and everyone else assumed the posture, part attention and 
part petrification, customary when someone of unusual rank invades a 
soldier's space. Sloan looked around a little, walked up very closely to 
Lepofsky, and said, "You know, son, we're counting on you. Someday 
you'll make the difference between men living or dying." To this day 
Lepofsky remembers the brief encounter as a significant emotional 
event, the first time he had ever thought of himself as doing something 
important. 43 Lepofsky went on to become a medical platoon sergeant 
highly regarded for his energy-and occasional fisticuffs-in getting 
the job done. 
Sloan depended heavily upon his officers to provide examples of 
commitment. He was a firm believer in that portion of War Department 
Field Manual 21-50 (Military Courtesy and Discipline, 1942) that read: 
There is a tendency on the part of a few officers to think too 
much of the personal benefits which they may derive from 
their status as an officer. In the interests of good discipline 
officers are required to wear distinctive uniforms, to live apart 
from their men in garrison, and to confine their social contacts 
to other officers. But do not make the mistake of thinking 
yourself as a superior individual; rather, regard yourself as one 
who has been accorded certain aids in order that he might best 
carry out the responsibilities of his office. In your relations 
with your men in the field never demand any bodily comforts 
for yourself which are denied to them. Think of yourself only 
after your men have been cared for. 
This ideal was not always easily achieved. Soldiers were disposed 
to believe officers took advantage of their positions, 44 so it was impor-
tant not only to be fair in fact, but also to be fair in appearance. All other 
things being equal, for example, officers are likely to get more mileage 
out of time off than privates. They have more money, are in better 
position to foresee opportunities, have the rank and administrative 
savvy to assure that the necessary paperwork stays straight, and may 
be in the habit of making more elaborate plans. This is not to mention 
hidden advantages rank brings when pursuing women or making 
financial arrangements. Sloan rode herd on his junior officers to see 
that their behavior was fair both in fact and in appearance. 
A case in point seems to have been the Christmas season of 1942. 
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Plans for parties perked and bubbled along among the officers and 
their wives, yet an increment of soldiers that had training to make up 
was to get no furlough, and many draftees bleakly faced their first 
Christmas away from home. Sloan saw to it that local women's organi-
zations had the names of all personnel remaining at Gruber. The 
women made sure that every soldier got a Christmas dinner invitation 
and boxes with gifts, cookies, and candy. Meanwhile, Sloan circulated 
a letter noting that frivolity was customary during the holidays and that 
if officers wanted to participate, they could. However, since there was a 
war on and so many of his comrades were already overseas-some 
having already made "the final sacrifice"-he himself would not feel 
comfortable indulging; he was going to stay home, so don't invite him, 
it said. In a rippling effect, many of his subordinates discovered they 
also would be uncomfortable if partying too heavily, and the officers' 
more elaborate plans fizzled. The net result was that the enlisted and 
the commissioned Christmas seasons were equivalently modest exper-
iences-and that a number of junior officers considered Sloan a killjoy. 
The point was, no matter how innocent an officer's intentions, he must 
measure his every act against how it will appear to his troops. 45 
Another factor affecting the morale of the 88th Infantry Division 
was job satisfaction. Given that few of the draftees would have chosen 
to be in the army, it nevertheless proved possible to move many into 
jobs wherein their talents could be used. One must remember that the 
88th's table of organization did call for over eight thousand in-
fantrymen, and those jobs would be filled-with luck, by men who 
were satisfied with them. Many fared well as riflemen, a role that had 
the advantage of some machismo. The division structure also con-
tained 60 technical sergeants, 173 staff sergeants, and 3,912 rated 
specialists. 46 Upon induction the draftees had encountered a some-
what hasty physical, the Army General Classification Test, and an 
elaborate effort to identify usable skills. 47 These initial records pro-
vided receiving units with information of considerable value when 
making initial assignments. The 788th Ordnance Light Maintenance 
Company was, for example, the direct product of induction efforts to 
identify mechanics and mechanical aptitude. 
The most valuable commodity in getting the right man into the 
right job was time. Given personnel stability, the cadre of the 88th had 
time to try men out in various positions, to shuffle them around, and to 
see who worked out best where. Most jobs were modest in their 
technical demands, and few draftees had much of an initial idea what 
any of them were like. Experimentation led to the best fit possible 
among talent, temperament, and task. This settling-in process would 
have been impossible had the 88th experienced the personnel tur-
bulence of other divisions. 
30 Draftee Division 
Insofar as approval or criticism of the 88th was concerned, at first 
the draftees did not take the division itself seriously. Rumor had it that 
"this outfit is just a replacement division-it'll never leave Gruber."48 
This was a recognition of the fate of so many World War I draftee 
divisions. General Sloan tried to set aside these doubts and conjured 
up an exciting nickname, "Ranger Division." The draftees did not like 
that one-perhaps it sounded too enthusiastic-and the whole 
"ranger" promotional scheme fizzled. Not until the fighting in Italy 
would the division gain a nickname everybody liked, "Blue Devils." 
Confidence that the 88th was truly a combat outfit grew slowly. As 
the division progressed steadily from individual training through 
squad, platoon, company, battalion, regimental combat team, and 
division maneuvers, the men became increasingly convinced that they 
were actually going to fight as a unit. Because few people left, the 
division got high marks on proficiency tests, and events seemed to be 
moving steadily in the direction of deployment as a unit, soldiers had 
less and less reason to doubt that they would be fighting alongside the 
men with whom they were training. 49 The growing conviction that the 
88th would actually fight seems to have reached a climax when Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, en route to Mexico, stopped by Camp 
Gruber for a visit. Characteristically, he gave considerable attention to 
being among the troops. He ate supper with 208 enlisted men, artfully 
chosen for their esprit and breadth of geographical origin, and four 
officers. If the president himself spoke of them as a fighting outfit, why 
shouldn't they consider themselves one?50 
As was the case with morale, unit cohesion, too, took time to 
develop. As with any other unit, cohesion in the 88th built up from the 
bottom. Men felt their strongest loyalties to the handfuls of men near-
est them, and the intensity of their commitment diminished with 
vertical and lateral organizational distance. For most, the day-to-day 
significance of being in the 88th was that it distinguished one from 
members of other organizations that were increasingly regarded as 
"riffraff." The truly strong bonds were to the immediate, or primary, 
group. 5 1 
One of the 88th's policies took advantage of the social mechanics 
involved in developing cohesion. 52 When the division was first 
organizing, the temptation existed to have the few cadremen who 
knew a specific topic teach it on a mass scale, or to rotate groups of 
soldiers past such individuals organized as teaching committees. This 
would be efficient and would provide time to further train OCS gradu-
ates and prospective junior NCOs. Sloan would have none of it; he 
insisted that instruction and leadership be in the hands of the chain of 
command at all levels from the first day of training. His formula was to 
have the knowledgeable men teach night classes for the apprentice 
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leadership in whatever they were next going to need to know, then to 
have these junior leaders teach their own troops the same subjects the 
following day. Fortunately, the technical subjects proceeded from sim-
ple to complex, and the junior leaders could stay a little ahead of their 
men. There are hazards involved in training through minimally 
qualified instructors, but the chain of command was visibly present 
and in control from the beginning. The policy seems to have worked. 
When Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair visited Gruber, he cited morale indica-
tors as "exceptionally good" and commented approvingly that "when 
spoken to, individuals were prompt in their replies. Junior officers 
were conducting instruction enthusiastically and with assurance."53 
The American army has come under some criticism for scrambling 
men of diverse geographical origins together. 54 This mixing is alleged 
to have interfered with the development of cohesion. It seems, how-
ever, that region of origin was not much of a deterrent in forming strong 
friendships and close primary group ties. People from the same state 
can hate each other, and regional origin seems to have less to do with 
personal identity in twentieth-century America than does such consid-
erations as social class, educational level, or vocation. No veteran I have 
interviewed considered the geographical origins of his comrades a 
problem-unless there was a language barrier as well. An endearing 
example of the opposite being true occurred in Italy when the 88th had 
to quickly conjure up mule-pack liaison teams for logistical support in 
the tortuous terrain. This effort threw together Missouri farm boys, 
who knew mules, with Italian-Americans, who knew the local lan-
guage. The unlikely comrades took to each other, and the urbanite 
Italian-Americans took great pleasure in acquainting the Missourians 
with "the ways of the world," as embodied in lyrics attributed to Pfc. 
Sam Petralia:55 
Hey, Paesano! Have you gotta the vino? 
I gotta the chocolate, cigarette, caramele; 
Signorina, tu sei molta bella, 
I gotta the chocolate, cigarette, caramele. 
In 1942, however, Italy was months down the road and yet to be 
imagined by the men of Camp Gruber. Given the stability of its person-
nel situation and the qualities of its cadre, the 88th Infantry Division 
was in a good position to sort through difficulties and train itself. It 
needed time to shape amalgams of men into combat units, and time it 
got. Alas, the 88th was one of relatively few divisions for which this 
held true. Largely through luck, it avoided the crippling personnel 
traumas experienced by other army units. Activated too late to be 
stripped in support of OCS or North Africa, the division embarked too 
early to be stripped for ASTP or in support of the battles in Europe. It 
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received its fair share of talented cadre and enlisted filler, and its senior 
officers were uniquely qualified to train junior officers and cadremen. 
All factors considered, in personnel matters the 88th represented an 
ideal case for a World War II draftee division. 
Why did so few other divisions enjoy such good fortune in person-
nel matters? One answer has been that American manpower arrange-
ments suffered a period of chaos before they stabilized and 
mobilization "matured." That was not the case; American manpower 
arrangements remained in chaos throughout the war. 56 Indeed, the 
situation got worse, not better, and Army Ground Forces ultimately 
would consider the last division embarked to have been, through no 
fault of its own, the least prepared of all. 57 It is impossible to exaggerate 
the effect of personnel turbulence upon the efficient use of military 
manpower. All other personnel considerations fade in significance 
when compared to this single factor. Despite the War Department's 
failure to adequately forecast requirements for individual replace-
ments, it remains difficult to understand the extent of the personnel 
turbulence that afflicted so many divisions while they were in the 
United States. Perhaps too many cooks were stirring the wartime 
broth. 
3 _____ _ 
Training: Honing the Edge 
In a retrospective report on Army Ground Forces activities during 
World War II, Gen. Jacob L. Devers, the postwar commander of Army 
Ground Forces, expressed satisfaction with the training programs the 
draft divisions had undergone. His report acknowledged that person-
nel turbulence had impaired the training of these divisions, but it 
nevertheless held that the programs had been eminently satisfactory 
overall and had required few changes, except in matters of detail, 
throughout the war. The wartime army chief of staff, Gen. George C. 
Marshall, agreed and in particular cited the battlefield performances of 
the 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions. 1 
Marshall's own policies had made it essential that the training of 
the new divisions be comprehensive and thorough. 2 In January 1942 
he decided not to expand the capacity of replacement training centers, 
although at that time these could barely provide sufficient personnel to 
those established divisions that already had a priority on replace-
ments. Another of Marshall's policies directed that any voluntary 
enlistee be sent to the replacement training center appropriate to his 
chosen branch of service. The effect of these two policies during 1942 
was that established divisions received, for the most part, voluntary 
enlistees who were basic training graduates from replacement training 
centers, while the new divisions received draftees who had had no 
training at alJ.3 The training programs of the new divisions necessarily 
worked, as the expression went, "from the ground up." 
On balance, the assessments of Devers and Marshall concerning 
the successes of the divisional training program were accurate. Tiny 
cadres of professionals had in fact used these programs to shape 
masses of untrained draftees into units whose combat performance 
measured up to standards set by the older divisions. The training 
programs for the new divisions were not without shortcomings, how-
ever. Cadremen were better prepared for some responsibilities than for 
others; some blocks of instruction were poorly taught or inappropriate; 
and serious omissions existed in the program as a whole. The 88th 
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Infantry Division itself would demonstrate the strengths and weak-
nesses of the training program it had undergone. 
A striking characteristic of American training programs during 
World War II was the extent to which they were run from the center. 
The concept of geographically dispersed units supervised in their 
training by a single headquarters was hardly new,4 but in the United 
States of 1942-1945 a combination of affluence and technology made 
possible a training program far more centralized than any before. 
In former wars, commanders and senior staff representatives could 
visit dispersed training camps only after tedious journeys. In World 
War II the general use of the airplane allowed quick access to units in 
training. Liaison planes were available down to the division level-the 
higher the level of command, of course, the more extensive the aviation 
assets. Ever-present automobiles and command vehicles sped visitors 
from airfields to training sites. In 1942, Army Ground Forces teams 
could adequately inspect a training camp per day of travel; they became 
so sophisticated that they filled two large planes for a single major 
inspection. One planeload of senior officers attended ceremonies and 
gathered general impressions, while junior officers from a second 
plane conducted detailed inspections within their staff areas of respon-
sibility. During its first four months the 88th Infantry Division was 
inspected by the commanding generals of its corps, army, and service 
command, as well as by the commanding general of Army Ground 
Forces, Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair. Another facet, of course, was the 
frequent presence of senior staff officers in the divisional training area, 
Camp Gruber, Oklahoma. 5 
One might have expected the division's leadership to resent so 
much attention. Apparently it did not. 6 The prewar army had been so 
small that the officers who made up the "visiting brass" and those who 
made up the "local brass" usually knew each other personally. If not, 
the inspecting teams-known as "feather merchants"-visited often 
enough to develop acquaintances in short order. The inspection teams 
did provide a genuine service; they were designed not merely to insure 
compliance with regulations and guidance, but also to identify prob-
lem areas with respect to logistics, personnel, and training. The 88th 
received valuable logistical assistance as a result of these inspections. 7 
Inspections became a means whereby units could communicate both 
their needs and their accomplishments. Commanders wanted their 
superiors to see what they were doing well and to understand their 
problems firsthand. 8 The magnitude of the tasks facing headquarters 
at all levels tended to preclude pettiness in relations among them. 
Improved transportation further influenced training by allowing 
the shuttling of personnel to and from special schools. The initial 
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training of the cadre was the most important case in point, but selected 
personnel also traveled to attend courses in such subjects as land 
fortifications (taught at Fort Belvoir, Virginia) and antitank warfare 
(taught at Fort Hood, Texas). Instructors also shuttled into Camp 
Gruber-veterans of the North African fighting, for example-to share 
their experiences with the trainees. 
Efficient transportation facilitated the supervision of training with-
in the division. The table of organization for 1941 allowed 212 light 
command vehicles, more than enough to provide a vehicle to every 
commander and field grade officer. Division and regimental staffs 
could observe dispersed training activities daily and still fulfill admin-
istrative responsibilities at their several headquarters. Commanders 
covered ground quickly and were apt to turn up anywhere. Junior 
officers seldom found themselves isolated from several echelons of 
training supervision. 9 
The division's table of organization called for 1,622 vehicles in 
addition to the command vehicles. Because more than half of these 
were cargo trucks suitable for transporting troops, the 88th could 
readily truck troops, and thus save time, when traveling to outlying 
training facilities. Army Ground Forces found it could economize by 
locating special training facilities in such a manner that they could be 
reached by truck from several divisional cantonments. An example of 
such a facility was a mock European village in Camp Bullis, Texas. 
Troops trucked in to experience realistic training for urban warfare: 
movements through narrow streets, breaking into buildings, live-fire 
engagements with pop-up targets, and overhead machine-gun fire 
amidst TNT artillery simulators. 10 
Improvements in communications paralleled improvements in 
transportation. At the higher levels of command, telephone con-
ferences allowed geographically scattered officers to participate in 
decisions without leaving their own headquarters. As was the case 
with inspections, telephone conversations deepened the personal and 
professional relationships of the officers involved. Within the division 
camp improved communications had similar effects. Camp Gruber had 
telephones installed in all offices down to and including company 
headquarters. Information could be communicated through telephone 
calls or, in unusual circumstances, through radio messages. Altera-
tions in training schedules, unanticipated changes in the status of 
facilities, newly approved subject matter, and weather reports quickly 
reached the lowest echelons of command.n 
Training films were another innovation that lent themselves to a 
centralized training program. In 1942, Army Ground Forces set out to 
produce training films that would "hold the interest of trainees long 
accustomed to viewing the finest Hollywood productions." 12 It is 
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doubtful that the draftees appreciated the moving parts of the M-1 
Garand rifle as much as the moving parts of Betty Grable, but the films 
did prove an asset in assuring uniform instruction at a time when 
qualified instructors were spread so thinly. Films also gave troops 
vicarious exposure to equipment too valuable or too scarce for alloca-
tion to training camps. To show these films Camp Gruber had five 
military theaters, and the 88th Infantry Division had an additional 
movie facility in each of its regimental areas. 13 
The Army Ground Forces training program also depended upon 
printed materials for dissemination. Since the nineteenth century the 
War Department had published training guides of one sort or another. 
During World War II the stock titles of field manuals and similar 
publications tripled. Changes in these materials were not merely quan-
titative; Army Ground Forces developed a genre of training literature 
tailored to the perceived requirements and interests of the draftees. 
This new literature was considered innovative by the virtue of its 
"comprehensible" writing and its extensive use of photographs, il-
lustrations, and drawings. If Army Ground Forces planners expected 
the draftees themselves to do much reading in their new field manuals, 
however, they must have been disappointed. Still, officers and NCOs 
training the troops read the new manuals and incorporated them into 
training activities. The general availability of this literature did much to 
standardize training across the country. 14 
All the developments discussed above enhanced the ability of 
Army Ground Forces to supervise training, but no development was 
more important in this regard than the detailed, highly structured, and 
unit-specific Army Training Program (ATP), initially called the Mobi-
lization Training Program (MTP). Developed on the premise that sim-
ilar units should be trained in accordance with a common plan against 
common standards, the ATP epitomized the determination of Army 
Ground Forces to run its war from the center. For infantry divisions, 
the ATP provided four major blocks of instruction: basic and individual 
training (seventeen weeks), unit training (thirteen weeks), combined 
arms training (fourteen weeks), and maneuvers (eight weeks). 15 
Each of these blocks allocated a week to standardized proficiency 
tests administered by a higher headquarters. Divisions could not ad-
vance from one block into the next without having passed these tests. 
Units that failed usually had to repeat the entire block of instruction, 
sometimes under a new commander. In the 88th Infantry Division, 
basic and individual training concluded with tests administered by X 
Corps and the Third Army. Unit training concluded with a physical 
training test administered by X Corps, a platoon combat firing test 
administered by the division commander, and artillery battery and 
Training 37 
battalion firing tests administered by X Corps and the Third Army. 
Combined arms training concluded with battalion field exercises and 
combat firing tests administered by X Corps and Third Army. The 
division's final maneuvers were observed by the Army Ground Forces 
itself. Tests were rigorous, demanding, and instructive. In all of them 
the 88th did well. 16 
Ostensibly, the training publications of the Army Ground Forces 
were aids to division commanders, not absolute directives. The rigor of 
the proficiency tests and the consequences to a commander's career 
should his unit fail them discouraged straying from approved pro-
grams. However, these programs did in fact prepare a unit to pass its 
proficiency tests. Insofar as the skills necessary to pass the proficiency 
tests were those needed in combat, they prepared a unit for combat as 
weli.l7 
In an earlier era this elaborate program of proficiency testing 
would have been physically impossible. In World War II proficiency 
testing combined with improved transportation, frequent inspections, 
continual staff visits, improved communications, audiovisual aids, and 
a massive publishing effort to create military training that was at once 
more extensive and more centralized than ever before. It greatly in-
creased the ability of a few experienced men to direct the training of a 
much larger mass. 
Given the extent to which General Marshall and his immediate 
subordinates intended to supervise the training of the new divisions, it 
is not surprising that a division's program started even before the first 
draftee set foot in its cantonment. Preactivation training prepared 
officers and enlisted cadre in accordance with detailed Army Ground 
Forces guidelines. The idea of building a unit around a trained nucleus 
of cadremen was not new, but systematic preactivation training for 
cadremen appeared for the first time in the War Department's activa-
tion plans of January 1942. Preactivation training fell under three 
headings: the training of cadre officers, the training of noncadre of-
ficers, and the training of the enlisted cadre. 18 
The cadre officers, of whom the 88th Infantry Division received 
197, attended special courses appropriate to the positions they were to 
fill. 19 General Sloan and twelve officers of his senior staff attended a 
month of instruction at Command and General Staff School (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas). The assistant division commander and ninety-
one infantry officers attended a month of instruction at Infantry School 
(Fort Benning, Georgia). The division artillery commander joined thir-
ty-one artillery officers for a month of instruction at Field Artillery 
School (Fort Sill, Oklahoma). Smaller contingents of officers scattered 
to one-month courses at the engineer school (Fort Belvoir, Virginia), the 
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quartermaster school (Fort Lee, Virginia), the medical field service 
school (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania), the signal school (Fort Mon-
mouth, New Jersey), and the cavalry school (Fort Riley, Kansas). 
More significant than the wide geographic scope of this schooling 
was the centralizing purpose it served. Cadre officers of the 88th had 
already attended the military schools appropriate to their prewar 
ranks. This earlier schooling had provided a somewhat broad and 
general preparation.20 In April1942 the 88th's cadre officers attended 
courses designed to prepare them individually for their new positions. 
These officers knew the positions to which they were to be assigned 
and they learned exactly what Army Ground Forces expected of them 
in those positions. 21 Despite a certain lack of experience with respect to 
mechanized warfare and vehicular maintenance, the 88th's officer 
cadre was, all factors considered, as highly trained and proficient as the 
circumstances of the time allowed. 22 These officers had had a variety of 
assignments in a prewar army that, although small, had been highly 
professional. Many had been instructors in military schools. This 
pedagogical experience proved of considerable value when training 
the noncadre junior officers. 
During the week of 19 June 1942, 427 officer candidate school 
graduates joined the 88th's cadre officers at Camp Gruber. Officer 
candidate schools experienced problems throughout the war, but their 
program of instruction seems to have prepared the candidates about as 
well as thirteen weeks would allow. As a group, the graduates proved 
intelligent and technically competent, although often deficient in their 
understanding of tactics and in their "feel" for leadership.23 
Largely because of lack of time-less than three weeks separated 
the arrival of the OCS contingent from the arrival of the draftees-
General Sloan's training program for junior officers did not imme-
diately address either tactics or leadership. Instead, it first emphasized 
technical subjects and subjects due to appear early in the troop training 
program. This reinforced the technical background developed during 
OCS and anticipated a training strategy Sloan had found effective 
when activating earlier units. For several months after activation the 
division's junior officers taught the troops blocks of material they 
themselves had only recently learned. As training progressed, the 
junior officers attended night classes covering the subjects they would 
teach next. When tactics became pertinent-during the unit training 
block-tactics became part of the junior officer's extra-duty training 
program. It is no exaggeration to say that the junior officers of the 88th 
were part-time students who were just a step ahead of their troops 
throughout the training cycle. 24 
The training program for the junior officers served its purpose in 
that from the outset they served as both leaders and instructors. At 
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each phase they knew as much as they needed to know at the time. This 
arrangement developed professional expertise and leadership experi-
ence simultaneously. Although it did not provide many opportunities 
for analysis or reflection, it did further centralize the entire program. 
No training could be more standardized than that in which fledglings 
received instruction mere days before they repeated it to their stu-
dents. 
Sloan's training program for his junior officers succeeded in part 
because enlisted cadremen carried most of the burdens of administra-
tion and logistics, thus freeing junior officers for training and supervi-
sion. The enlisted cadre included senior NCOs actively involved in the 
training of the draftees, but most enlisted cadremen were clerks, 
cooks, drivers, mechanics, and other types of administrative person-
nel. Indeed, of the 1,172 enlisted cad rem en the division received, 
fewer than 200 were experienced line NCOs. This meant that there 
were far more "ninety-day wonders" (that is, OCS graduates) training 
troops than there were "leather-lunged NCOs," popular literature to 
the contrary notwithstanding. 25 
As has been discussed, most enlisted cadremen of the 88th came 
from the 9th Infantry Division, which had been designated as the 
88th's "parent" division. Approximately two months before the activa-
tion of the 88th, the commander of the 9th selected enlisted men from 
its own ranks to fill cadre positions designated by Army Ground 
Forces. The 9th then undertook on-the-job training for these men to 
prepare them for their new responsibilities. Because this training oc-
curred within an active division, the enlisted cadremen received prac-
tical experience that complemented the somewhat more theoretical 
preparation of officers in the army school system. The enlisted cadre 
joined the officer cadre at Camp Gruber during June 1942. They as-
sumed ranks appropriate to the positions they were to fill and, after a 
week of further training, took over administrative and logistical re-
sponsibilities. 26 
When the 88th Infantry Division activated on 15 July 1942, it was 
led by men who had spent months preparing for that event. Each 
cadreman had recently trained for the specific job he was about to 
undertake. There were areas of weakness in the leadership of the new 
division, but it seems to have been as well prepared as time and 
circumstances would allow. 
The arrival of the enlisted filler initiated the next phase in the 
division's training cycle. In the two weeks following 15 July 1942, troop 
trains delivered approximately twelve thousand draftees onto Camp 
Gruber's Bragg Railroad Siding. These were not necessarily a sight 
likely to inspire confidence. Hustled through induction centers, many 
wore ill-fitting khaki uniforms. Here a man had rolled up trouser legs 
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and shirt sleeves in order to have the use of feet and hands; there a man 
exposed inches of forearm and ankle beyond the full reach of his 
clothes. Cloth garrison caps stood on disparately groomed heads at 
every conceivable angle; those too big came down to the ears like 
grocery bags while those too small perched precariously and tumbled 
off with every quick head movement. The first trains, in from Massa-
chusetts and New York, delivered perspiring Northeasterners into the 
blazing Oklahoma sun. Those a little chubby and a little Nordic were 
true spectacles, with their lather of sweat and their flushed red faces. 
As the draftees muscled bulging barracks bags off the trains, they 
stumbled, collided, cursed, and swore-mostly in English, but in a 
variety of immigrant tongues as well. Twenty-nine of the draftees were 
not yet Americans; they would be sworn in as citizens as training 
progressed. In these early days of the mobilization, the appearance of 
new draftees varied not only because of ethnicity and physique, but 
also because of age. Along the dusty road to Camp Gruber, forty-four-
year-old Pvt. William S. Frederick, Sr., encountered his own son, 
twenty-year-old Pvt. WilliamS. Frederick, Jr. Both were taxicab drivers 
from Olean, New York; neither had dependents; and both had been 
snapped up by their local draft board. The cadremen of the 88th looked 
out over the disorderly swarms of draftees and saw their mission. The 
training of the cadre ended as the training of the division began. 27 
Formal basic training began on 3 August 1942. Prior to this the 
cadre broke the draftees in to the" Army way" of doing things, assum-
ing that if they could be made to look and act like soldiers, they would 
begin to think of themselves as soldiers. 2~> Looking and acting like 
soldiers meant a number of things. It started with neatness. Off went 
the ill-fitting uniforms and on came others of a more appropriate size. 
Personal preferences with respect to the garrison cap disappeared; 
every soldier wore his the same way atop an appropriate GI haircut. 
Shoe polish and brass polish became important features of daily rou-
tines. Each draftee was shown the proper way to sweep and mop a 
floor, then was expected to use his new skill regularly. Men were to be 
out of bed at 0545 and were to go from reveille formation to the latrine 
for a shave-whether they needed it or not. Each bed was to be tight 
enough that a quarter tossed upon it bounced; socks were rolled up in a 
certain way; personal equipment was stored in designated places; and 
the uniform was worn properly at all times. This standardization of the 
smallest details had a purpose: to subordinate the soldier's individu-
ality to the unit of which he was becoming a part. 29 
Close-order drill was another means of subordinating the individu-
al to the unit. The training schedule included twenty hours of formal 
instruction in dose-order drill. During this men progressed from ex-
ecuting maneuvers alone-"about face," "forward march," "right 
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oblique, march" -through executing the same maneuvers in massed 
formations of battalion size. Formal training represented only a part of 
the draftee's exposure to close-order drill; from the day they arrived, 
troops found that groups of men ordinarily moved about in accordance 
with drill procedures. Drill provided a means for efficiently moving 
large numbers of men and, it was thought, for conditioning them 
psychologically as well. On duty the draftees marched as part of a 
team; off duty they were to carry themselves with the erect posture and 
measured cadence appropriate to soldiers. 30 
Fatigue details provided another means to promote cooperation 
among the troops. The most famous of these details was the much-
maligned KP-kitchen police-an assignment to do whatever the mess 
sergeant thought needed doing. The popular image of KP is peeling 
potatoes, a frequently assigned task given the army's wartime depen-
dence upon that potent and versatile vegetable. KPs also loaded and 
unloaded delivery trucks, prepared food for the cook's use, washed 
dishes, and mopped out mess halls. Other fatigue details included 
exterior guard duty, interior guard duty, and a host of miscellaneous 
details best described as janitorial. Sharing these unpleasant, yet nec-
essary, tasks was considered good for developing a spirit of coopera-
tion and teamwork in the soldiers. 
Physical conditioning was a pervasive aspect of basic and individu-
al training. Mobilization training programs prescribed a minimum of 
thirty-six hours of physical training and twenty of conditioning 
marches for all of the division's units. Infantry regiments, understand-
ably enough, were expected to do more of both. Physical training 
progressed from light calisthenics and short runs, done in uniform 
cadence, through difficult calisthenics and long runs. It included on-
duty athletics stressing team sports and off-duty athletics stressing 
team sports and the combatives. Athletic activity was encouraged not 
merely for its own sake but was subordinated to a general training 
program stressing conditioning and teamwork.3 1 
Obstacle courses resembled the battlefield rather than the gym-
nasium. The culmination of physical training was the requirement that 
the soldier, with rifle and thirty-pound pack, negotiate a 1,500-foot 
obstacle course in three and one-half minutes. Specific requirements 
were that he32 
Take off with a yell, [yelling or singing frequently accompanied 
physical activity], mount an eight-foot wall, slide down a 10-
foot pole, leap a flaming trench, weave through a series of 
pickets, crawl through a water main, climb a 10-foot rope, 
clamber over a five-foot fence, swing by a rope across a seven-
foot ditch, mount a 12-foot ladder and descend to the other 
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side, charge over a four-foot breastwork, walk a 20-foot catwalk 
some 12 inches wide and seven feet over the ground, swing 
hand-over-hand along a 15-foot horizontal ladder, slither un-
der a fence, climb another and cross the finish line at a sprint. 
Conditioning marches also developed physical attributes the draf-
tees would eventually need. During the first weeks draftees undertook 
short marches in light gear. Distances and weight of gear steadily 
increased. Marches were conducted in accordance with long-standing 
War Department guidance, found in field manuals already familiar to 
the senior officers. 33 Within the 88th, marches were earnest and com-
petitive. Rates of march provided a tangible measure of unit progress-
probably more tangible than any measurement other than collective 
marksmanship scores. Ultimately the division's 351st Infantry Regi-
ment received recognition from General Marshall himself when it 
conducted a record sixty-two-mile march in full gear in twenty-nine 
hours without a man falling out. 34 
In the third week of basic training the infantrymen of the 88th 
began firing the M-1 Garand rifle and artillerymen began firing live 
ammunition from their guns. Every soldier, regardless of branch, was 
required to "qualify" with his assigned weapon through a cumulative 
training process allotted more than one-hundred hours in the training 
schedule. Individuals and crews progressed from lectures through 
demonstrations, called "tables," to a qualification table fired for record. 
Individual soldiers repeated as much of this process as was necessary 
until they achieved qualifying scores. 
Infantrymen qualified with the M-1; they also fired and "familiar-
ized" themselves with the automatic rifle, the light machine gun, and 
the 60-millimeter mortar. Artillerymen familiarized themselves with 
the 37-millimeter antitank gun and the .50-caliber machine gun; all 
soldiers familiarized themselves with the M-1 rifle, regardless of 
branch. Familiarization was a systematic process akin to qualification, 
but it required less time and no particular score on the final firing table. 
During basic and individual training, infantrymen received more 
than one hundred hours of instruction in individual, squad, and 
platoon tactics. Training progressed from lectures through demonstra-
tions, "walk-throughs," and practical exercises. During this period 
emphasis was not so much on the performance of squads and platoons 
as on the individual roles of soldiers within squads and platoons. 
Soldiers learned to do such things as use cover and concealment, 
maintain spacing, and provide covering fire for a maneuvering element. 
In addition to out-of-doors training, the 88th also gave formal 
classroom instruction. The training schedule devoted the following 
classroom time to this instruction:35 
Training 
Military courtesy and discipline, articles of war 
Orientation ("Why We Fight," etc.) 
Military sanitation, first aid, and sex hygiene 
Defense against chemical attack 
Equipment, clothing, and shelter tent pitching 
Hasty field fortifications and camouflage 
Elementary map and aerial photograph reading 
Protection of military information 
Organization of the army 
6 hours 
7 hours 
IO hours 
I2 hours 
7 hours 
4 hours 
8 hours 
3 hours 
I hour 
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Classroom instruction had advantages in that it could be conducted in 
inclement weather-in training time that otherwise might have been 
totally lost-and it could make use of films to compensate for instructor 
deficiencies. Nevertheless, it seems to have been the most unpopular 
of the division's training efforts, largely because it lacked immediate 
application. 36 Military courtesy, discipline, and the articles of war seem 
to have become familiar by virtue of daily contacts with the chain of 
command rather than through classroom instruction. Equipment, 
clothing, and shelter tent pitching proved to be learned on bivouacs 
more readily than in the classroom. Sex hygiene was more often an 
occasion for ribaldry than for serious instruction. 37 
The troops seem to have been unimpressed with the classroom 
training they received. The new divisions simply were not suited to 
this type of instruction. In the press of mobilization it proved impossi-
ble to provide uniformly qualified instructors, coherent cumulative 
curricula, or assigned readings. Army Ground Forces eventually re-
duced the time allotted to such instruction. Fewer than sixty of the 
division's training hours were lost to this classroom activity. 3H 
The most pressing problem the cadre of the 88th faced during basic 
and individual training was in the delays the division experienced 
before receiving its full enlisted complement. As was the case with 
most other new divisions, the 88th did not build up to full strength 
until several months after activation. Unlike many other divisions, 
however, the 88th received its full enlisted complement before the end 
of basic and individual training. Instruction for basic and individual 
training could be flexibly scheduled, in contrast to later unit training 
blocks. A number of expedients, including overtime training and de-
ferring some make-up instruction into the Christmas furlough period, 
allowed the 88th to rush latecomers through and catch them up to the 
training cycle. The division's unit training block began on I December 
I942, on schedule. 3 LJ 
The unit training block of the 88th Infantry Division lasted until28 
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February 1943; its combined arms training block spanned from 1 March 
to 22 May 1943. Taken together, these formed continuous-process 
training units of steadily increasing size, from squad to platoon, to 
company, to battalion, to regiment. During unit training the instruc-
tion of the several branches was, for the most part, conducted sepa-
rately. Combined arms training integrated the activities of several 
branches. 
Unit training stressed instruction in the field and included little on-
duty garrison activity. The men spent increasing amounts of time 
living under conditions they were likely to encounter in combat. There 
was no sharp break with previous training. Squad and platoon tactics 
continued; during unit training commanders emphasized the perform-
ance of units as a whole rather than the skills of individual soldiers. 
The infantrymen and cavalrymen were already familiar with such 
individual skills as covering by fire or advancing by bounds. During 
the first weeks of the unit training block, they practiced these tactics as 
units, one squad covering while another advanced by bounds. When 
squads were proficient, platoons began to practice similar tactics on a 
larger scale, integrating the greater firepower available in their heavy 
weapons squads. In addition to infantry tactics, the cavalrymen also 
practiced special techniques of scouting and screening. This phase of 
unit training culminated with the Army Ground Forces Platoon Corn-
bat Firing Proficiency Test. 
Artillery exercises also expanded in scale as batteries and then 
battalions fired for record. This expansion was more of a change for 
chains of command and fire direction centers than for gun crews, who 
continued to execute the crew duties they had learned earlier. During 
unit training artillery officers added variations in service practice, 
cross-training with alternate weapons, motor marches, vehicle recov-
ery, and difficult traction expedients to the gun drills that had domi-
nated basic and individual training. 
The training of support troops also increased in complexity. Medi-
cal technicians advanced from practicing simple first aid to administer-
ing enemas and blood transfusions; ordnance personnel undertook 
increasingly complex maintenance tasks; and signalmen attended divi-
sional schools in their specialties. Support troops also trained as units. 
The medical battalion practiced evacuating casualties over long dis-
tances through difficult terrain and simulated the movement of casu-
alties through several levels of collecting and clearing stations. 
Ordnance and quartermaster companies conducted motor marches 
and bivouacs. The engineers constructed and removed field fortifica-
tions, built fixed and floating bridges, laid and breached mine fields, 
built roadblocks, and constructed roads. By the time the 88th began its 
combined arms training, its infantry regiments, artillery battalions, 
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cavalry reconnaissance troop, and engineer battalion had all trained as 
units in their respective combat roles. 
Combined arms training welded these several components into 
teams capable of acting in concert as a whole. The most easily executed 
of the combined arms exercises involved command post training. In 
these, commanders and staffs worked through tactical problems while 
simulating the presence of personnel and equipment. Command post 
exercises progressed from simple terrain walk-throughs to complex 
division problems in which officers moved extended distances as if 
their units were with them. These exercises gave the officers of the 
several branches the experience of working together, improved tactical 
communications systems, and resolved problems with respect to com-
mand and staffing. Some command post exercises were rehearsals for 
specific regimental or divisional maneuvers. 40 
Regimental combat team exercises were the next step in the divi-
sion's progression through combined arms training. In these, a regi-
ment maneuvered with an artillery battalion and cavalry and engineer 
elements attached. Commanders coordinated infantry movements 
and artillery fires during attacks, night movements, defenses of pre-
pared positions, and river crossings. Regimental combat teams de-
veloped particular proficiency with respect to the coordination of 
artillery and infantry. 41 
Division maneuvers brought together the entire division and 
climaxed the combined arms training block. In six separate exercises 
the division operated against simulated opponents or against one of 
its regimental combat teams while practicing attacks, defenses, and 
phased withdrawals. In May 1943 these rigorous, full-scale exercises 
concluded and X Corps observers designated the 88th as prepared for 
maneuvers on an even larger scale. 42 
When the 88th Infantry Division departed for its Louisiana maneu-
vers on 13 June 1943, it had achieved a high state of training. It also had 
a full complement of personnel and equipment. These advantages 
were not unusual for a maneuver-bound division in 1943. The 88th 
enjoyed another advantage as well; it had a rival. 
The 88th was scheduled to maneuver against the 31st National 
Guard Infantry Division-the "Dixie Division" -an old division char-
acterized as experienced and maneuver-wise. The Louisiana maneu-
vers of the summer of 1943 involved three "green" draftee divisions: 
the 95th Infantry, the 11th Armored, and the 88th. Of these, the 88th 
most particularly "came to regard the 31st as its own personal enemy." 
It is not altogether surprising that the draftees envied the old division's 
status; apparently the 88th's cadremen inconspicuously encouraged 
this nascent rivalry. 43 
Rivalry between the 88th and the 31st manifested itself in a number 
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of ways. The draftees attempted to perform better than the guardsmen 
even when the two units were not maneuvering against each other. 
When they were, the draftees were usually reluctant to withdraw on 
the umpire's orders if they thought the guardsmen had not demon-
strated the necessary tactical advantages. On occasion, soldiers ig-
nored umpires altogether and fought on their own terms until officers 
restored order. Usually these informal battles went no further than an 
exchange of insults, but sometimes fistfights broke out on the line of 
contact. 
The rivalry between the "green" draftees and the "maneuver-
wise" guardsmen probably enhanced the performance of both. For the 
draftees, the very novelty of the maneuvers proved worthwhile. Ac-
counts written by draftees during this period boast of poison ivy, 
mosquitoes, chiggers, ticks, snakes, hogs, mud, and dust. 44 Mos-
quitoes were big enough to drag a man out of his tent. Ticks were so 
numerous that soldiers spent days picking them off of each other. 
Chiggers and snakes stood formation with the troops. Armed guards 
were posted to keep hogs out of the mess areas. All this embellished 
unpleasantness seems to have raised morale; the draftees were proud 
of themselves for having graduated into the "real thing." The tough-
ness of the environment was a psychological asset to units that had 
conducted training in conditions ever closer to those expected in 
combat. The steady advance from parade-ground drills through 
sweeping maneuvers across challenging terrain lent the draftees a 
sense of purpose and progress. 
The Louisiana maneuvers began with operations on the level at 
which combined arms training had concluded. Divisions spent the 
first week conducting unopposed attacks, night movements, defenses 
of fortified positions, and river crossings. These exercises were fol-
lowed by flag exercises in which umpires simulated the presence of 
opponents with flags of different sizes and descriptions. After the 
divisions negotiated problems without opponents, they maneuvered 
against each other, first in scripted problems and then in free maneu-
vers, or war games. Throughout the exercises umpires observed per-
formances and teamwork. 45 
During the first river crossing of the war games, the 88th's per-
formance received particularly favorable comment from umpires and 
observers. The 88th had been ordered to withdraw into Texas and 
defend a river line against the 31st, 95th, and 11th Armored. As it 
withdrew, it left a reconnaissance radio team deep within enemy 
territory. This tactic was unconventional at the time, as was the ad hoc 
radio relay net that enabled the team to report regularly to the divi-
sion's G-2 (intelligence officers). The team demonstrated considerable 
initiative identifying troop movements and evading detection. Given 
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ideal intelligence, the 88th easily forestalled every enemy initiative. 
The operation continued to be one-sided until the umpires extended 
the problem-and the radio team ran out of food and water. The men of 
the division, and most maneuver observers, regarded this defense as a 
triumph for the 88th. 46 
Few people had more experience than General Sloan in the sub-
tleties of looking good on maneuvers. His reputation as an accom-
plished military pedagogue had in part resulted from his organization 
and direction of the Fourth Army Umpire School for a major command 
post exercise conducted during the summer of 1939. This exercise 
became something of a model when the War Department increased the 
resources allocated to major maneuvers; the experiences of 1939 and 
1940 were drawn upon extensively in planning the maneuver pro-
grams of the new divisions. Maneuver umpires followed standard 
procedures and checklists in a complex rating system with which 
Sloan, formerly the trainer of umpires, was familiar. Sloan was not a 
man to take unfair advantage of his special knowledge, but he could 
legitimately lay stress on things likely to influence the appraisal of the 
umpires. 47 
As the summer wore on, the 88th continued to perform well and 
look good in the maneuvers and exercises. In particular, observers 
cited the division for the "marching power" of its infantry, the profi-
ciency of its artillery, and the teamwork demonstrated by its compo-
nent elements. In fact, the division so impressed umpires and 
observers that Army Ground Forces changed the embarkation se-
quence of the participating divisions and selected the 88th to precede 
the 31st overseas. This particular adjustment, which moved a new 
division ahead of an old one, was the principal reason the 88th was the 
first of the draftee divisions overseas. 4H 
It is worth noting that the four divisional participants in the Loui-
siana maneuvers of the summer of 1943 saw their first combat in widely 
separated theaters: the 88th entered combat in the mountains of Italy; 
the 31st, in the jungles of Mindanao; the 95th, on the plains of northern 
France; and the 11th Armored, in the rolling terrain of Southern 
France. 49 Although fighting in different environments, all had under-
gone similar training programs-with certain obvious exceptions in 
the case of the 11th Armored. This serves to illustrate the standardiza-
tion that was at once a strength and a weakness of the Army Training 
Program. 
The 88th Infantry Division, given its stable personnel situation and 
relatively minor logistical problems, provides an excellent case study of 
the training program Army Ground Forces envisioned for the new 
divisions. The 88th's performance on the Louisiana maneuvers vali-
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dated that program insofar as it could be tested short of combat. 
Progress from induction through basic, individual, unit, combined 
arms, and maneuver training had been steady and purposeful. The 
draftees had practiced individual skills time and again, and their 
physical conditioning was superb. Units repeatedly conducted chal-
lenging field exercises under realistic conditions and commanders at all 
levels matured during a year of rigorous training. All factors consid-
ered, the 88th seemed likely to give a good account of itself anywhere 
in the world. 
For all the strengths of the Army Training Program, there seem to 
have been weaknesses as well. The draftees themselves commented 
that training they received in the classroom proved to be of little value. 
The soldiers of the 88th practiced most combat skills thoroughly, but 
there were some skills-combined arms support for patrolling, tactical 
communications, integration of tanks and infantry, land mine warfare, 
and close air support-that were not stressed much during the divi-
sion's training, but that proved particularly important in Italy. A pro-
gram applicable everywhere in general is not necessarily the ideal 
program for somewhere in particular. 
The test of combat would dramatically demonstrate both the 
strengths and the weaknesses of the training program the 88th had 
undergone. The creators of the highly structured and rigidly cen-
tralized Army Training Program had anticipated most of the division's 
training needs. Unfortunately for the draftees and for the draftee 
divisions, they had not anticipated them all. 
4 _____ _ 
Logistics: The Strongest Card 
Of all the arguments that advocates of an incremental expansion of the 
army made against a levee en masse, the most persuasive were logistical. 
Even if masses of men could be summarily levied and properly 
trained-which Uptonians by no means conceded-of what use would 
they be in modern warfare if ill-equipped? Also, how much would it 
cost to feed, house, uniform, and supply so many poorly equipped 
troops?1 
More than any other military activity, logistics require planning 
and preparation. Americans have a poor record in preparing for war 
while still at peace. Until the tenure of Elihu Root as secretary of war 
(1899-1904), American mobilization planning had been superficial at 
best. Even after Root it was not entirely adequate; the American Expe-
ditionary Force in World War I could not have taken the field without 
supplies and munitions from the British and the French. After World 
War I, American logistical planners assumed that in the event of 
another war they could break out stockpiled World War I inventories, 
reopen World War I cantonments, and thereby accommodate whatever 
personnel the situation demanded. Within a decade, however, mobi-
lization plans became more sophisticated and mobilization planners 
more attentive to logistical considerations. Gen. Douglas MacArthur 
and Gen. Malin Craig, the U.S. Army chiefs of staff from November 
1930 to October 1935 and from October 1935 to August 1939, respec-
tively, undertook extensive mobililization planning and stressed logis-
tics as a critical consideration in that planning. 2 
MacArthur, Craig, and their principal subordinates believed that 
the American political process would not allow for much more than 
planning during peacetime; they further believed that the logistical 
assets initially available in another war would be slender at best. They 
thought it would be wiser to concentrate assets on hand into estab-
lished formations rather than to dissipate them uselessly among a host 
of new ones. Mobilization Plans 1933, 1938, and 1939 featured modest 
rates of military expansion along Uptonian lines and favored the use of 
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established, rather than levied, divisions in operations overseas. Draf-
tee divisions were never eliminated from mobilization plans, but they 
seemed destined to be second-rate combat units or administrative 
headquarters training and transporting replacements for established 
divisions. 3 
Pressed by events in Europe and East Asia, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt initiated active preparedness measures as early as 1938. The 
army, augmented by the National Guard and the draft, underwent a 
relatively orderly expansion from 1939 through 1941. In the aftermath 
of Pearl Harbor such a modest rate of expansion could not, of course, 
continue. There was no alternative to general mobilization and the 
rapid rates of expansion draftee divisions represented. Nevertheless, 
the draftee divisions that went overseas were no worse fed, housed, 
uniformed, or equipped than the established divisions that preceded 
them. The American logistical achievement in World War II defied 
suppositions that mass mobilization would produce a rabble in arms. 
Not even the most ambitious of the prewar mobilization plans sug-
gested that a year of involvement in a general war would end with an 
American army half as large as the one actually raised, equipped, and 
supplied during 1942.4 
The magnitude of this achievement should not obscure the fact that 
the new divisions did encounter logistical difficulties, even if they 
never were without adequate food, clothing, fuel, ammunition, shel-
ter, and equipment. The difficulties encountered were not the simple 
matters of quantity anticipated by the Uptonians nor, given the circum-
stances, were they inevitable. 
When considering logistics, one often thinks first of supply-the 
tons of rations, clothing, personal equipment, petroleum products, 
repair parts, vehicles, ammunition, and miscellaneous materials nec-
essary to support an army. It was with respect to this single logistical 
function of supply that the critics of the levee en masse had made their 
gloomiest predictions and, in the outcome, proved widest of the 
mark. 5 
Mobilization plans of the 1930s were dominated by the concept of 
M-day-Mobilization Day-a distinct division between peace and war. 
Contrary to War Department expectations, American political leaders 
undertook extensive preparations for war--quasi-mobilization, if you 
will-while America was technically still at peace. Indeed, after the fall 
of France in June 1940, congressional preparedness measures were in 
some respects more ambitious than those recommended by the War 
Department. War Department planners feared that enthusiasm and 
special interest would interfere with the orderly expansion they hoped 
to achieve. 6 Popular literature to the contrary notwithstanding, 7 De-
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cember 1941 dawned on an American army well prepared for mobiliza-
tion insofar as supply per se was concerned. Consider in turn each of 
the r •. .1jor classes of supply: rations, clothing and personal equipment, 
table-of-organization equipment, petroleum products, and ammuni-
tion.7 
Rations never proved a serious problem for the fifteen million men 
America ultimately put under arms. The Subsistence Branch, the most 
firmly entrenched of all quartermaster sub-bureaucracies, had been a 
separate service until 1912 and had retained a tradition of autonomy 
through numerous administrative realignments, including the whole-
sale quartermaster reorganization of March 1942. Stable bureaucracy 
produced stable procedure. Cadremen of the 88th were familiar with 
Subsistence Branch's prewar rationing system and with its recom-
mended diet. War brought few changes in procedures for divisional 
personnel, so the 88th's cadremen found themselves fully prepared for 
their responsibilities with respect to rations. 8 
There were some changes in rationing procedures at levels higher 
than that of the division, but these went smoothly because the related 
plans had existed for some time. Indeed, they had already been exer-
cised in part to support the Civilian Conservation Corps. Upon mobi-
lization, the prewar local crediting system called the garrison ration 
ceased, and the Subsistence Branch assumed direct responsibility for 
all purchases through a system of regional market centers. Centraliza-
tion allowed the Subsistence Branch, in concert with other agencies, to 
reconcile competing demands, control prices, and limit profiteering. 
Because all the army had to do to procure an adequate supply of food in 
midcentury America was to buy it, it is hardly surprising that quan-
titative subsistence demands were easily met.'~ 
Given the demands on the nation's transportation system during 
mobilization and the advantages of mass purchasing, the Subsistence 
Branch found it could best guarantee efficient rationing through stock-
piling. Within the United States it stockpiled rations against a facility's 
anticipated forty-five-day demand. Thus requisitions were not against 
meals on the table but against stockpiled inventories. Indeed, rationing 
seems to have been, if anything, unduly lavish. One quartermaster 
study estimated the army threw away $117 million worth of food in one 
year. 10 
The 88th Infantry Division, like other new divisions, lacked neither 
food nor cooks to prepare it. Cadre cooks ranged in numbers from one-
third to one-half of the total numbers required by tables of organiza-
tion, and every company had an experienced cadre mess sergeant. 
With high percentages of experienced personnel, mess teams had little 
difficulty training their draftee cooks while at the same time support-
ing their assigned units. 11 
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The experience of the 88th with respect to petroleum products also 
posed few problems. Quartermaster's Fuel and Heavy Equipment 
Branch was never as stable as the Subsistence Branch, and effective 
centralized administration of petroleum products disappeared al-
together for a time. Nevertheless, the 88th was well enough served 
even by the uncoordinated systems that remained. General Sloan was 
on cordial personal terms with the commander of the Eighth Service 
Command, near the Texas and Oklahoma oil fields, and with represen-
tatives of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, which serviced Camp Gruber. 
This may have helped; the division never seems to have been short 
petroleum products. 12 
In December 1942 the War Department seemed to rediscover pe-
troleum as a strategic commodity requiring centralized administration 
and procurement. This rediscovery, one might note, coincided with 
President Roosevelt's establishment of the Petroleum Administration 
for War to cope with nationwide disorganization in the petroleum 
market. By May 1943, War Department reorganizations led to the 
establishment of the Fuel and Lubricants Division, a thoroughly inte-
grated commodity organization handling all aspects of army petroleum 
use. Although the 88th was not suffering prior to the reorganization, 
petroleum supplies were clearly more secure thereafter. 13 
Fuel handling posed as few problems as did fuel supply. Each of 
the separate services had developed its own equipment for transport-
ing and pumping fuel. The many different types of such equipment 
caused some difficulties in obtaining spare parts, but these difficulties 
had minimal effect. The widely issued five-gallon can, variously called 
the "jerry can" or the "blitz can," provided an alternative means for 
dispensing fuel. Because fuel itself had been standardized in 1941, it 
could be readily transferred between vehicles, dispensing systems, 
and branches without contamination. 14 
Another class of supply that posed few problems was ammunition. 
Rounds in all calibers were sufficiently available to conduct the lavish 
firing exercises of the Army Ground Forces training schedules. The 
War Department had stocked small-arms ammunition in considerable 
quantity after World War I. Training demands and physical deteriora-
tion caused stocks to dwindle, but in early 1940 the army still possessed 
over one-half billion usable rounds. This situation improved further 
because of an enormous increase in American productive capacity 
during the eighteen months preceding Pearl Harbor, increases spurred 
by Roosevelt's decision to aid the British after Dunkerque. The notion 
of America as an "arsenal of democracy" did not altogether appeal to 
War Department planners, who preferred to hoard resources rather 
than divert them to the British. However, without these highly visible 
shipments overseas-and the resultant equally visible declines in am-
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munition stockpiles-it is doubtful that congressional leaders would 
have voted funds for plant expansion on the scale they did during 1940 
and 1941. 15 
Given a blank check, the Ordnance Corps and its civilian contrac-
tors managed to exceed all realistic needs by the summer of 1942. In the 
words of the chief of Ordnance's Industrial Service, the army had 
small-arms ammunition "running out its ears." In June 1942, the 
month before the 88th activated, the Industrial Service recommended 
major cuts in production plans and reduced 1942 goals from the 
astronomical figure of fifty-nine billion rounds to the more realistic but 
still lavish figure of twenty-three billion rounds. ln 
Concerning small-arms ammunition, accountability presented 
more problems to the 88th than did supply. Far from worrying about 
too little ammunition, commanders worried about "surreptitious am-
munition," ammunition that was not in its proper place and thus was 
available for misuse. 17 Camp Gruber's ordnance warehouse carefully 
doled out ammunition on the day it was to be used. When leaving 
ranges, troops shook out clothing and equipment to find rounds 
inadvertently lodged in cuffs, pockets, or folds, and cadremen in-
spected barracks and vehicles daily for lost rounds. 
The supply of artillery ammunition proved somewhat more trou-
blesome than did that of small-arms ammunition. There had been 
technological changes, in particular increased calibers, between the 
wars, so World War I stocks were of little value. Production, procure-
ment, and distribution all involved unique complexities. The Ord-
nance Corps' sixty government-owned, contract-operated artillery 
ammunition plants were not able to exceed all reasonable demands 
until August 1943. Despite these problems, artillery production 
fulfilled the actual needs of the army even if it was tardy in fulfilling 
army desires. The 88th fired all required training missions with live 
ammunition and did not suffer significant shortages during the course 
of its training cycle. Despite some miscarriages with respect to fore-
casting during 1944, American artillery ammunition production suf-
ficed to meet the actual needs of Allied forces fighting overseas and of 
new divisions training at home from the summer of 1942 until the 
conclusion of the war. 18 
The 88th Infantry Division also suffered little from shortages of 
clothing and personal equipment, other than in a few of the less-
common sizes. The 88th did not, however, train with all the items of 
clothing and personal equipment it later was to use in combat. This was 
largely because of the lag between development and procurement; 
obsolescent clothing and personal equipment continued in production 
to meet mobilization needs even as replacement items were coming 
into production to modernize the inventory. Belated changes in head-
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gear and uniforms were not particularly consequential-not even the 
dramatic change from khaki to olive drab. Belated developments in 
army footwear led to more serious problems. Until November 1943, 
footwear consisted of the basic service shoe and leggings. The combi-
nation was inadequate in cold, wet weather and was so difficult to put 
on and take off that it contributed to poor foot hygiene. The 88th 
suffered a high incidence of trench and immersion foot during cold, 
wet weather until early 1944, when the improved high-top combat boot 
with overshoes and shoepacs became generally available. 19 
Virtually all items of personal equipment-field packs, barracks 
bags, ammunition carriers, shelter halves, sleeping gear, entrenching 
tools, web gear, etc.-changed significantly during 1942 and 1943. 
Each individual change was, in itself, not particularly consequential, 
but the cumulative effect of changes and delayed deliveries was to 
render the draftees less familiar with their final issue than they other-
wise would have been. This was especially true of new gear designed 
for cold, wet weather. Water-resistant "duck" material replaced cotton 
or wool. Shelter halves and barracks bags (later, duffel bags) increased 
in volume and closure. Sleeping bags replaced wool blankets as stan-
dard sleeping gear, and the waterproof poncho became an item of 
general issue. The draftees of the 88th had little opportunity to train 
with this new equipment prior to embarkation, and they suffered from 
this lack during the winter of 1943-1944.20 
Insofar as the 88th Infantry Division was concerned, supply short-
ages predicted by critics of the levee en masse failed to materialize with 
respect to four of the five major classes of supply. Food, petroleum 
products, and ammunition were available in abundance. Clothing and 
personal equipment were adequately available insofar as quantity was 
concerned, and initial qualitative shortcomings were not particularly 
related to the numbers of draftees being inducted. Of all the classes of 
supply, only table-of-organization equipment involved the 88th in 
quantitative shortcomings. 
Table-of-organization equipment, hereafter referred to as T.O. 
equipment, consists of items neither expendable nor uniformly avail-
able for personal use: vehicles, weapons, tools, auxiliary-powered 
equipment, communications equipment, etc. Extracts from the table of 
organization of June 1941 appear in Tables 1 and 2. As was true with 
other classes of supply, T.O. equipment benefited from massive in-
creases in congressional funding beginning in May 1940. T.O. equip-
ment was more complex and required more production lead time than 
did other classes of supply; it was not yet available in sufficient quan-
tities to meet the requirements of 1942. Production of most items 
peaked in 1943, before the draftee divisions went overseas but well 
after most of them had activated. 21 
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Table 1. Table-of-Organization Weapons Specified for 
Infantry Divisions, June 1941 
Div 
HQ 
and Inf 
MP Recon Sig Reg Div Eng QM 
Co Troop Co (3) Arty Bn Bn TOTAL 
Machine gun, cal. 50 36 36 
Machine gun, cal. 30, heavy 32 72 18 122 
Machine gun, cal. 50, heavy barrel 17 60 77 
Machine gun, cal. 30, light 3 54 57 
Submachine gun, cal. 45 35 35 
Antitank gun, 37 mm 36 24 60 
Gun, 75 mm 8 8 
Howitzer, 105 mm 36 36 
Howitzer, 155 mm 12 12 
Mortar, 60 mm 81 81 
Mortar, 81 mm 36 36 
Pistol, automatic, cal. 30 183 147 261 3,543 2,685 118 262 7,199 
Rifle, automatic, cal. 30 375 375 
Rifle, cal. 30 47 32 6,297 516 50 6,942 
SOURCE: Tables of Organization of Infantry Units (Washington, D.C.: Infantry journal, 
1941), T.0.70 
Insofar as T.O. equipment was concerned, the War Department 
gave units in training a priority behind units embarking and lend-lease 
shipments to Allies. Until July 1943 new divisions were programmed to 
receive only 50 percent of the T.O. In fact, they received somewhat less 
(see Table 3). This equipment did not arrive prior to activation, as 
planned; instead, it trickled into division cantonments over a period of 
months. 22 
Just how consequential were these temporary shortages of T.O. 
equipment? The issue became a matter of heated dispute between the 
Army Ground Forces and the Services of Supply. Insofar as the 88th is 
concerned, the evidence indicates the shortages were of little con-
sequence. The division's training schedule developed in such a man-
ner that actual requirements for T.O. equipment were minimal at first 
and increasing with time. The division was seldom short of equipment 
it needed to train or support itself. Unlike some earlier divisions, it 
never had to simulate the presence of vehicles, weapons, or equip-
ment.23 
Vehicles were available in sufficient numbers even if those num-
bers fell short of T.O. authorization; the table of organization provided 
56 Draftee Division 
Table 2. Table-of-Organization Vehicles and Special Equipment 
Specified for Infantry Divisions, June 1941 
Div 
HQ 
and Inf Med 
MP Recon Sig Reg Div Eng Bn/ QM 
Co Troop Co (3) Arty Bn Surg Bn TOTAL 
Air compressor 3 3 
Assault boat 10 10 
Lighting set 
Earth auger 
Water purification unit 4 4 
Scout car 16 16 
Bulldozer 3 3 
Ambulance, V2 ton 36 36 
Sedan 3 1 5 10 
Motorcycle, solo 12 10 3 25 
Motorcycle with side car 8 2 78 43 4 5 140 
Trailer, 1 ton 2 10 45 123 23 4 53 260 
Trailer, 250 gal 7 7 
Motor tricycle 7 7 
Truck, V2 ton, carryall 6 6 
Truck, V2 ton, command 2 3 99 69 5 8 13 200 
Truck, V2 ton pickup 15 10 6 6 38 
Truck, V2 ton, radio 6 6 10 22 
Truck, V2 ton, 
weapon carrier 3 321 46 370 
Truck, V2 ton, cargo 6 30 129 21 186 
Truck, 1 V2 ton, dump 53 53 
Truck, 2V2 ton, cargo 4 276 15 63 360 
Truck, 1 V2 ton, 
cargo with winch 3 3 
Truck, 2V2 ton, wrecker 2 2 
Truck, 4 ton cargo 16 3 19 
Truck, 4 ton wrecker 2 2 
SOURCE: Tables of Organization of Infantry Units (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, 
1941), T.0.70. 
lavishly. Some observers, Winston Churchill among them, thought the 
table allotted more trucks than any division could possibly need. It 
certainly provided for more trucks than were necessary to support a 
division training at a fixed installation. At full TO. strength, the 88th 
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Table 3. Table-of-Organization Equipment on Hand for New 
Divisions, April 1943 
Item 
Flame thrower, M-1 
Binoculars, M-3 
Light armored car, M-8 
Submachine gun, cal. 45 
Howitzer, 105 mm 
Mortar, 60 mm, M-2 
Mortar, 81 mm, M-1 
Rifles and carbines, all types 
Rifle, BAR 
Truck, 2Y2 ton, 6 x 6 
Radio set, SCR-510 
Switchboard, BD-71 
Vehicle medical kit 
Percentage of allowance on hand 
15.4 
52.2 
6.8 
67.2 
71.5 
54.9 
52.9 
46.7 
30.1 
48.3 
35.1 
48.2 
100.0 
NOTE: These figures represent totals across Army Ground Forces. Figures 
varied from division to division depending upon the point reached in the 
training cycle and the priority for embarkation. 
SOURCE: Army Ground Forces letter (subject: equipment for Army Ground 
Forces) to commanding general, Army Service Forces, 6 April1943, AGF 401-1, 
MMRB, National Archives. 
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would have had 707 vehicles with a cargo capacity of one ton or more, 
and a net cargo capacity of 1,514.5 tons, this to support approximately 
14,000 men. 24 
During basic training the only transportation requirements within 
the division involved hauling supplies several miles from Camp 
Gruber's railroad sidings to division facilities, or hauling ammunition 
somewhat greater distances to firing ranges. The vehicles on hand 
proved more than adequate for such modest requirements. By the time 
major field problems increased demands upon transportation assets, 
the numbers of vehicles available had also increased. When the 88th 
left Camp Gruber to participate in its Louisiana maneuvers, it had all 
the vehicles specified in the table of organization. Thus, although the 
88th did not receive its full allowance of vehicles until eleven months 
after activation, the division always had sufficient vehicles to meet 
transportation requirements. Indeed, the 88th had enough transporta-
tion to support not only its own needs but also nondivisional activities 
and facilities at Camp Gruber. 25 
Shortages of weapons proved only a little more troublesome than 
shortages of vehicles. Every rifleman in the 88th had his own weapon. 
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One out of every two crew-served weapons was available from the 
beginning, so crews rotated in such a manner that each crew trained 
upon an actual weapon. Troops trained as individual crews first; by the 
time mass fire was called for by the training schedule, more weapons 
were available to support the training. 26 
Shortages of communications equipment did not adversely affect 
the division's conduct of the Army Ground Forces training program, 
although inexperience with certain aspects of tactical communications 
later proved a handicap. 27 Units did well on proficiency tests using 
communications arrangements-such as runners and mounted mes-
sengers-that later would prove inadequate in combat. In addition, 
communications equipment the 88th used when training was obsoles-
cent by the time the division moved overseas. 
At first, auxiliary-powered equipment was in short supply-for 
example, kitchen ranges, generators, specialized engineer equipment, 
pumps, and mobile maintenance shops. Fortunately this equipment, 
designed for field use, was duplicated by fixed facilities at Camp 
Gruber, so training did not suffer. The division used garrison equip-
ment during its first several months. By the time the division had to 
support itself in the field, adequate auxiliary-powered equipment was 
available and had been issued. 
In summary, shortages of T.O. equipment did not much affect the 
progress of the 88th Infantry Division through its training cycle. It was 
true that equipment arrived later than mobilization planners had 
hoped, that equipment shortages complicated scheduling, and that 
there was no real substitute for the experience of operating at 100 
percent of T.O. Nevertheless, equipment on hand sufficed to meet 
actual needs, and equipment shortages never forced major adjust-
ments in the training program. 
If T.O. equipment shortages posed no serious problems, the main-
tenance ofT. 0. equipment, especially vehicles, did. None of the armies 
that fought World War II seems to have been fully prepared for the 
technological demands of modern warfare. 28 The U.S. Army did as 
well or better than any in keeping up its equipment-and that of a 
number of allies as well-but proper maintenance did not come easily 
to the fledgling draftee divisions. 
The 88th Infantry Division was no exception. Within a month of 
activation, 5.1 percent of the division's vehicles had been "on deadline" 
(inoperable) for more than three days-they were so unserviceable 
reasonably expedient repairs could not make them available for use. 
After another month the rate of three-day deadlines climbed to 9.3 
percent. Much larger numbers of vehicles were deadlined for briefer 
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periods. An inspector general's report entitled the "Automotive Dis-
ability Report of the 88th Division" was sufficiently alarming to receive 
attention at the highest levels of the War Department. 29 
The body of correspondence-smoke and thunder-generated by 
this report causes one to believe neither the Services of Supply nor the 
Army Ground Forces fully comprehended the maintenance problems 
the new divisions faced. Indeed, an officer familiar with the army's 
present vehicular maintenance apparatus is apt to marvel that the 
88th's deadline rate was not even higher. 30 The new divisions faced 
critical problems: an uneven distribution of organizational mechanics, 
an utter lack of effective support maintenance within divisions, and 
repair part shortages. 
Organizational mechanics are the men who first address mainte-
nance problems that go beyond the driver's capability. While the driver 
can carry out most checks and services and many simple repairs and 
diagnostics, he generally consults a mechanic for complex checks, 
services, repairs, and diagnosis. Mechanics are ordinarily assigned to 
units in proportion to the vehicles in the T.O. The ratio presently used 
in the army, after decades of experience, is about one mechanic for 
every eight wheeled vehicles. 31 
In 1942 experience in wheeled vehicle maintenance was still slight. 
Each branch and service had its own notions concerning the numbers 
of mechanics necessary to support its vehicles, ranging from one 
mechanic for twenty vehicles in the case of Signal Corps to one me-
chanic for three vehicles in the case of Mechanized Cavalry. Even more 
erratic than these perceived needs were the actual distributions of 
experienced mechanics assigned to the various branches and services. 
Mechanized Cavalry, Artillery, and the Medical Corps had adequate 
automotive maintenance expertise available. Signal, Quartermaster, 
and Infantry had ridiculously few experienced mechanics. The Corps 
of Engineers naively assumed that the general mechanical aptitude of 
their NCOs qualified them to be motor sergeants without any immedi-
ate need for trained mechanics. Table 4 shows how many mechanics 
were involved, both cadre and draftee, in the division's maintenance 
establishments and the numbers of vehicles they were expected to 
maintain. As it suggests, the mechanics of the 88th represented an 
amalgam of branch and service solutions that bore little relationship to 
actual maintenance needs. 32 
Support maintenance within the new divisions was in even greater 
disarray than was organizational maintenance. Support maintenance 
performs repairs beyond the capabilities of organizational mechanics. 
Within the newly activated 88th, vehicular support maintenance was 
virtually nonexistent. Prewar bickering had equivocally settled such 
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Table 4. Automotive Maintenance Personnel, New Divisions, July 1942 
Draftees 
Unit NCOS Cadre EM Draftees to cadre Vehicles 
Div HQ 1 1:2 11 
Sig Co 0 0 3 3:0 61 
Recon Troop 2 6 2:1 22 
QM Bn 0 48 48:1 91 
Eng Bn 6 0 12 2:1 74 
lnf Reg 3 0 63 21:1 558 
Div Arty 29 21 62 6:5 417 
Med Bn 5 9 3:2 90 
Overall 46 25 204 3:1 1,324 
SOURCE: Tables of Organization of Infantry Units (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, 
1941). 
responsibilities upon two branches-quartermaster for vehicles of es-
sentially civilian design (for example, trucks) and ordnance for equip-
ment without civilian counterparts (for example, tanks). This 
compromise represented extensions of quartermaster's traditional role 
as a procurement service and ordnance's traditional superintendency 
of military technology. All but sixteen of the division's T.O. vehicles 
were trucks, ambulances, or sedans, and thus they were quartermas-
ter's support maintenance responsibility. The 88th Quartermaster Bat-
talion Maintenance Platoon consisted of one NCO and forty-four raw 
draftees. It was hardly prepared to provide adequate support mainte-
nance to hundreds of vehicles. 33 
Even if it had had an adequate maintenance establishment, the 
88th still would have suffered from armywide shortages of repair parts. 
During 1941 and 1942, quartermaster procurement emphasized pur-
chasing vehicles, which filled out organizational tables of organization, 
rather than spare parts, which did not. At a time when the battle-wise 
British characteristically purchased spare parts worth 35 percent of the 
value of new vehicles ordered, the Quartermaster Corps doled out 5 
percent. An initial lack of standardization in the army's vehicle fleet 
complicated inadequate spare parts stockage. Prewar standardization 
efforts had run afoul of congressional suspicion and vested interest. 
Not until the summer of 1941 could the army negotiate contracts 
specifying design; before then it had to purchase vehicles "off the 
street." During 1942 the newly mobilizing divisions coped with 330 
makes of vehicles requiring a total of 260,000 different repair parts. 
Civilian jobbers who had supported prewar vehicle fleets were over-
whelmed by the mobilization, and civilian spare parts stockages 
proved inadequate for military use. 34 
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Table 5. Changes in Cadre Automotive Maintenance 
Personnel, July 1941 to November 1942 
Component unit Raw change Percent change 
DivHQ +1 +33 
Sig Co +2 + Infinity 
Recon Troop -1 -33 
QM Bn 0 0 
Eng Bn 0 0 
Inf Reg +24 +800 
Div Arty -5 -10 
Med Bn 0 0 
Ord Lt Maint Co New Unit +Infinity 
61 
The maintenance situation of the 88th would have been even worse 
than it was had it not been for several factors. Virtually all of the 
division's vehicles were new. The 88th did not immediately receive its 
full T.O. authorization, so its ratio of mechanics to vehicles was always 
higher than that provided for in the table. Transportation requirements 
and, thus, vehicular wear were moderate during the first several 
months of training. The chain of command at all levels carried on 
preventative maintenance-"motor stables"-with a persistence that 
in part compensated for lack of expertise. Finally, most operators had 
sufficient mechanical know-how to assist the harried mechanics. 35 
The 88th could not have muddled through indefinitely. The ulti-
mate resolution of underlying maintenance problems required the 
direct intervention of the War Department. Recognizing the uneven 
distribution of organizational mechanics, that department cut across 
branch and service lines and redistributed cadre automotive mainte-
nance personnel. 36 By November 1942, the changes reflected in Table 5 
were complete; that is, branches and services short of mechanics 
received more and those with excesses were trimmed. 
The War Department's answer to the absence of support mainte-
nance was equally heavy-handed and equally effective. Brushing quar-
termaster prerogatives aside, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, 
commanding general of the Services of Supply, designated ordnance as 
the service into which support maintenance was to be concentrated. 
The Ordnance Corps was already well along in a program for training 
maintenance companies to support major headquarters. It found itself 
able to graft similar units-Ordnance Light Maintenance Companies-
onto the new divisions as well. The new divisions simply had not been 
an appropriate environment in which to train teams of maintenance 
specialists. Ordnance absorbed the Motor Transport Service of the 
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Quartermaster Corps, trained new maintenance companies sepa-
rately, then transferred these companies intact into the new divisions. 
Support maintenance that had not existed suddenly appeared in the 
88th. 37 
The Services of Supply handled spare parts shortages with another 
simple expedient: more money. Purchases leaped from $50 million in 
1941 to $730 million in 1942 and $1.36 billion in 1943.38 This last figure 
equaled 27 percent of the value of new vehicles purchased. By late 1942 
massive purchasing yielded salutary results-adequate spare parts 
stockages-in the new divisions. 
The effects of changes with respect to maintenance cadres, support 
maintenance, and spare parts were soon apparent in the 88th Infantry 
Division. By January 1943 the three-day deadline rate dwindled to 2.5 
percent, even though training schedules by then placed increasingly 
severe demands upon the division's vehicles. 39 Except during certain 
peculiarly demanding combat situations, vehicle maintenance never 
again became as severe a problem as it was during the division's first six 
months. 
Of all the logistical problems faced by the new divisions, inade-
quate automotive maintenance was the most dangerous and required 
the most time, energy, and adjustment to resolve. The 88th fared 
relatively well, for all its deficiencies. In other divisions maintenance 
deficiencies proved even more severe. 40 
One should note that the conditions that weakened automotive 
maintenance within the new divisions did not affect the maintenance 
of weapons, communications equipment, or auxiliary equipment to 
the same degree. In part this was because of the nature of the equip-
ment itself. Vehicles have more moving parts that undergo more vibra-
tion, wear, and tear. One estimate holds that three mechanic man-
hours went to automotive maintenance during World War II for every 
mechanic man-hour spent on the maintenance of other equipment. 41 
In the case of communications equipment, a single separate serv-
ice, the Signal Corps, supervised procurement, maintenance, and use. 
While the Signal Corps encountered problems during mobilization, it 
did succeed in providing sufficient numbers of trained maintenance 
personnel to the new divisions. Indeed, it had undertaken to train all 
communications personnel for the new divisions, including radio and 
telephone operators. In the press of mobilization this proved too am-
bitious, but the corps managed to provide a cadre of forty-three out of 
the ninety-seven communications maintenance personnel the division 
required. 42 
Weapons also proved to be more easily maintained than auto-
motive equipment. The Ordnance Corps was responsible for procure-
ment and support maintenance. The corps provided two NCOs and six 
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mechanics to each of the new infantry divisions. Although each infan-
try company designated a promising draftee as "armorer-artificer," in 
actual practice NCOs in the tactical chain of command provided the 
organizational maintenance of small arms. There had been an ample 
supply of machine guns and rifles in the interwar army, and newer 
models represented no important technological changes. Cadre NCOs 
proved sufficient to assure the maintenance of small arms, with only 
occasional reliance on armorer-artificers or ordnance support mainte-
nance mechanics. Heavier weapons were a more difficult proposition, 
so Artillery provided one cadre artillery mechanic to each of its firing 
batteries, one mechanic to every four guns. Initially, the mortars and 
antitank guns of the infantry regiments were maintained without 
specialists. This posed fewer problems than one might have expected, 
since mortars virtually defied the need for maintenance and antitank 
guns were not at first available for issue. 43 
Weapons maintenance demands within an infantry division had 
not changed much since World War I. It was true that there had been 
technological innovations, but these did not require a reorganization of 
maintenance arrangements. The same mechanics had to learn to do 
some slightly different things. In the cases of some weapons, mainte-
nance techniques and records of repair parts stockages dating as far 
back as the Civil War continued to be useful. 44 In 1942 the army was 
prepared to maintain the weapons it had on hand. 
Auxiliary-powered equipment also seems to have been readily 
maintained, although hauling this equipment around placed increased 
automotive maintenance demands on the carriers. Original designs, 
prototypes, and models of auxiliary equipment generally called for 
aluminum and stainless steel. During the first years of the war, these 
metals were designated as critical, so manufacturers substituted heav-
ier metals. The weight of the M1937 field range, for example, increased 
from 138 to 178 pounds. Changes in auxiliary equipment thus in-
creased demands upon carriers at a time when automotive mainte-
nance was already the division's greatest single problem. 45 
One might conclude a discussion of the maintenance problems of 
the draftee divisions by reflecting on the maxim that armies prepare for 
the last war rather than for the next one. Weapons and auxiliary 
equipment had not changed much between the wars, so the army of 
1942 was prepared to maintain them. Of the communications equip-
ment, the wired was old and the wireless, new. The wired presented 
relatively few maintenance problems and, unfortunately, the wireless 
did not reveal the full extent of its vulnerabilities until the division was 
actually in combat. Radically increased numbers of vehicles posed 
maintenance problems with which the army was not prepared to cope. 
Quantitative changes were so great that they became qualitative; divi-
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Table 6. Changes in Divisional Logistical Personnel, June 1941 to 
November 1942 
Automotive 
maintenance 
Administrative & 
clerical 
Ammunition 
Finance 
General 
Postal 
Supply 
Food services 
Legal services 
Chemical 
Police 
Religious 
Communications 
Medical 
Specialist 
Nonspecialist 
1941 
Cadre 
71 
6 
14 
128 
0 
99 
282 
4 
4 
2 
18 
65 
111 
5 
1941 
Draftee 
204 
23 
0 
97 
13 
78 
277 
0 
0 
65 
4 
939 
124 
365 
1941 
"Student-
teacher" 
ratio 
3:1 
4:1 
4:5 
13:0 
4:5 
1:1 
32:1 
14:1 
1:1 
77:1 
1942 
Cadre 
Cadre 
percent 
change 
92 +30 
4 -33 
12 -14 
158 +23 
4 + Infinity 
115 +16 
275 -2 
4 0 
4 0 
2 0 
14 -22 
62 -5 
93 -16 
20 +300 
sions, new and old alike, were forced to rebuild automotive mainte-
nance establishments after demolishing the ramshackle provisions 
they had inherited from the past. 
Maintenance was not the only logistical service within the 88th 
plagued by shortages of trained personnel or inequities in their dis-
tribution. Few of the logistical services escaped a period of change and 
adjustment with respect to cadres and personnel allocations before the 
composition of both stabilized late in 1942. Table 6 summarizes the 
changes that proved necessary between June 1941 and November 1942. 
As it indicates, only cadre provisions for military police, legal as-
sistance, and chemical services remained unchanged in 1942. 
Logistical services showed a high interchange between civilian and 
military skills. The War Department attempted to utilize technical 
skills the draftees brought with them, and the new divisions seem to 
have been better able than the old to find useful vocational experience 
within their ranks. For certain services, such as those of meteorologist, 
draftsman, carpenter, welder, musician, gymnasium manager, recrea-
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tion specialist, or instrument specialist, there were no cadremen, and 
the draftees themselves were the only source of talent. The potential 
richness of the draftees' experience is exemplified in the division's 
response to its rabbi's request: he wanted, as an enlisted assistant, a 
Jew who could drive, service a jeep, type, sing, and play a portable 
organ. The New York contingent of the enlisted filler contained ten 
men who possessed this unlikely combination of characteristics. 46 
Logistical personnel also often received support from local civilian 
agencies and businesses. This proved particularly important during 
the initial months, when the division was not yet prepared to support 
itself. The Muskogee Veterans Administration Hospital treated a total 
of 2,314 personnel while the Camp Gruber Hospital was being 
organized. Victory Bus Lines, expanded from two to fourteen vehicles 
by enterprising businessmen, provided transportation between Mus-
kogee and Camp Gruber. Civilian contractors installed and initially 
operated the telephone system servicing Camp Gruber. Local realtors 
housed married service members; local jobbers maintained and serv-
iced auxiliary equipment; local clergymen provided religious services; 
local policemen detained the errant and rescued the lost; and, of 
course, local businessmen supplemented the division's recreational 
program with facilities and diversions of their own. Camp Gruber was 
never entirely dependent upon military resources for its own logistical 
support. 47 
Army Ground Forces found it necessary to augment cadre provi-
sions for that collection of logistical functions best described as admin-
istrative and clerical. Even those increases proved insufficient to meet 
the administrative and clerical demands of 1942. Ultimately it proved 
necessary to establish special schools within the division to train 
administrative and clerical personnel. Given the increased material 
demands of World War II, schooling for supply sergeants proved 
particularly necessary. 4H 
One should note that administrative and clerical cadremen, re-
sponsible for training subordinates, were usually inexperienced them-
selves. Often they were merely promising young men who had been in 
the service a brief period before being selected for the 88th. For-
tunately, the personnel chosen to be clerks, often designated AGCT 
Class I, were exceptions to the general rule that soldiers do not learn 
much about their jobs by reading. All of these men were literate, and 
many were well educated. 49 Clerks, whether cadre or draftee, did 
much to train themselves. Army regulations provided them detailed 
administrative guidance: technical manuals with examples of corre-
spondence and administrative actions, standard forms outlining ad-
ministrative actions, and electrical messages dictating the format of 
specific reports. Grizzled first sergeants and harried sergeant majors 
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may not have fully understood the paperwork involved, but they 
valued their clerks' contribution-in particular, the appeasement of 
higher headquarters-enough to provide them that special genre of 
patronage traditionally associated with orderly rooms. 5° 
Finance and postal services were exceptions to this policy of self-
instruction because they required more standardization than did the 
other clerical tasks. The 88th's postal clerks received considerable 
training and follow-on attention from the Post Office Department. The 
division's entire finance contingent trained en bloc at the Army Finance 
Center (Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana), then transferred bodily into 
the new division. These functions were too important to be left to the 
good intentions of the 88th's partially trained cadremen or to their 
capability to teach themselves over time.51 
Clerics of another type, the chaplains, proved readily available in 
the new division. Each division received fourteen chaplains, for the 
most part officers drawn directly from civilian life. This could cause 
problems. General Sloan himself once stormed into a group of officers 
in whom he detected a lack of military bearing-they wore their 
uniforms poorly, were milling around purposelessly during the duty 
day, and, worst of all, none of them called the group to attention to 
salute him. Outraged, Sloan collared the group as a body, "raising 
hell" with them for their slovenly behavior. Shortly, to his surprise and 
embarrassment, he learned that the objects of his tirade were a con-
tingent of chaplains new to the army and recently arrived at Gruber. He 
resolved to put such direct commissions into a special training pro-
gram before they exposed themselves to the division. 52 The chaplains' 
personal assistants came from the enlisted filler and experienced 
somewhat less culture shock. 
Chaplains had a military as well as a religious role in the draftee 
divisions. The public statements of General Sloan, his principal subor-
dinates, and the chaplains themselves indicate that they considered 
crusading zeal and evangelical fervor important components of the 
American will to fight. 53 Commanders and chaplains worked in con-
cert within the division and in promoting the war effort in communities 
surrounding Camp Gruber. 54 The division's head chaplain acknowl-
edged that his role was to enhance the draftees' motivation and morale 
as well as their spiritual health. 
The draftee's physical health was cared for by a medical establish-
ment that initially was uneven in quality. The individual medical skills 
of physicians and technicians, for the most part drawn directly from 
civilian practice, was of a high order. 55 These men proved more than 
competent to train the additional medical technicians specified in the 
table of organization. The division's total medical establishment, how-
ever, required considerable nonspecialist activity as well. Nearly four 
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hundred ward attendants, litter bearers, drivers, cooks, and clerks in 
the medical units also had to be organized and trained. Medical officers 
were not altogether suited for this task, largely because of the more 
properly medical demands on their time, their relative lack of military 
experience, and, in some cases, their nonmilitary tastes and tempera-
ments. 
The division surgeon recalls an incident wherein four veteran 
army wives observed an officer with his felt hat on backwards, ac-
coutrements scrambled, pants pressed sideways, and trousers three 
inches too high. They correctly assumed that he was medical. On 
another occasion General Sloan had his jeep jerked to a halt because it 
had just passed a captain who failed to salute. Confronted by the 
bantam Sloan, the embarrassed doctor apologized and explained that 
he thought generals traveled in long black limousines; he never imag-
ined he would encounter a general in such a vehicle as a jeep. The 
weight of training nonspecialists necessarily fell upon nonspecialist 
cadre NCOs. Of these, the medical battalion originally had only five. 
This number proved inadequate and increased fourfold during 1942. 
With greater numbers of NCOs, the training of the medical battalion 
progressed far more satisfactorily. 56 
Signal Corps was another service wherein cadre technicians were 
sufficiently numerous but cadremen to train nonspecialists were not. 
The NCOs who trained the draftee wiremen, radio operators, switch-
board operators, and signal vehicle drivers were, for the most part, line 
rather than signal NCOs. Communications personnel were so directly 
integrated into the units they supported that the chains of command 
within those units assumed responsibility for them. This must have 
contributed to discipline, to a sense of belonging, and to the mastery of 
common skills, but it also must have reduced the exposure of these 
signalmen to signal-specific training. 57 
Collectively considered, shortages of trained logistical personnel 
and inequities in their distribution caused the 88th an array of reason-
ably manageable problems. Except in the case of automotive mainte-
nance, the division was able to work its way through to satisfactory 
resolutions without much outside help. There was a great deal of talent 
among the draftees; personnel stability allowed that talent to surface 
and settle into appropriate slots. It also allowed the draftees sufficient 
time to be trained by someone-including themselves-even if that 
someone was not the cadreman initially designated for the task. 
The physical quality of the Camp Gruber cantonment illustrates 
another type of logistical problem that troubled the new divisions: 
hastily built quarters. Between January 1939 and December 1941 the 
War Department's cantonment construction program kept pace with 
the then moderate expansion of the army. This prewar construction 
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effort faced and for the most part overcame a number of difficulties, the 
most embarrassing of which was a feud concerning responsibilities 
between the Quartermaster Corps and the Corps of Engineers. On 1 
December 1941, President Roosevelt signed a bill transferring canton-
ment construction from the quartermasters to the engineers. The 
transfer was to be effective on 16 December. The Japanese attack on 7 
December placed radically increased construction demands squarely 
upon an agency in transition. At the time of the bidding on Camp 
Gruber, the engineers had not had sufficient time for the preliminary 
work their procedures required. They had not done the detailed plan-
ning that would have allowed them to define construction needs and 
costs accurately. 5R 
Manhattan Construction Company-Long Construction Company, 
an organization with considerable experience in defense construction, 
won the Camp Gruber contract. Its bid was twenty-eight million dol-
lars, four million dollars higher than the Corps of Engineers estimate. 
Manhattan-Long produced results quickly. In April 1942, Camp 
Gruber was 10 percent completed; by July the cantonment was 
finished. Construction moved along at a rate of one building con-
structed every forty minutes. The hastily assembled buildings con-
formed to a standard plan: large bays with little interior sectioning, 
unfinished pine board interiors, painted wooden exteriors, and vir-
tually no insulation. Construction safety requirements had been 
abridged for the duration of the war although, curiously, a regulation 
issued by the surgeon general to minimize contagion prevented dou-
ble bunking in troop billets. This considerably reduced the efficiency 
with which space could be used. The buildings themselves were com-
fortable enough during the summer of 1942, but somewhat less satis-
factory in the winter that followed. The simple, wooden shells did 
house relatively sophisticated utilities and equipment; subcontractors 
installed an electrical system, plumbing, a telephone system, five 
motion picture theaters, and impressive arrays of modern kitchen 
equipment. 59 
Had the time necessary for detailed topographical research been 
available, it probably would have become apparent that the plans for 
Camp Gruber provided inadequate roads and parking. The access road 
connecting Camp Gruber with Muskogee and the outside world was 
too narrow for the volume of traffic moving over it, and it was impossi-
ble to keep well drained and repaired. Within living memory, the 
Cookson Hills wherein Gruber was located had been a favored hideout 
for outlaws and public enemies. For them the attraction had been 
inaccessibility. After heavy rains the camp was often cut off altogether. 
Within the camp, roads were of marginal quality and insufficient 
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hardstand parking existed for the division's trucks, tractors, and 
guns. 60 
Sloan recognized these problems when he first visited the con-
struction site in April 1942, but his efforts to redress them proved 
ineffectual. Manhattan-Long had no incentive to undertake con-
struction in excess of that originally contracted for. Pressed by an 
accelerating construction program, the Corps of Engineers had little 
interest in further research or negotiation for such peripheral con-
struction. The Oklahoma State Highway Department promised to 
improve the access road, then reneged. These oversights became an 
embarrassment to the 88th. The 2,149 vehicles of the new division put a 
severe strain on surface routes and motor parks. The condition of the 
access road led General Sloan and the Muskogee Chamber of Com-
merce-which also had an interest in routes to and from Camp 
Gruber-into heated confrontation with state highway officials. Mud 
in Camp Gruber's motor parks, and the attendant maintenance com-
plications, came to the attention of Gen. Leslie}. McNair himself. Sloan 
enjoyed more flexibility with respect to construction needs when his 
own engineer batallion was trained and equipped. Until then he made 
do with the Camp Gruber he had received: a marginal facility that cost 
too much. 61 
The logistical problems faced by the new divisions were not the 
mere matters of scale predicted by Uptonian critics of a levee en masse. 
Far from being caught entirely unprepared on M-day, American legis-
lators had funded preparedness measures that were well advanced by 
the time of Pearl Harbor. Supply per se was not a critical problem for the 
new divisions. Rather than choosing between a small, well-equipped 
army or a large, ill-supplied army in 1942, the War Department was 
able to achieve a large, well-supplied Army. Mobilization planners did 
not fully appreciate the implications of modernization, however. Logis-
tical services that had changed little between the wars, such as weap-
ons maintenance or food services, found themselves in less turmoil 
than did those most subject to the pressures of modernization, such as 
vehicle maintenance. 
All factors considered, the American logistical mobilization for 
World War II must number among the greatest of the nation's military 
accomplishments. The problems and waste were vast; so was the 
achievement. Neither problems nor waste were inevitable, but they 
were readily enough resolved or endured as the nation prepared to 
exert its military might overseas. 
5 _____ _ 
The Movement Overseas: 
Keeping the Edge 
The 88th Infantry, the first American draft division into combat in 
World War II, took over a sector of the Italian front on 5 March 19441-
twenty months after its activation and twenty-eight months after the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The American draft divisions did not 
weigh heavily in the balance against the Axis powers until the summer 
of 1944, two and one-half years after the United States entered the 
war. 2 
Why did the United States take so long to deploy its newly mobi-
lized divisions overseas? Some of the reasons for delay have already 
been discussed. The War Department considered the twelve-month 
training cycle an indispensable prelude to the entry of the draft divi-
sions into combat. Divisions usually progressed from this into multi-
divisional maneuvers lasting about a month. Thus, a division moving 
on schedule through its training cycle was not prepared for deploy-
ment until thirteen months after activation. Additional delays might be 
caused by personnel transfers or failures to meet the exacting stan-
dards of tests administered at the conclusion of every training block. 
The 88th progressed through its training cycle on schedule and was 
designated deployable in August 1943, thirteen months after activa-
tion. 3 Seven months later it finally reached the Italian front. What did 
the division do during those seven long months? 
Among the first issues to suggest themselves to War Department 
planners concerned with overseas movement was the problem of com-
mand supervision. 4 The War Department was ultimately responsible 
for overseas movement, but subordinate headquarters were more di-
rectly involved. In the Zone of the Interior the immediate subordinates 
of the War Department were the army's three great, often feuding, 
fiefdoms: the Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces, and the 
Army Service Forces. Each of these agencies had its own vast comple-
The Movement Overseas 71 
ment of installations, facilities, subordinate commands, units, respon-
sibilities-and its own sense of prerogative. Because the Army Air 
Forces had little to do with the preparation and deployment of ground 
combat troops, the major headquarters most involved with the draft 
divisions were the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces. 
Throughout the war the Army Ground Forces and the Army Serv-
ice Forces-the first responsible for personnel and training, the second 
for logistical support-worked in tandem. Their mutual cooperation 
was more effective, all factors considered, than one might have ex-
pected of two such bureaucratic behemoths, but differences could not 
always be easily reconciled. These differences were sometimes func-
tional, since Army Ground Forces stressed training and Army Service 
Forces stressed logistics. Other times, they were related to the competi-
tions for facilities, since the Army Ground Forces controlled training 
cantonments and maneuver areas, while the Army Service Forces 
controlled railways and ports of embarkation. 5 
The confusion that could develop during embarkation had been 
amply demonstrated in the autumn of 1942. The overseas movement of 
Task Force A, led by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., became an 
administrative nightmare. Some of the difficulties encountered by Task 
Force A were inevitable, but most probably could have been avoided if 
the several agencies involved had cooperated more effectively. What-
ever his merits as a field commander, Patton was not suited to the 
delicate task of developing habits of cooperation among supporting 
agencies. 6 The preparation of Task Force A was characterized through-
out by defective coordination and indignant recrimination. 7 
After its sobering experience getting Patton overseas, the War 
Department set about developing a consistent program detailing the 
responsibilities of commanders and agencies involved in overseas 
movements. This activity resulted in a thirty-four-page directive, pro-
mulgated on 1 February 1943, labeled POM (Preparation for Overseas 
Movement). This established definite responsibilities and greatly facili-
tated planning and preparation. H 
Insofar as command arrangements were concerned, POM subordi-
nated units to different headquarters at different times during the 
course of their movements. 9 Draftee divisions served under the Army 
Ground Forces until the conclusion of their twelve-month training 
cycle. Army Ground Forces alerted a division three months prior to its 
proposed embarkation date. This alert notification initiated specific, 
detailed activity for which the division's responsibility was divided, 
part of it to its army headquarters (Army Ground Forces) and part to its 
service command (Army Service Forces). When embarkation was im-
minent, the designated port commander, a member of the Army Serv-
ice Forces, called the unit to port. The port commander assumed 
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supervisory responsibilities while the unit remained in the port of 
embarkation. Once the unit was on the high seas, it reverted to the 
direct control of the War Department until the receiving theater as-
sumed command. 
The details of POM represented an effective series of compromises 
between the training-oriented Army Ground Forces and the logistics-
oriented Army Service Forces. On receiving the POM directives, a 
division undertook a specific sequence of activities, some of which 
favored training and some, logistics, regardless of the headquarters to 
which it was assigned at the time. 
Once alerted, the 88th, in accordance with POM, undertook sever-
al weeks of training even more intensive than it had previously under-
gone. This intensive training was facilitated by the division's transfer to 
Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in the first week of September 1943. Here the 
88th received priority in the use of the nearby Camp Bullis training 
area, a sophisticated facility featuring mock European villages, pop-up 
targets, live ammunition, and pyrotechnic training aids. Camp Bullis 
was famous not only for the innovativeness and realism of its training, 
but also for the size and persistence of its ticks. Here the draftees found 
"tick-picking" buddies indispensable; if they still retained any modes-
ty they quickly shed it in their desperation to be rid of the pests. After a 
brief period of intense training, the attention of the division turned to 
logistics. During October the activity of the 88th was, for the most part, 
given over to inventory, issuance, maintenance, packing, shipping, 
and the turnover of property remaining behind. 10 
Maintaining reasonable standards of property accountability was 
difficult at best throughout World War II. The logisticians of the 88th 
had to account for millions of dollars of property, including far more 
T.O. equipment than had ever been issued in any army, anywhere. The 
88th initiated its POM property accountability with a massive invento-
ry-a "show-down inspection"-to identify "original shortages" with-
in component units. Some of these original shortages were reconciled 
from stocks within the division. The remaining, or unreconciled, 
shortages were compiled into "initial lists of shortages" in sextuplicate. 
Of these six copies, one was retained and one was forwarded to each of 
five officers: the G-4 (supply officer) of the Third Army, the Eighth 
Service Command, the G-4 of the Army Ground Forces, the Stock 
Control Division of the Army Service Forces, and the appropriate chief 
of a supply service (quartermaster in the case of a boot, ordnance in the 
case of a gunner's quadrant, etc.). These agencies reviewed the initial 
lists of shortages to assure that they represented reasonable property 
losses during the course of the training cycle-assuming shortage 
items had been issued in the first place-then canvassed their own 
resources to assist in making the shortages good. 11 
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During the period in which the division reconciled shortages of the 
property it was to take overseas, it also prepared to turn in property it 
was to leave in the Zone of the Interior. In addition to cantonment 
facilities, this property included the division's general-purpose vehi-
cles. The Army Service Forces, conscious of the limitations of Allied 
shipping, had determined that such vehicles should be shipped sepa-
rately, disassembled and in bulk. Bulk shipments were consolidated in 
depots overseas, then issued to incoming units as they arrived. Often 
this equipment was shipped directly from the factory and first as-
sembled overseas. 12 
As did most draftee divisions, the 88th transferred the vehicles 
with which it had trained in the United States to the Army Service 
Forces, shipped without such equipment, then drew an entirely new 
issue of vehicles overseas. These arrangements had advantages for all 
concerned, but there were disadvantages as well. Units following the 
88th through the training cycle had to use equipment increasingly 
worn each time it was passed on, or "bumped." Units such as the 88th, 
which transferred general-purpose vehicles and shipped organiza-
tional weapons, had to do without this equipment during the months 
required to move overseas. 13 This lack of equipment affected the state 
of training. 
Equipment that was to accompany the division also had to be 
cleaned, serviced, packed, and stored. Soldiers served as packers, 
drivers, and stevedores, while officers assumed the responsibilities of 
overseers and shipping clerks in what proved a tedious process. This 
unglamorous logistical activity served the needs of the Army Service 
Forces far more than it furthered the training of the draftees and their 
cadremen. During October the division abandoned training efforts 
altogether while it met the logistical demands of POM. Inventories 
were necessarily repetitive since each major reconciliation initiated yet 
another listing of shortages. Division wags complained of "show down 
and short arms scheduled ... daily." Preparing vehicles and weapons 
for turn-in was also a lengthy process; the packing details came to be 
compared with slave labor. 14 
The tedium was in part relieved by preembarkation furloughs. In 
accord with Army Ground Forces guidance, troops with homes in the 
Mississippi Valley received ten-day furloughs, while those from out-
side it were given fifteen days. Preembarkation furloughs staggered 
between 6 September and 24 October in such a manner that enough 
troops always remained available to provide fatigue details. Furloughs 
had an important effect on morale, since many of the draftees had not 
seen family since induction and few had been home since the Christ-
mas season of 1942. They traveled in uniform and almost invariably 
encountered expressions of support for the war effort and their role in 
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it. At home they were heroes to the children and recipients of unprece-
dented respect from their fathers and other older men. If they could get 
over their mothers' anguished looks upon parting, the trip was almost 
fun. 
Even a document as detailed as POM could not have anticipated all 
requirements, so supplementary directives and hastily convened staff 
conferences were as much a part of the movement overseas as they 
were of training or combat. This unprogrammed activity was vulnera-
ble to personalities. Unanticipated demands strain the time and re-
sources of commanders who think their time and resources are already 
stretched to the limit. Staff officers and bureaucrats whose directives 
have been overlooked can never be sure that they are not being deliber-
ately ignored. The effectiveness of coordination beyond that required 
by POM depended to a considerable extent upon the personalities of 
the officers involved. General Sloan and his chief of staff, Col. Robert J. 
McBride, consciously acted with an easy gentility that "made friends 
fast." 15 Their professional philosophies made no allowance for person-
ality conflicts, and they did not permit their subordinates such indul-
gences either. Unlike Task Force A, the 88th Infantry Division enjoyed 
the personal goodwill of those in charge of the service commands to 
which it was assigned, supporting civil agencies, and the several 
installations in which the unit was based. 16 These good relations 
doubtless facilitated the many coordinations necessary as the division 
moved overseas. 
As must have been the case with every other unit on its way to 
combat, the state of training of the 88th Infantry Division deteriorated 
en route. After the Louisiana maneuvers of July and August and the 
brief flurry of intensive training in September 1943, the 88th could do 
little unit-level training until it reassembled overseas. The month of 
October was given over to logistical preparations and furloughs, after 
which, without most of their equipment, the units of the 88th would 
trickle after each other along the rail lines to Camp Patrick Henry, 
Virginia, their port of embarkation. 
During this period without meaningful unit training, the 88th's 
state of training suffered even further because of its second major 
instance of personnel turbulence (the surrendering of a cadre to the 
11th Airborne Division being the first). This arose from requirements 
that the division embark at T. 0. strength and that it release for reassign-
ment men who could not meet the rigorous age and physical 
requirements of POM overseas screening physicals. These preem-
barkation losses were in addition to routine personnel losses accumu-
lated during the course of the training cycle because of injuries, 
illnesses, selected reassignments, and discharges for cause. All sources 
considered, the personnel shortages of the 88th came to 2,057, or about 
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15 percent of the division's authorized manpower. Plans specified by 
POM called upon the division's parent army, the Third Army, to make 
up these shortages within fifteen days. 17 
Even under ideal circumstances the new men would have faced the 
usual integration problems of individual replacements. In addition to 
routine integration problems, however, the draftee divisions also 
risked receiving disproportionate numbers of undesirables in their 
preembarkation replacement contingents. Personnel shortages in 
fighting units or in those en route to combat were often reconciled by 
stripping men from units not yet prepared to embark. Troops thus 
gained were at various levels of training, and often they already identi-
fied with their original units. What was worse, commanders of the 
stripped units too often culled out their poorest troops for transfer. 
Contingents of "bolos" greatly aggravated integration problems in the 
receiving units. A replacement training center contingent tended to be 
a balanced cross-section of young men; the balance in stripped-off 
contingents depended upon the scruples of the commanders who gave 
them upY' 
General Sloan was alert to the possibility he might receive un-
desirables from other units. Accompanied by the adjutants and per-
sonnel officers of the division, Sloan met the replacement train at the 
railhead on the day his preembarkation replacements were to arrive. 
He had guards posted and ordered that no one was to leave the train 
until the records of all had been screened. Technically, troops belonged 
to their original units until they debarked and were processed in. In a 
short time Sloan's adjutants and personnel officers established beyond 
doubt that the train was filled with the problem soldiers of the unit that 
had dispatched them. It was "wall-to-wall bolos" without one man in 
five "fit to pull KP." Sloan ordered the train to return whence it had 
come-without a man aboard ever having set foot in his cantonment. 1 '-i 
Sloan's flagrant act of refusing replacements precipitated stormy 
command and staff sessions in a number of headquarters. Comman-
ders cursed and swore at Sloan's intransigence while the Third Army 
staff frantically attempted to gather another group of seventeen hun-
dred replacements within their fifteen-day deadline. Fortunately, 
Sloan was good at mending fences and he avoided prolonging the 
controversy. He soon received seventeen hundred fully qualified re-
placements from the 86th Infantry Division-not, incidentally, the unit 
from which the rejected contingent had been drawn. 20 
Beginning 25 October 1943, the units of the 88th Infantry Division, 
including the partly integrated preembarkation replacements, traveled 
in relays by train from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to Camp Patrick 
Henry, Virginia. Camp Patrick Henry was a secured area, which re-
stricted movements because of space limitations and security precau-
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tions. The perimeter was heavily guarded and men were forbidden to 
move freely or to refer to unit designations, even when training. The 
post was suited for only the most basic sort of training; even this 
proved difficult because so much time had to be spent on preembarka-
tion personnel actions, immunizations, inventories, inspections, and 
uploading. 21 
Army Ground Forces recognized that a unit's training deteriorated 
in transit and at ports of embarkation. It recommended speedy transit 
and a maximum of two weeks in the ports. Army Service Forces found 
these specifications difficult to meet, for shipping dates were approx-
imations based upon the anticipated availability of transportation. 
Increments of the 88th departed for North Africa on 2 November, 3 
November, 19 November, 23 November, 7 December, and 17 December. 
Thus the division phased its units through Camp Henry with less than 
a month in the port itself, although always with more than two weeks. 
This was somewhat better than average, as port movements went. All 
these increments closed to Casablanca by 27 December 1943.22 
Once on the high seas, the division's opportunities for training did 
not improve. Troops bunked five high on canvas hammocks filling all 
the space available in the lumbering liberty ships. Deck space also was 
limited. Safety requirements kept men belowdeck except during 
daylight, so troops passed the long winter nights belowdeck in an 
atmosphere reeking of sweat, damp equipment, and sometimes vomit. 
The situation aboard ship would have offered few possibilities for 
meaningful training even had the troops been fit. As it was, the 
draftees of the 88th encountered the health hazards associated with 
major troop movements. The trip across the Atlantic took three weeks 
for all but those fortunate enough to cross in a week on the converted 
luxury liners Empress of Scotland and HMS Andes. Immediately before 
embarkation a virus swept through the congested Camp Henry can-
tonment and temporarily disabled thousands. Half the division 
eventually went to bed rest, ashore or at sea, and five hundred of its 
soldiers were hospitalized. Seasickness also set in. Soldiers could lie 
down on their hammocks through the worst days of seasickness, but 
the atmosphere was stifling and the power of suggestion so great that 
vomiting became contagious. Soldiers could also get up onto deck for 
fresh air, recognizing that they might have to make a run for the railing 
if the ship took a sudden lurch. Most troops took the latter alternative, 
and made what wags referred to as "the Atlantic crossing by rail. "23 
As if these temporary debilitations were not trying enough, the 
division narrowly escaped an outbreak of spinal meningitis. Division 
surgeons making daily inspections of the crowded holds identified the 
initial symptoms of two cases. They isolated these patients early 
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enough to prevent further contagion. The patients received extensive 
doses of the not yet fully understood "wonder drugs" and survived 
both the disease and the treatment. An epidemic of spinal meningitis in 
the crowded holds would have been nothing less than catastrophic. 
As the voyages wore on, the stateside virus ran its course and men 
gained their "sea legs" as well. Physical illness gave way to the tensions 
of prolonged confinement as the greatest threat to morale. Attempts to 
conduct training or calisthenics did little to relieve the monotony. A 
divisional parody of "Thanks for the Memories" rhapsodized: "Of 
training on the way, of decks that swing and sway I Of thieves and 
crabs and bayonet stabs I And a swell Thanksgiving Day." 
Some of the fights that broke out in the fetid holds took an unex-
pected twist, for men began squabbling over the theretofore maligned 
fatigue detail of KP. Kitchen police duty provided temporary escape 
into the comparatively luxurious facilities reserved for the merchant 
marine crew. It also guaranteed more food to satisfy renewed, at times 
voracious, post-illness appetites. Shipboard provisions specified only 
two meals a day to the soldiers, this because of reduced physical 
activity, limited tonnage, and the administrative complications of serv-
ing three meals a day. Reduced rations were hardly a problem for the 
seasick, but when appetites returned even master sergeants pulled 
rank on lesser grades to make the KP list. 24 
Rather than shipping directly to Italy, the 88th would debark at 
Casbalanca, travel by rail to a staffing and training area about seventy-
five miles south of Oran, then move by sea to Italy from Oran. The War 
Department considered the Gibraltar area too dangerous for the lum-
bering troop ships. Although the diversion through Casablanca re-
quired a 650-mile trip in boxcars through the Atlas Mountains, it had 
some redeeming features. Several days of rest and recreation at Cas-
ablanca were certainly welcome. Casablanca's camel caravans, 
wrecked French battleships, mysterious veiled women, colorful ba-
zaars, and ostensibly off-limits sections received ample attention from 
the not-altogether-cosmopolitan assortment of draftees. Movies pro-
vided additional entertainment, and the mess halls of Camp Don B. 
Passage represented a considerable improvement over shipboard fare. 
When rest and recreation led to rowdiness, some of the new arrivals 
became familiar with Camp Passage's prison facility, Music Hill. Of-
ficers made the point that disciplinary standards would be even more 
severe overseas than in the United States. 25 
After those days of rest, recreation, exercise, and decent meals, 
troops crowded into boxcars for the trip to Oran, forty to a car. A single 
Iyster bag provided water in each of the boxcars and meals consisted, 
for the most part, of unheated C rations. Many a soldier shivering 
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under a single blanket and bumping along through the frigid winter 
nights of the Atlas Mountains may have longed for the warm, fetid 
holds and hot, if skimpy, meals of the liberty ships. 
General Sloan was understandably unhappy with what he saw of 
his division as it off-loaded into the muddy staging and training area 
near Oran. In three months, two of them spent in actual transit, the 
division had lost the edge demonstrated in its Louisiana maneuvers. 
One soldier out of eight had never maneuvered with the division at all. 
The training of the others had suffered from the prolonged inactivities 
of transit, the time devoted to logistical preparation, and the recent lack 
of organizational equipment. To General Sloan, ever the stern ped-
agogue, the condition of the division suggested only one response-
the time-honored "big buck-up," an intense period of training and 
inspection to "whip a unit back into shape."26 
Sloan realized that his division might be stranded for weeks be-
cause of the vagaries of Allied shipping in the face of competing 
priorities and Axis threats. In fact, the 88th remained near Oran for 
more than a month. Seizing this opportunity for training, Sloan used 
the French Foreign Legion's Bedeau Cantonment south of Magenta. 
Here the empty vastness of the Atlas Mountains offered an ideal 
environment in which to retrain for the rigors of Italy. For weeks the 
infantry regiments maneuvered against each other through the rugged 
terrain while artillery, engineers, and logistical units struggled to 
render support. In particular, units reviewed land mine warfare, 
marksmanship, demolitions, small-unit operations, crew duties, and 
night operations. Even in the absence of organizational equipment-
personal weapons were at all times available-the challenge of the 
terrain and the pace of the training whipped the division back into 
shape. 
Soldiers again became hardened to life under canvas in inhospita-
ble conditions, and they relearned the skills involved in caring for 
themselves and their equipment. Along with conventional field expe-
dients, enterprising draftees discovered the properties of a local bev-
erage called Eau de Vie. Versatile enough to drink or to serve as heating 
fuel, it relieved two shortages at once. One did have to take precautions 
against its fiery taste and unpredictable volatility, however. 
Magenta exposed the division to many of the environment and 
leadership challenges it would encounter in Italy, including peddlers, 
pilferers, and camp followers. Theft seemed endemic, peddler and 
pilferer were often the same person, and local prostitutes were so 
degraded they virtually guaranteed infection. One wholesome alter-
native to these temptations came with the arrival of the division's Red 
Cross Clubmobile. Attached from Magenta until the end of the war, 
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this unit consisted of four attractive young women who provided 
soldiers with doughnuts, coffee, entertainment, and somewhat cir-
cumscribed feminine companionship. It was hoped that glimpses of the 
girl back home might help the draftees resist the temptations they 
would encounter in the fleshpots of the Old World. Four girls could 
hardly console fourteen thousand soldiers, but their smiles and serv-
ices do seem to have exerted a disproportionate effect on morale. 
The Magenta interlude, extending from the last week of December 
1943 through January 1944, proved invaluable to the 88th. During this 
intensive training in rough terrain, the division recovered from the 
prolonged deterioration of overseas movement. Indeed, some partici-
pants considered the exercises in the wintry Atlas to have been the 
finest training the division ever had. Unlike many other divisions, the 
88th debarked into the combat zone within two weeks of intensive 
retraining. 
As the 88th prepared for its somewhat risky voyage from Oran to 
Naples, attention swung to the question of when, where, and under 
what circumstances it was to enter the front lines. The complete 
replacement of an entire division with another along the Italian front 
was no easy task, so sentiment developed in Fifth Army headquarters 
for detaching components of the 88th to reinforce the badly worn 
regular and National Guard divisions already in Italy. Even as General 
Sloan pushed his division across the Mediterranean, he unhappily 
reflected upon the fate of most World War I draftee divisions-liqui-
dated upon their arrival in the combat theater. 27 
While at Magenta, Sloan dispatched an advance party to facilitate 
the division's deployment either as a unit or as piecemeal reinforce-
ments. On 26 December this advance party, consisting of officers and 
NCOs from each component unit and led by the assistant division 
commander, Brig. Gen. Paul W. Kendall, scattered through front-line 
American units in Italy. The advance party was to become familiar with 
the actual front-line situation so that on its return it might carry a 
leavening of experience to each company, battery, and headquarters of 
the 88th. 
The advance party gained experience quickly. General Kendall 
won the Silver Star when he became involved in the 36th Infantry 
Division's bloody attempt to cross the Rapido River on 20-21 January 
1944. One advance party NCO, caught in a German air raid, was killed 
in action. By the time the 88th arrived in Italy, it already had seasoned 
"pilots" scattered along the Italian front. 2 8 
Once the main body was finally under way, its transfer from Oran 
to Naples went smoothly. One French and ten British ships shuttled 
the division in three convoys between 1 February and 21 February. On 
the first night out, German planes intercepted the first convoy as it 
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cleared Oran's harbor defenses. One ship, containing no personnel or 
equipment associated with the 88th, went down. This was the only 
battle damage during the voyages. Once in Naples, units bivouacked 
overnight in the College of Costanza Ciano, then trucked to the vicinity 
of the 88th Infantry Division's new headquarters at Piedmonte d'Al-
ife. 29 
Once all units closed to Piedmonte d' Alife on 21 February, the 
circumstances of the 88th's eventual deployment became a critical 
issue. Fifth Army headquarters had plans for the piecemeal deploy-
ment of the division's component units. Already on 9 February the 
351st Regimental Combat Team (the regiment plus an artillery battalion 
and accompanying elements) had received orders for embarkation and 
shipment to the Anzio beachhead. Senior staff officers of Fifth Army 
now announced arrangements for the deployment of individual bat-
talions to reinforce the battle-weary 34th and 36th infantry divisions 
near Cassino. Artillery units were to reinforce firing batteries all along 
the Italian front. Even as the 88th drew new organizational equipment 
from the Peninsula Base Section depots at Naples, it seemed that it 
could cease to exist as a unit. 30 
Alarmed by these developments, Sloan arranged to lay his case 
before the commander of the Fifth Army, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, in a 
personal conference. 31 There were arguments for and against the 
dissolution of the 88th. On the one hand, the unit was fully trained, 
with an intact chain of command and a well-developed logistical appa-
ratus. It had demonstrated high morale and had distinguished itself as 
far as it could short of combat. The value of unit integrity for the 
established divisions had always been taken for granted; why should it 
be any less important to a draftee division? On the other hand, hard-
pressed Allied divisions around Anzio and Cassino, which already 
knew the ground, were badly in need of relief, yet their complete 
extrication and replacement would be difficult at best. Would the front 
not be better served by leaving the experienced divisions where they 
were and relieving their component units on a smaller scale? 
While these rational arguments and doubts must have weighed 
heavily in General Clark's mind, it seems he considered the personal 
factor as well. Clark and Sloan were old friends whose acquaintance 
dated from the time Clark was Sloan's student at the Command and 
General Staff School. Both men had the highest regard for each other's 
personal integrity and professional competence. Both knew that Sloan 
had passed the army's overseas service age for major general and that 
the 88th Infantry Division afforded him his last opportunity to com-
mand in combat. Clark elected to favor Sloan's position. 
On 27 February the 88th Infantry Division received orders to 
relieve the British 5th Infantry Division in the Minturno sector of the 
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Fifth Army line. This precedent repeated itself three weeks later when 
the 85th Infantry Division also moved intact into the line on the 88th's 
immediate left. The stage was set for the validation of the draftee 
division and the Army Training Program. As it happened, no other 
American draftee division would serve in combat until after these two 
went "over the top." 
One does not ordinarily think of movement into a front-line posi-
tion as combat, but such movement can be even more dangerous than 
the occupation of the front line itself. When a front is stable, risks are 
greater to a unit in motion within the range of enemy artillery than to 
units already settled into the entrenchments and bunkers of the front-
line trace. As the 88th Infantry Division relieved the British 5th Infan-
try Division, it executed its first maneuver in the face of hostile fire. 
While the front lines of Italy had reached an impasse, it was a more 
fluid stalemate than that of the Somme or Ypres in World War I. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the very roughness of the terrain 
lent the battlefield more depth and activity than it might otherwise 
have had. 32 A number of peaks provided positions from which obser-
vers could see well into the enemy rear. Even on the highest mountain, 
lines of sight often extended miles in one direction-but only meters in 
another. Draws, gullies, and dead space throughout the rugged land-
scape concealed the night patrols that scurried and skirmished through 
no-man's-land, gathering wisps of information concerning enemy dis-
positions or movements. Not even the front lines themselves were 
impermeable to enterprising patrols. 33 
Behind the Italian front's cat-and-mouse game of patrol and coun-
terpatrol, intelligence and counterintelligence, stood the firing bat-
teries of field artillery, the greatest man-killers of World War II. The 
skirmishing of the patrols in part represented infantrymen's continual 
efforts to locate lucrative artillery targets. Artillerymen of the Italian 
campaign-German, British and American-would reach the peak of 
technical competence. Located in one area for an extended period, 
they registered firing data on hundreds of reference points, correlated 
reports from numerous observers, repeatedly updated situation maps, 
and stood by to fire within seconds of a call for support. Artillery alone 
reached onto every meter of the Italian battlefield regardless of 
weather; it dominated the Italian battlefield in a way that no other arm 
could. 
Among the most vulnerable artillery targets was an exposed col-
umn of infantry marching toward or away from the protection of front-
line entrenchments. Mindful of the dangers that would attend their 
replacement of the British 5th Infantry Division, the commanders of 
the 88th undertook elaborate precautions. In an effort to create the 
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impression that the British were not to be relieved, the draftees mas-
queraded as British and wore the traditional shallow "basin" helmet 
rather than the deeper American steel pot. 34 Because German spies 
were generally Italians who recognized a uniform more readily than an 
accent, the disguised draftees called little attention to themselves in the 
British sector. American movements in the British rear areas were 
staggered so that the numbers involved at any given time approxi-
mated those of routine movement. The Germans had little reason to 
believe that anything was afoot in the area of the British 5th. 
The 88th needed to keep adequate firepower forward during the 
exchange, for the Germans were likely to exploit any weaknesses they 
detected in the Allied front lines. The 88th's infantry regiments spaced 
their movements forward over four nights, and always moved at night. 
On the first night a quartering party from each company infiltrated 
forward to reconnoiter and coordinate with British counterparts. On 
the second night heavy machine guns came laboriously forward, after 
which British heavy machine guns withdrew equally laboriously. On 
the third night the antitank platoons of the two armies furtively ex-
changed places. On the final, and most critical, night the infantry 
platoons themselves filtered past each other in the darkness. 35 
The assignment of guides from both armies to each platoon pre-
cluded delays, misorientations, or mistaken identities. Front-line posi-
tions were fully manned at all times and patrols maintained their usual 
levels of activity forward. Artillery batteries and rear echelon units 
found it somewhat less difficult to displace the British, but they, like the 
infantry, took extraordinary precautions to avoid being observed while 
moving forward or digging in; they wore British helmets, guarded 
against noise and light, and carefully planned and coordinated every 
phase of the relief. Even with these elaborate precautions, the relief was 
not accomplished without mishap. The 338th Field Artillery Battalion 
lost four men and one gun to an artillery barrage, 36 and elements of the 
351st Infantry narrowly avoided heavy shelling on their fourth night of 
movement. 
Despite the casualties, the relief was well executed and rated a 
"good show" from those British officers best in a position to observe it. 
A letter from Brig. Gen. L.L. Lemnitzer, deputy chief of staff of the 
Allied Central Mediterranean Force, informed General Sloan that the 
British officers "were much impressed by the quiet, efficient, and 
business-like manner in which your units took over their respective 
sectors and got on with the job. Not only were they impressed but they 
made it a point to express their views during their visits here."37 
It is hardly surprising that British and, later, French officers made 
such a point of expressing confidence in the newly arrived 88th Infan-
try Division. 38 The British and French seem to have been, if possible, 
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even more pleased to see the first American draftee division enter 
combat than were the veterans of America's own regular army and 
National Guard units. Among these Allied officers were some who 
could remember the agonizing delays that had preceded the forward 
deployment of newly arrived American divisions during World War I. 
In this new world war, the first American draftee division was in the 
line within two weeks of its arrival in Italy. America's vast reserves of 
conscripted manpower were at last coming into play directly, rather 
than through the filter of established prewar divisions. 
Moving a division overseas during World War II was a lengthy and 
difficult process. The experience of the 88th Infantry Division amply 
illustrates the time and complexity involved. Identified as deployable 
in August 1943, the 88th gave over September to intensive training 
while awaiting specific instructions. October was spent in fulfilling the 
directives of POM; November and December, including delays, in 
transit to Africa; January and part of February 1944, including delays, 
in transit from Africa to Italy; and the remainder of February in draw-
ing new supplies and making final preparations to enter combat. The 
88th seems to have moved through this process as quickly and effi-
ciently as the details of POM and the vagaries of available transporta-
tion allowed, yet seven months lapsed between the time the division 
was identified as deployable and the time that the division actually 
deployed. Some readers may be surprised that it took so long. Others, 
more impressed by the problems involved, may wonder that it hap-
pened so quickly. 
6 _____ _ 
Mintumo: Baptism by Fire 
On 4 March 1944 the draftees of the 88th Infantry Division at long last 
assumed responsibility for a sector of the Italian front. At that time the 
division's combat proficiency was unknown; it would in most respects 
remain an unknown until the 88th participated in its first major offen-
sive, which began on 11 May. For officers and men anxious to share in 
great events, the nine-week interval may have seemed stale and inac-
tive. Still, those weeks proved an important period of adjustment 
during which the division matured as a combat organization. 
Across Europe the months of March and April 1944 stood in the 
shadow of greater events planned for May and June. In Italy, efforts to 
break the Gustav Line at Monte Cassino, the Rapido River, and, indi-
rectly, through Anzio had all proven abortive in January and February. 
Now Allied commanders defended a stalemated front while gathering 
resources for yet another effort. In England two million men prepared 
for Operation Overlord, the invasion of France. In Russia the war 
ground on as one Soviet front and then another hurled itself at the 
Germans-Odessa finally fell on 10 April-but even in Russia lesser 
offensives were a prelude of sorts to the truly climactic Battle of White 
Russia, which began on 22 June. 
There were differences between the war the draftees of the 88th 
had trained for and the war they first found themselves called upon to 
fight. While in the United States, the division's training had empha-
sized offensive operations. At Minturno, the division found itself 
initially engaged in a defense. Changing from an offensive to a defen-
sive orientation-and learning to function in the peculiar climate and 
terrain of Italy-required adjustments in addition to those normally 
associated with "baptism by fire." 
An overall evaluation of the 88th's performance during its first two 
months in Italy would be favorable, 1 but it should not be supposed that 
all developments were positive steps in the direction of ever greater 
combat proficiency. The division demonstrated the outlines of a cycle 
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of growth, stagnation, deterioration, and conscious renovation that 
would be repeated, at varying intervals, through the balance of the war. 
The 88th's initial performance at Minturno was unique, but not 
unprecedented. Other divisions had experienced or would experience 
similar periods of adjustment. The 88th was the first of the draftee 
divisions to do so. Both strengths and weaknesses in the preparation of 
these new divisions were revealed. 
The reality of the Allied situation along the Gustav Line in March 
1944 had little in common with the military ballet of regimental combat 
teams deftly maneuvering against each other through the expanses of 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana. Across the width of Italy and around 
the "stranded whale" of Anzio,2 Allied and Axis troops lay frozen in 
stalemate. While the Western Allies gathered the resources necessary 
for yet another massive attack to break the deadlock, the 88th manned 
its small portion of a rigidly immobile front. 
One of the unique features of a stalemate is the "no-man's-land" 
that tends to develop between the opposing sides. In a stalemate 
between worthy opponents, this no-man's-land is repeatedly threaded 
by patrols executing missions of reconnaissance, ambush, or general 
combat. 3 Reconnaissance patrols attempt to develop information con-
cerning enemy positions, usually in order to bring them under artillery 
fire or to provide tactical information in the anticipation of larger 
operations. Ambush patrols attempt to intercept and wipe out small, 
moving enemy units-such as reconnaissance patrols. Combat patrols 
are somewhat larger bodies of men designed to inflict casualties upon 
moving or stationary enemy troops in order to increase the enemy's 
overall attrition. For inexperienced troops, patrolling provides an im-
portant opportunity for baptism by fire. To quote General Sloan on the 
subject:4 "It's [patrolling] the only way to let the men get the feel of 
battle before being shoved into a hot fight .... They go up for a while, 
kill off a few Germans, and then come back feeling like veterans." 
The draftees were not unprepared for the most purely "infantry" 
aspects of patrolling. The rifleman's training had emphasized stealth, 
markmanship and fire, and maneuver. This emphasis had been rein-
forced during the course of the rigorous small-unit training in the 
wintry Atlas Mountains. Even after the division arrived at Minturno it 
continued to sharpen patrolling skills by regularly sending personnel 
to the Fifth Army patrolling school. 5 Indeed, the division's patrolling 
proficiency was so polished that during its first week in the line the 
draftees killed or captured five Germans for every man of their own 
that they lost. 6 
The division's initial success seems to have resulted in part from an 
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enthusiasm for combat that caught the battle-weary Germans un-
awares. The draftees captured Germans sleeping in dugouts on several 
occasions, and consistently initiated those engagements that did oc-
cur. 7 At least one of the 88th's patrols used knives alone to dispatch its 
astonished adversaries. 8 Apparently the long-suffering British and 
German soldiers in the sector had had a more relaxed relationship with 
each other than that which the newly arrived draftee division was 
willing to allow. Examples of German inattentiveness abound. Pfc. 
George Zelinsky, on patrol, sat down for a self-appointed break on a 
small mound. The clattering of mess cans underneath alerted him to 
the fact he was sitting on a dugout occupied by four "krauts"; he 
captured them all. Pvt. John Flores burst into a house to capture a Nazi 
officer he observed writing a letter. The astonished German meekly 
surrendered, as did fourteen others who overheard the commotion 
from the adjoining room. Pvt. Leo Witwer got lost when carrying a 
message to the 349th Command Post and inadvertently wandered into 
German-held Castelforte. Rescued by a British patrol, he came back 
with invaluable intelligence. His comment upon returning to the safety 
of American positions was, "Ma will be pretty sore if she hears about 
this." These draftees, far from being exemplars of the martial tempera-
ment, were ordinary men who summoned up the pluck to accomplish 
extraordinary things. Witwer was lost; Zelinsky was taking liberties in 
"taking ten"; and Flores later was court-martialed for laughing at a 
warrant officer who told him to put on his helmet. 9 
The combat edge initially enjoyed by the 88th did not continue 
uncontested. Once alerted to the presence of the new and enthusiastic 
88th Division, the Germans of XIV Corps with its 94th and 71st infantry 
divisions reacted with grim efficiency. The Americans had learned 
patrolling as if it were uniquely the province of the rifleman. Their 
lightly armed, fast-moving patrols soon found themselves outgunned 
by German patrols relying upon the support of heavier weapons. 
Speed and stealth would not enable the Americans to prevail in the face 
of heavily armed, battle-hardened, terrain-wise German formations. 
On the night of 12 March, a week after the division's arrival in the line, 
the 88th lost seven out of twelve men in a combat patrol that encoun-
tered Germans supported by heavy machine guns and mortars. 
Throughout the next week other American patrols suffered similar 
losses. By 19 March, General Sloan was sufficiently alarmed by his 
cumulative losses to direct that combat patrols-not to be confused 
with reconnaissance or ambush patrols-were to be discontinued until 
further notice. 10 
In part, the 88th's problems resulted from the long-term purpose 
of its patrolling. Americans and Germans alike knew that eventually 
the Allies would launch yet another attack against the Gustav Line. 
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American patrols sought to dominate no-man's-land and to develop 
intelligence concerning the nature and depth of German defenses. To 
the Germans, the domination of no-man's-land was far less critical than 
was the masking of their own defensive positions-to preclude the 
Americans from gathering intelligence. Thus the bulk of the patrolling 
took place closer to German than to American lines. This meant that 
German patrols consistantly were closer to their own sources of combat 
support. 11 
The Germans maximized their advantages. 12 Heavy machine-gun 
positions watched over the movements and activities of their patrols. 
Mortar and artillery forward observers, with wire communications to 
firing batteries, assured additional fire support. German combat pa-
trols of twelve to fifteen riflemen, reinforced by machine guns, mor-
tars, artillery, and at times even tanks, proved far more lethal than their 
American counterparts. American reconnaissance and ambush pa-
trols, while not as vulnerable as the combat patrols, proved ever less 
productive in the face of increasingly wary and well-supported oppo-
nents. These lighter patrols could not, of course, afford firefights of any 
duration. 
The American riflemen needed supporting fires if the probing of 
the German lines was to continue. Heavy machine guns were too 
unwieldy for rapidly moving patrols operating through extended dis-
tances in rough terrain. Artillery and mortars were the logical sources 
of supporting fire. Infantry-artillery combined arms training had been 
one of the strongest features of the draftees' training program. This 
combined arms training had not, however, been conducted with pa-
trolling in mind. Massive artillery preparations had been an integral 
feature of major maneuvers; the minutiae of fire support for patrols had 
never received much emphasis. When the 88th sought to provide 
artillery support to its patrols, it faced severallimitations. 13 
Only a handful of the division's personnel was proficient in the 
techniques of calling for and adjusting artillery. 14 During the course of 
the division's training, calls for artillery fire had been referred through 
forward observers accompanying maneuver companies or through 
battalion artillery liaison officers. This practice worked well when 
companies were maneuvering en masse, but there were not enough 
trained personnel to allow forward observers to accompany each of the 
division's numerous patrols. Companies routinely sent out two or 
three patrols a night. Across the division, given that two out of three 
companies were ordinarily on the front line in a battalion, this trans-
lated to something between thirty and fifty patrols out at any given 
time. 
Limitations with respect to tactical communications complicated 
this situation. The infantry's standard SCR 300 FM radio, which 
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weighed thirty-two pounds, had a range of about three miles under the 
best of conditions. The radio combinations used by artillery forward 
observers or headquarters elements were more powerful, but two men 
were required to carry them, thus they were altogether unsuitable for 
rapidly moving patrols. These radios were also the first and most 
logical target of the astute German sniper. All radios were, of course, 
vulnerable to mechanical and electrical failures, not to mention de-
graded performance because of terrain or weather. Wire communica-
tions (field telephones, etc.) were more reliable, provided the tactical 
situation permitted one to lay wire behind one's advance. 15 
Three days after the embarrassing and costly encounter of 12 
March, the patrols of the 88th began concerted efforts to tie into 
artillery and mortar firing nets. Reconnaissance patrols sent out on 15 
March laid wire behind them until they reached positions on high 
ground from which the further movements of the patrols could be 
observed. At these overwatching positions, patrols established obser-
vation posts equipped with wire communications that reached back to 
an artillery forward observer on the front line. The patrols then moved 
forward without laying more wire and scouted through the terrain 
within several hundred yards of the observation posts. Patrols that 
located Germans without being observed withdrew to the observation 
posts and phoned artillery forward observers. In several instances 
artillery responded with telling effect. 16 
Unfortunately, the Germans could not be relied upon to remain 
stationary throughout such maneuvers, nor could the Americans al-
ways approach and observe German positions undetected. The over-
watching positions usually lost visual contact with the patrols when 
they moved forward into the darkness, so they could not effectively 
bring in supporting fires until the patrols returned with the necessary 
information. In the case of firefights it usually proved impossible for 
those manning the observation post to distinguish friend from foe. A 
better technique was needed. 
The next logical step, undertaken the following week, was to send 
an SCR 300 radio forward with the patrol while leaving another SCR 
300 behind in the overwatching position. Despite range limitations, the 
SCR 300 could usually be relied upon to reach as far as the observation 
post. The observation post in turn could relay targeting information to 
the rear by wire. There wf're delays as this information passed from 
patrol to observation post, to artillery forward observer, to firing bat-
tery, but the system proved adequate in most cases. On occasion, 
patrols were close enough to friendly lines to allow for communications 
directly through front-line elements rather than through a forward 
observation post.I7 
The division's experiments yielded interesting results. At least one 
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patrol crossed five hundred meters of open ground in daylight behind 
a radio-adjusted, mortar-delivered smoke screen. Other patrols pre-
registered fires on positions within their proposed areas of operation, 
then called for fires on those positions they subsequently found actu-
ally occupied. This advance planning radically reduced the time neces-
sary for artillerymen to respond to a patrol's calls for supporting fire. 1H 
By the first week in April, the 88th's patrols were once again 
competitive with German patrols attempting to mask the German front 
lines. Despite delays, the communications relay system usually deliv-
ered supporting fires quickly enough to balance the advantages Ger-
mans gained by being closer to their heavy weapons. On 11 April, 
General Sloan underscored his renewed confidence by once again 
removing all restrictions concerning the size and mission of patrols. 19 
After a relatively brief period of embarrassment and trial and error, the 
draftees of the 88th had adapted training and technology to the pecu-
liar demands of no-man's-land in Italy. Their adaptation was not 
unique, but it was a creditable display of flexibility in the face of a 
demanding tactical environment. 
No-man's-land was not the only scene of the maturation and ad-
justment experienced by the 88th Infantry Division. The front-line 
infantryman not on patrol endured the stresses often associated with 
positional warfare: shelling, physical hardship, boredom. Comman-
ders faced particularly perplexing problems when evacuating casu-
alties and bringing replacements forward. These considerations, taken 
together, all weighed heavily against that great intangible, morale. 
During the 88th's first month of combat, hardly a day went by 
without a man being killed by snipers, mortars, or artillery. German 
artillery observers on the heights overlooking American positions 
enjoyed vistas stretching deep into the American rear. Nothing was 
safe. Infantry positions, artillery batteries, bridges, communications 
sites, logistical facilities-all came under fire. On the division's first 
day in the line an artillery battery lost three dead, four wounded, and a 
howitzer destroyed in a shelling. On the following day another shell-
ing virtually buried the men and equipment of a battery dug into a 
sandy stretch of beach. A record for close calls seems to have been set 
by Pfc. Marvin Blake. Within fifteen minutes he was knocked to the 
ground by an artillery shell, had his rifle shot out of his hands by a 
sniper, lost his helmet to a machine gun bullet, and had the seat of his 
pants set ablaze by a phosphorous mortar round. He later said that 
fifteen minutes seemed like a long time. So it went, day after day. 
Smoke machines, camouflage, reinforced emplacements, restrictions 
on noise and light, movement control, counterbattery fires-all were 
used. Nevertheless, the death and damage went on. By the end of 
March the 88th had suffered 99 killed, 252 wounded, and 36 missing, a 
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casualty rate three times that considered average for positional war-
fare.20 
As if shellings and snipings were not enough, the draftees too 
often became noncombat casualties as well. 21 Close living in foxholes 
and dugouts contributed to the spread of infection, as did exposure to 
spring rains, snowmelt, and the chill of the mountain nights. Blankets 
alone were an insufficient answer to the chill and wetness. Wet-
weather gear, overshoes, and insulated sleeping bags were not yet 
items of general issue. There seemed to be no effective way to keep 
everyone warm, dry, and healthy. Hepatitis, respiratory ailments, and 
trench foot inflicted significant casualties. Extensive inoculation pro-
grams and liberal doses of penicillin reduced the numbers of noncom-
bat casualties somewhat, but only warmer April weather and a massive 
dry-socks program eventually brought health problems under control. 
The dry-socks program included command directives that soldiers, 
supervised by their superiors, would change socks daily and receive 
sufficient laundry service to keep them in dry socks. The overall 
noncombat casualties of the 88th during the month of March came to 
about seven hundred men requiring hospitalization. Compared with 
other divisions under similar circumstances, this was about average. 
The evacuation of casualties, whether combat or noncombat, 
proved difficult in the broken Italian terrain. 22 It could hardly have 
raised the morale of the draftees to know that if severely wounded, 
they probably would die before reaching a surgeon. Medical evacua-
tion proceeded from litter trail to wheeled ambulance, to aid or clearing 
station, to field or evacuation hospital. Company aid men gave the ill or 
wounded emergency first aid, then turned them over to litter bearers 
(each battalion was assigned twenty-two), who rushed over carefully 
delineated litter trails to the wheeled ambulance pickup point. Italian 
roads were so few and so poor that this pickup point often was thou-
sands of difficult yards from where the soldier was wounded. Once the 
patient was aboard an ambulance, his evacuation was likely to be 
further delayed by congested vehicular traffic. Ideally, echeloned med-
ical facilities and the traffic between them would have organized along 
routes separate and distinct from those supporting other logistical 
traffic. In Italy the terrain rendered this impossible; all traffic funneled 
into a few narrow roads. Not only were ambulances delayed, they also 
tended to come under German artillery fire targeted on other traffic. 
One response to the time involved in medical evacuation was to 
push medical facilities closer to the front. It was not uncommon for 
field hospitals to be within five miles of the front lines and within 
walking distance of divisional clearing stations. This arrangement had 
dangers as well as advantages. Field hospitals thus deployed were not 
altogether clear of the fighting and might well end up-because of the 
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congested routes available to vehicular traffic-in close proximity to 
gasoline storage areas, ammunition dumps, headquarters, and other 
attractive artillery targets. When field hospitals were located close to 
the rear of one unit, flanking units found themselves forced to evacuate 
casualties along routes parallel to the enemy front rather than directly 
through their own rear. Lateral routes were more exposed and often 
more difficult than those going directly from front to rear. All factors 
considered, medical evacuation proved unpleasant for all concerned, 
particularly for those who watched and wondered, "Who's next?"23 
Although less harrowing than the evacuation of casualties, a new, 
experimental method for replacing casualties had implications hardly 
less important to the morale of the draftees. Uptonian notions of 
replacement had paralleled the Uptonian notion of training; both were 
thought best done within the context of established units consisting 
largely of veterans. Units stayed in the line without replacement until a 
prearranged rotation date, or until excessive casualties rendered them 
combat-ineffective, then they withdrew to secure rear areas. Once in 
the rear, these units absorbed new men and undertook rigorous train-
ing to "work them in." Under the Uptonian replacement system, 
warfare was to be a cycle of front-line duty, rotation, and training, with 
two or three units on the line for every unit in the rear and, preferably, 
twelve-day tours on the line separated by four-day breaks. 24 
At Minturno the 88th spent six weeks in its first stretch on the line. 
In that time it was the first division to exercise the new replacement 
system, whereby units stayed in contact with the enemy and individu-
al replacements came forward into them. Men were replaced through 
logistical techniques similar to those whereby expended ammunition 
and broken equipment were replaced. Theoretically, units exercising 
the new system could remain on the front line at full strength indefi-
nitely. The 88th even received, shortly before offensive operations 
began, an overstrength of 1,037 personnel to insure that individual 
replacements would be immediately available. 25 
The new replacement system had advantages and disadvantages. 
On the one hand, units did in fact remain at full strength without 
withdrawing from combat. This was no small advantage when one had 
relatively few divisions to rotate, as did the United States in World War 
II; the U.S. Army had ninety divisions, compared to the Japanese with 
one hundred, the Germans with three hundred, and the Russians with 
four hundred. On the other hand, units remained on the front lines 
longer than was desirable for combat effectiveness, and replacements 
often did not immediately identify with or integrate into their new 
units. 26 
Understandably, the 88th began to encounter neuropsychiatric 
casualties. The combination of hardship, boredom, and tension for 
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weeks on end proved to be more than many soldiers could bear. Minor 
pleasures-dry socks, a letter from home, or uninterrupted sleep--
assumed an importance that survivors considered pathetic in retro-
spect. 27 Men snapped following the most minor of frustrations. All 
ranks experienced the strain. One regimental commander suddenly 
ordered his astonished subordinates to conduct an unsupported, full-
scale attack that would have been nothing less than suicidal. For-
tunately, the regimental staff had the good sense to prepare le-
thargically while one of its number apprised General Sloan. Sloan 
hastened to the scene, canceled the operation, and relieved the com-
mander. During April alone the 88th evacuated eighty-five such neu-
ropsychiatric casualties to the rear. 28 
Sloan's treatment for neuropsychiatric casualties was, charac-
teristically, a four-day dose of rigorous training. Line officers admin-
istered a therapeutic program that emphasized strenuous physical 
exercise as the best single treatment for "anxiety neurosis." The pro-
gram also featured adequate sleep, cleanliness, health habits, whole-
some food, and an array of challenging classes. Patients were either 
busy or asleep twenty-four hours a day in order to insure that they had 
no time to dwell upon their misfortunes. More than half of the divi-
sion's neuropsychiatric casualties returned to duty within a week. 29 
In the light of our now somewhat more sophisticated understand-
ing of mental illness, it is probably safe to say that Sloan's neuro-
psychiatric program was successful for the wrong reasons. Most of his 
patients were probably exhaustion cases or malingerers rather than 
genuine neuropsychiatric casualties. Exhaustion cases got the rest they 
needed during the course of Sloan's treatment. Malingerers found his 
program more arduous than front-line duty. Bona fide neuropsychiatric 
casualties, on the other hand, probably remained unaffected. 30 
Along the front lines the soldiers themselves seem to have done 
more to secure their own psychiatric health than their commanders 
possibly could have. When not on patrol, on watch, or asleep, the 
draftees occupied themselves with improving their environment. 
"Deluxe dugouts" featuring pilfered or fabricated chairs, tables, and 
beds proliferated just to the rear of the front lines. One soldier even 
went so far as to build one of these dugouts around an abandoned, yet 
serviceable, grand piano. Mine detectors readily located wine casks 
buried by the Italians. After consuming the contents, soldiers cut the 
casks in half and used them as bathtubs. Enterprising mess sergeants 
developed or appropriated facilities and continued their timeless atten-
tion to the stomachs of their troops. Deluxe dugouts eventually 
evolved into elaborate recreational facilities featuring reading, letter-
writing, card playing, bathing, snacking, bantering, partying, and the 
services of self-appointed lawyers, psychiatrists, and barbers. 31 
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Not to be left unentertained, the draftees encouraged acts of bra-
vado-which most of them comfortably enjoyed as spectators. One 
such act was an incendiary mission by a Piper Cub airplane billed as 
"epic, colossal, history making." On the day of the big event a 
ridiculously light artillery spotter plane swooped over German lines 
dumping five-gallon tins of gasoline upon flames caused by a white 
phosphorus round, then strafed the front with .45-caliber pistols. 
Entrenched American infantrymen whooped and cheered throughout 
the course of this ineffectual but daring display. 32 
Not to be outdone, the Germans came up with their own widely 
visible acts of bravado. A case in point was a daring motorcyclist who 
made a daily routine of racing along the length of the German front in 
plain view of the Americans. His tiny motorcycle was closely pursued 
by bursting shells, and soldiers of both sides cheered his progress and 
jeered the unsuccessful American artillerymen. The cat-and-mouse 
duel continued day after day-until the day the intrepid cyclist disap-
peared under a burst credited to the division's 338th Field Artillery 
Battalion. 33 
Their macabre quality notwithstanding, such displays represented 
an adherence to tacit rules of conduct whereby German and American 
soldiers found it easier to live in each other's presence. Along with acts 
of bravado there developed mutually-agreed-upon rules of engage-
ment. Where lines were within rifle range of each other, neither side 
fired while food was being brought forward. The draftees occasionally 
played football games on exposed fields while the Germans quietly 
observed. "Axis Sally" -a prominent German agent whose radio com-
mentaries sought to demoralize the American soldiers-growled that 
the contestants would not forever continue unmolested, but the Ger-
mans did nothing at the time. Both sides developed the habit of 
discontinuing barrages once ambulances or medics were observed in 
the target area. Prisoners tended to be well treated; even during the 
brutal skirmishing in no-man's-land efforts were made to capture, if 
possible, rather than to kill. 34 
Perhaps the most spectacular single instance of tacit rules of con-
duct was the Easter service of the 349th Infantry Regiment. 35 For nearly 
an hour all firing ceased while the division chaplain conducted services 
in English and German. Loudspeakers carried Protestant services, 
Catholic Mass, and nondenominational female vocal accompaniment 
along the length of the front. Services concluded w~th the notification 
that troops of both sides should return to cover, afte~ which the firing 
resumed. 
Tacit rules of conduct between American and German were a 
puzzling phenomenon. Skirmishing in no-man's-land retained its es-
sential brutality. Everyone knew the restraints were off once the Allies 
94 Draftee Division 
began their major offensive. Yet, however ephemeral, the rules made it 
easier for soldiers of both sides to tolerate each other's presence. It was 
just as well, for the draftees of the 88th would see much of the Germans 
in the 94th and 71st infantry divisions who were, like themselves, 
collections of conscripts officered by small cadres of professional sol-
diers.36 
No less than the rifleman, the logistician found it necessary to 
adjust to the realities of the Italian theater. In some cases stateside 
preparations translated readily to the rigors of actual combat, and 
adjustments were matters of detail. In other cases, adequate logistical 
support required important changes. 
Supplies in all classes were readily available to the division. The 
Minturno positions were less than fifty miles from the enormous 
Peninsula Base Section depots around Naples. Naples had been dam-
aged during the fighting preceding its capture in October 1943, but by 
the time the 88th arrived, port facilities were once again operational 
and supplies flowed unimpeded. 37 
Rations-A, B, or C-never seem to have been in short supply. 
Canned and packaged foods were increasingly supplemented by items 
locally procured as spring returned to the portions of the Italian coun-
tryside hastily overrun in the first rush of the Allied invasion. Spring 
thaws guaranteed ample supplies of potable water throughout the 
division's sector. 38 
Clothing and personal equipment also were readily available from 
the Peninsula Base Section depots, although the spring of 1944 still saw 
the 88th equipped with antiquated shoes and leggings. There also 
seems to have been no lack of petroleum products. Newly constructed 
pipelines carried fuel as far north as Sessa, less than ten miles from the 
division's front-line trace. Secondary issuance of fuel proved simple 
enough, largely because of readily available fuel pods and the ever-
present five-gallon cans. The division trucked packaged POL products 
(petroleum, oil, lubricants) directly from the Naples depots or received 
them through higher support activities originating at those depots.39 
Maintenance, repair parts, and the supply of major items of equip-
ment also posed few problems throughout the division's tenure at 
Minturno. The vehicles and equipment were virtually new; there was 
rarely a need for any save the most minor of repairs. Combat losses 
were not yet significant in this respect, and the grueling maintenance 
demands of exte?lded forward movements under inhospitable condi-
tions were yet to come. 
Ammunition in all calibers was readily available, although the 
expenditure of artillery was carefully rationed and controlled.40 This 
parsimony with respect to artillery was a local manifestation of world-
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wide stockpiling in preparation for Operation Overlord and other 
offensives planned for the spring of 1944. Despite rationing, lucrative 
artillery targets do not seem to have gone unengaged for want of 
ammunition. 41 
Simply put, supply per se was not a problem for the 88th during its 
occupancy of the Minturno position. The real difficulty lay in the area 
of tactical transportation-that is to say, in the delivery of supplies into 
the hands of front-line troops. In its rush towards modernization the 
American army saddled infantry divisions with road-bound truck 
fleets not altogether suited for the peculiarities of the Italian terrain. 
Large sectors of the front could be reached only by mule or porter 
under even the best of circumstances. German artillery interdiction 
rendered even more of the front unapproachable to trucks. The divi-
sion's table of organization and its training provided for nothing in the 
way of off-road transportation other than the backs of the troops 
themselves. 
The 88th was not the first division to suffer from this inadequacy of 
transportation. Following the Salerno breakout in the autumn of 1943, 
American front-line troops repeatedly had found themselves under-
supplied-even when mere miles away from enormous stockpiles. On 
occasion, strategic terrain seized in hard-fought battles was abandoned 
when victorious Allied troops could no longer be supplied. As a 
stopgap, infantry and engineer battalions had been diverted from 
combat roles to serve as porters for battalions more heavily engaged.42 
Porters were not the long-term solution to transportation prob-
lems. By the time the 88th Infantry Division arrived in Italy, a Fifth 
Army program attaching Italian mule-pack companies to infantry divi-
sions was well along. The now-Allied Italian army organized these 
companies and attached them to Allied divisions. Upon its arrival in 
Italy the 88th received four such mule-pack companies numbering 
some 450 muleteers and 1,400 mules. 43 
The Italian mule-pack companies could not operate within the 
division without liaison and supervision. American muleteers accom-
panied the mule-pack companies at a ratio of one American for every 
ten Italians. This increased the number of muleteers and assured that 
English-speaking personnel moved with each of the mule trains. Dur-
ing its first month at Minturno, the 88th undertook a somewhat 
frenzied recruiting and training of muleteers. The division established 
a muleteer training school; most of its older artillerymen had had 
experience with animal transportation. Indeed, General Sloan himself 
once had organized an ROTC program of instruction on the subject. 
The division also had hundreds of farm boys among its draftees. Many 
of these knew mules well and some had, in fact, been muleteers. The 
draftees also included dozens of bilingual Italian-Americans. The mix-
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ture of farmers and Italian-Americans proved a good one. Italian mule-
pack companies integrated quickly and efficiently into the division's 
logistical establishment. 44 
Some logistical problems did develop out of the peculiar interna-
tional status of the mule-pack companies. Technically speaking, the 
mule-pack companies remained part of the Italian army. Although 
under the operational control of the 88th, they reverted to Italian 
channels for matters of discipline, administration, and supply. Disci-
pline seldom was a problem with the 88th's muleteers. The Italian 
major in charge and his officers proved an experienced and competent 
set of disciplinarians. 45 For similar reasons administration also posed 
few problems. 
Unfortunately, mule-pack companies were plagued by shortages 
with respect to two critical items, boots and mules. Under the best of 
circumstances, boots wore out quickly in the rugged Italian terrain. 
Muleteers did more walking under more trying conditions than any-
body in the theater. Although Italian muleteers wore out their boots 
quickly in support of U.S. troops, Allied military authorities refused to 
allow American divisions to supersede Italian supply channels and 
provide Italian muleteers with American-issued boots. The problems 
associated with keeping the muleteers in serviceable boots were never 
satisfactorily resolved, but local solutions ameliorated the situation. 
Corpses, in particular German corpses, were seldom evacuated or 
buried with their boots on. The boots of the living also proved highly 
pilferable. American logisticians seem to have exercised imaginative 
interpretations concerning the transportation of stockpiled boots. 
Some of the stockpiles were carried around on Italian feet rather than in 
trucks, ostensibly to reduce transportation and storage requirements. 
One way or another, the 88th kept its muleteers in boots. 46 
Keeping the muleteers in mules was even more difficult. 47 In 
deference to local sensibilities, the division could not directly con-
fiscate mules. In deference to Italian and American procedures con-
cerning the accounting of funds, the division could not directly buy or 
requisition mules either. Mules were purchased en masse by high-level 
procurement agencies, then distributed to the mule-pack companies. 
Centralization allowed for a greater control of markets and prices, but 
also reduced flexibility at the division level. The 88th's logisticians 
found it difficult to influence the procurement process and thus to 
keep the supply of mules at constant or even predictable levels. 
These several bureaucratic obstacles notwithstanding, the mule-
pack companies proved an invaluable asset. Without them, tactical 
resupply might have posed insuperable problems. With them, no 
terrain proved too difficult for the division's logisticians. 48 The division 
did not, of course, dispense with its wheeled vehicle fleet, so it enjoyed 
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the benefits and suffered the costs of two separate extensive, and not 
entirely complementary, transportation establishments. This duplica-
tion may have been an expensive way of doing business, but what 
World War II American logistical activity was governed by its expense? 
As the 88th settled into an extended occupancy of its Minturno 
position, General Sloan once again had reason to become concerned 
with the division's state of training. 49 A paradox of warfare is that a 
unit's general combat readiness often decreases while its readiness 
increases for the particular type of operation in which it is presently 
engaged. 50 The ultimate purpose of the 88th was to attack. At Minturno 
it was learning to defend. 
The training of the 88th had emphasized operations more mobile 
and more offensive than those in which the division now found itself. 
Of Camp Gruber's eight regimental combat team blocks of instruction, 
only one included a deliberate defense-a defense conducted by one 
regiment in order that the other regiments would have something 
challenging to attack. Battalion field exercise tests and platoon combat 
firing proficiency tests were altogether given over to attacks. Battalion 
combat firing proficiency tests specified a thousand points for the 
defensive phase and two thousand points for the offensive phase.51 
This emphasis upon offensive operations as the true measure of a 
division's worth arose from American military psychology and doc-
trine. 52 America intended, after all, to carry the war into the Nazi 
heartland. The big crusade and the knockout blow were hallmarks of 
the American military tradition. Imbued throughout its training with 
the much-desired "aggressive attack spirit," the 88th was now develop-
ing a character better suited for the antithetical experience of positional 
warfare. Could it still attack? 
One of the division's growing limitations was, quite simply, phys-
ical fitness. 53 Prolonged periods of inactivity in forward areas afforded 
troops little opportunity for physical exercise. Infantrymen averaged 
less than one extended patrol a week. Rearward echelons, under the 
surveillance of Germans on the heights, got scarcely more exercise. 
Lack of stamina would have adverse physical and psychological effects 
if poorly conditioned troops attempted the rigors of an attack. 
Physical deterioration complicated a more general erosion of sol-
dierly skills. Marksmanship deteriorated because few soldiers saw the 
enemy within rifle range, much less engaged identifiable targets with 
rifle fire. As for maneuver, the division seldom moved more than a 
dozen men at a time throughout its stay at Minturno. An organization's 
efficiency with respect to maneuver deteriorates rapidly. 54 The units of 
the 88th once again fell away from peaks of efficiency demonstrated 
during the Louisiana Maneuvers. 
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Another potential weakness within the 88th concerned its facility 
for combining the several combat arms, artillery excepted, into a single 
coordinated attack. Reconnaissance troops, signalmen, engineers and 
antitank sections all suffered from a lack of recent practice. 
The experiences of the armored reconnaissance troops at Minturno 
had not differed materially from those of the infantrymen. 55 The 
patrols they sent forward were comparable to those of the infantry in 
size and duration. Reconnaissance troops had not recently practiced 
masking the forward movement of larger formations because there had 
not yet been such larger formations to mask. Reconnaissance troops 
had not, of course, operated mounted in their scout cars since the 
division moved into the line. 
The division's signalmen had established a respectable array of 
static communications and had developed proficiency in laying wire to 
support patrols. They had not had any experience pushing communi-
cations forward over significant distances at a pace commensurate with 
the progress of an attack. 56 The signalmen were conscious of the 
limitations of the SCR 300 radio and of shortages with respect to the 
SCR 536, but these were problems beyond their ability to resolve. 
The division engineers had cleared mine fields left scattered 
around rear areas by the somewhat untidy British, 57 and their officers 
had gone forward with infantry patrols to get a feel for the terrain. The 
engineers had not, however, recently practiced such critical offensive 
skills as the breaching of mine fields and obstacles or route con-
struction. 
Antitank sections had the dual offensive role of fighting tanks and 
of providing direct fire support to forward-moving infantrymen. They 
were to maneuver with the infantry during the development of the 
attack. These sections had not had the opportunity to fire or maneuver 
while in the static Minturno emplacements. Reconnaissance, signal, 
engineer, antitank, and infantry units all needed to practice previously 
learned skills before they would be prepared for the spring offensive. 
The proposed integration of tanks into the offensive posed problems 
that were somewhat more complex. The 88th Infantry Division had no 
tanks of its own, nor had it previous training exposure to tanks. 
Indeed, it had no organic armored fighting vehicles at all, other than 
the sixteen armored cars of its reconnaissance troop. Army Ground 
Forces planners had determined that infantry divisions would be 
supported by independent tank and tank destroyer battalions if such 
support became necessary. To this end, independent tank and tank 
destroyer battalions had been activated and had undergone mobiliza-
tion and training programs separate from those of the infantry divi-
sions. The men of the 88th had never trained with the tankers who 
were to support them in Italy-or with tankers at all, for that matter. 5H 
Baptism by Fire 99 
Beyond a simple lack of actual combined arms training, there were 
also problems presented by the lack of an agreed-upon combined arms 
tactical doctrine. Members of the fledgling armored force displayed an 
understandable lack of interest in supporting infantry attacks. Tankers 
saved their enthusiasm for a vision of tanks advancing rapidly en 
masse-a mechanized version of a medieval cavalry charge that was 
hardly practical in all circumstances. Limitations upon such tank em-
ployment were particularly severe in Italy. Vehicular movement was 
often restricted to roads or ridge lines. Battle-wise Germans rendered 
these restrictions even more severe through their judicious positioning 
of mine fields and antitank guns. The "lessons" of Poland and France 
notwithstanding, mass tank attacks against prepared German posi-
tions would have been suicidal. If tanks were to be of use in the rugged 
Italian terrain, they would have to operate in support of and at the pace 
of infantry. 59 
Although American tank commanders recognized that their vehi-
cles must support infantry attacks on occasion, they had not yet agreed 
on how such an unwelcome mission might best be accomplished. By 
1944 differing opinions had reduced themselves to three distinct meth-
ods. 
The oldest and simplest method saw the tank as a mobile pillbox, 
behind which dismounted infantrymen would advance. 60 Tanks 
would push forward at three miles an hour along what ever routes were 
available, smashing barbed wire and obstacles, exploding antiperson-
nel mines harmlessly, suppressing enemy positions with volumes of 
fire, and shielding infantrymen huddled in their tracks. As enemy 
positions were breached, infantrymen would fan out and mop them 
up, then return to the shelter of the tank and push on to the next 
obstacle. If immobilized or knocked out, a tank would provide in-
fantrymen a supporting pillbox and firing position until another tank 
trundled past to assume the lead. 
The mobile pillbox method was easy to control and was apt to work 
reasonably well where engagements were close range, such as in urban 
areas or in the jungle, or where objectives were shallow, such as when 
seizing a small island. The method also would work well when one's 
opponent was ill-equipped with antitank weapons or unaccustomed to 
battling armor. Marines in the Pacific adopted this technique early in 
the war and used it successfully throughout their island-hopping 
campaigns. 61 Against Germans in the Mediterranean Theater, how-
ever, the technique worked less well. 62 Antitank mines, covered by 
antitank guns with interlocking fields of fire, blocked all vehicular 
avenues of approach, often from extended ranges. Antitank guns were 
usually concealed or sited on reverse slopes in such a manner that they 
were unobserved until they opened fire. After mines or antitank 
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gunners halted the slowly moving processions, artillery observers 
called in fire that blasted infantrymen out from behind the shelter of 
the disabled tanks. Circumstances favoring the mobile pillbox method 
of tank employment rarely existed in Italy. 
A second method, endorsed by Gen. GeorgeS. Patton, Jr., treated 
tankers and infantrymen as somewhat more loosely integrated. 63 
Where circumstances or terrain dictated a dismounted pace, infantry 
provided a forward screen while tanks followed within about three 
hundred yards. Tanks defiladed themselves until the infantry made 
contact, then rushed forward to pummel enemy positions that the 
infantrymen had located. When these positions were knocked out, 
tankers resumed defiladed positions while the infantry once again led 
the advance. As infantrymen located mine fields or other obstacles, 
they probed for bypasses or breached them with the aid of engineers, 
all the while covered by the watchful gunners of nearby tanks. Tank-
infantry teams advanced in successive bounds, or rushes, with infan-
try providing reconnaissance and security while tankers provided 
firepower, shock action, and mobility. 
This second method for combining the efforts of tankers and 
infantrymen proved successful in France and has come to be the 
formula approved by current American doctrine. Insofar as Italy was 
concerned, however, the method had serious weaknesses. Tanks oper-
ating in such close proximity to infantrymen tended to become tied 
into the infantry battle to such an extent that they could no longer be 
conveniently extricated to deal with unanticipated threats or to exploit 
unanticipated opportunities. In Patton's case this posed few problems; 
he deployed such large numbers of tanks that he could commit tanks to 
the infantry battle and still have reserves available for counterattack or 
exploitation. In Italy an infantry division was usually supported by a 
single tank battalion, a situation that afforded commanders no such 
luxury. 64 
A third method for supporting infantry attacks with ~anks had the 
tanks trail by five hundred to fifteen hundred yards-well clear of the 
infantry battle. 65 Tanks hung back until the infantrymen developed the 
situation sufficiently to identify a preferred objective or avenue of 
exploitation. Tanks then rushed forward, joined the infantry, pounded 
a selected array of targets, and withdrew or exploited. 
This third method divorced infantrymen from continuous tank 
support but allowed for the most efficient use of a relatively few tanks. 
It also separated infantrymen from the artillery barrages that moving 
tanks tended to attract. This method of tank support was the one 
espoused by the commander of the 760th Tank Battalion, 66 assigned to 
support the 88th. Eventually the 88th used this method to integrate 
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tanks into plans and preparations for the spring offensive of 1944. This 
choice was not, as shall be seen, without its consequences. 
The training of the 88th had not integrated close air support for 
reasons similar to those that left it without integrated tanks. With the 
Army Air Force altogether separate from the Army Ground Forces, the 
former contributed little to the training of the latter. Upon mobilization, 
the focus of the air force quickly shifted to its sustained campaigns 
overseas, and it never devoted time, resources, or interest to joint 
training with ground units in the United States. This disinterest was 
mutual. Ground commanders regarded artillery as a far more reliable 
means of close support and preferred to rely upon the familiar to get 
the same job done. Artillery was available in all weather and, most 
important for Italy, was efficient at night, when much of the fighting 
took place. Sloan, thirty-one years an artilleryman, was probably even 
less of an air enthusiast than most ground commanders. There is no 
evidence he ever considered close air support-as opposed to aerial 
interdiction of air interception-as much of an asset, yet he discovered 
the 88th was to receive a significant number of air sorties. His staffs at 
several levels would need the training necessary to coordinate them. 67 
As the month of April progressed, General Sloan found himself 
approaching the eve of a major offensive with his division not fully 
prepared to attack. A month of defensive warfare had eroded its 
offensive skills. The men were no longer physically fit and had not 
exercised such critical skills as marksmanship for some time. Major 
units had not maneuvered en masse and specialized elements had not 
recently exercised those aspects of their specialties appropriate to 
offensive operations. The soldiers had never trained with the newly 
attached tank and tank destroyer battalions, and his staffs had no 
practical experience coordinating air support. The only bright spot in 
this somewhat grim picture was the ever-increasing experience of the 
division's artillerymen. During April alone the artillerymen fired 
43,940 rounds on an array of targets that would have been as appropri-
ate for offensive as for defensive operations. During that period every 
artillery officer directed firing problems in concentrations ranging 
from highly flexible, independent battery missions through massive, 
division-concentrated fires. 68 Target arrays ranged from moving pa-
trols through the most heavily entrenched of positions. Even relatively 
sophisticated control measures such as simultaneous time on target or 
rolling curtain fires had become familiar to the 88th's artillerymen. The 
recent experience of the artillerymen was comparable to that which 
they could expect in a major offensive. The rest of the division was not 
so lucky. 
General Sloan's response to the 88th's condition was, charac-
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teristically, a brief period of intensive training. On 15 April the 88th-
its artillery excepted-rotated out of the line and reconcentrated. The 
ostensible purpose of the rotation was R and R, rest and recreation. 
Sloan's soldiers more accurately described the objectives as R, R, and 
R-rest, recreation, and retraining. For two weeks the 88th undertook 
training as rigorous as it had ever experienced.69 
Infantrymen reworked an abbreviated version of the entire pro-
gram they had undergone at Camp Gruber. Day and night they sharp-
ened tactical skills that had atrophied while in front-line positions. 
Maneuvers progressed from squad battle drills through battalion field 
problems. Physical conditioning received a special emphasis; each day 
the draftees marched prolonged distances through difficult terrain and 
practiced mountain climbing. 
The retraining program put a special emphasis on the reduction of 
fortified positions. Fifth Army engineers constructed mock enemy 
strong points on the sides of mountains in the rest and recreation area. 
Platoons maneuvered against these pillboxes, while entrenched ma-
chine gunners fired noisily but harmlessly over their heads whenever 
they inadvertently presented targets. Dynamite charges simulating 
incoming artillery rounds added noise, realism, and confusion. Infan-
try platoons attacked, debriefed, and attacked again as they struggled 
to master techniques of maneuver and assault in the face of heavily 
fortified positions. 
During this period the 88th exposed the draftees to new equip-
ment. Assaulting squads used pole charges to breach obstacles and 
barbed wire entanglements. Recent graduates of the Fifth Army Flame 
Thrower School, a dozen men from each regiment, scorched dummy 
positions with their fearsome devices. Tankers from the 760th Tank 
Battalion integrated themselves into battalion-scale maneuvers. Each 
infantry battalion maneuvered at least once with a platoon of medium 
and light tanks attached. An exchange program brought pilots into the 
88th's division and regimental headquarters. Here they exchanged 
ideas concerning close air support with operations officers and com-
manders. Perhaps some good was done, but there still was no practical 
training. 
The 88th exercised its more familiar weapons in new and imag-
inative ways. Weather balloons attached to blocks of wood dropped 
into the Gulf of Gaeta became moving targets for 57-millimeter anti-
tank gunners; prevailing winds and currents carried the balloons past 
firing positions. Antitank gunners, antitank grenadiers, and bazooka 
crews fired at destroyed German vehicles dragged onto ranges as hard 
targets. This firing was in addition to rifle marksmanship undertaken 
by all infantrymen, regardless of rank or duty position. 
The reconnaissance troop undertook an intensive program similar 
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to that of the infantrymen, save for its particular emphasis on infiltra-
tion, long-range patrolling, and mounted movement. Infiltration and 
patrolling were activities that might well precede or mask the move-
ment of larger units. Mounted movements led by the reconnaissance 
troop's armored cars could be critical in exploiting the much-hoped-for 
general breakthrough. 
Engineers also trained for the peculiarities of an offensive in Italy. 
Engineer officers who had gone forward to reconnoiter no-man's-land 
converted the knowledge thus gained into sand table reproductions of 
the division's front. Officers of all branches studied the obstacles, 
avenues of approach, and probable enemy positions displayed on the 
sand tables. The engineer units themselves practiced skills that ul-
timately enhanced the spring offensive. Engineer platoons breached 
one mock barrier after another. Engineer companies carved jeep trails 
along the sides of mountains, practice in pushing supply routes for-
ward through inhospitable terrain. 
When the 88th Infantry Division rotated back into the line during 
the first week of May 1944, General Sloan had more reason to be 
confident of its combat readiness. The leadership of the division was 
enhanced by assignment of two able and experienced combat leaders. 
Col. James C. Fry, who would become known as "Fearless Fosdick" to 
his devoted soldiers, took command of the 350th Infantry Regiment 
from the ailing Col. Charles P. Lynch. Col. Joseph B. Crawford, who 
had served as an infantry battalion commander and regimental ex-
ecutive officer throughout the North African, Sicilian, and present 
Italian Campaigns and had been dubbed "Krautkiller", took command 
of the 349th Infantry Regiment. These two new leaders with Col. 
ArthurS. Champeny-"Champ"-of the 351st would give the 88th a 
regimental leadership of a caliber enjoyed by few if any other infantry 
divisions. Also, once again the draftees were at a peak of training and 
readiness. Once again they had the offensive at the front of their 
minds. 
Sloan was prepared for the supreme test along the lines of a 
promise he had made concerning veterans of earlier wars: "their faith 
will be sustained, their record maintained and the glory of the colors 
never will be sullied as long as one man of the 88th still lives." Sgt. 
Delphia E. Garris put it a little differently: "We have got to lick those 
bastards in order to get out of the Army. That's our main thought-to 
get rid of the Germans in order to get out of the Army." Sloan and 
Garris may have had differences in perspective, but both sought the 
same result and both were, as the saying went, leaning forward in the 
foxhole. 70 
All units are in part the products of training and combat experi-
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ence. Trained to attack, at Minturno the 88th Infantry Division was first 
called upon to maintain fixed position. In its first month of combat the 
division grew accomplished with respect to the defensive realities of 
the Italian stalemate. Even while giving a good account of itself in 
front-line positions, however, its overall combat readiness eroded. The 
answer to such deterioration was retraining; in a frenzy of renewal the 
division shook off the lethargy of the bunkers and foxholes and pre-
pared for the big offensive. Physiques hardened, tactical readiness 
improved, the "aggressive attack spirit" once again became pervasive. 
Even in this renewal, however, there were the germs of later disap-
pointment. In particular, problems with respect to tanks and radios 
surfaced that were to reappear at a later time under more trying 
circumstances. March and April1944 saw but the first of several cycles 
of growth, stagnation, deterioration, and conscious renovation experi-
enced by the 88th. 
The art, as opposed to the science, of war seems to include an 
element of timing. Units are not prepared to do everything equally well 
all the time. Units, like individuals, peak and decay. Some units are less 
radical in their fluctuations-perhaps because of combat experience, 
relative numbers of veterans, collective emotional temperaments, 
etc.-but all units peak and decay. It is science that prepares troops for 
war. It is art that assures their preparedness peaks at the moment when 
it is most needed. 
The leadership of the 88th seems to have grasped some portion of 
that art. The draftees of the 88th, trained to a peak in North Africa, 
arrived in Italy eager to fight Germans and moved into the front lines 
smoothly. Although not fully prepared for the particulars of their initial 
role, they adjusted quickly and soon gave a good account of them-
selves. No one had the illusion that this respectable initial showing 
represented a validation of the draft division, however. That validation 
was to come, if it came at all, in the division's first major offensive. By 
then the draftees were once again trained to a peak. 
7 _____ _ 
Diadem: The First Three Days 
As April turned to May, every soldier in the 88th Infantry Division 
knew the first major test was at hand. However creditably the division 
had performed during training or during the skirmishing of March and 
April, its ultimate worth would be measured not by virtue of training or 
skirmishing, but by performance in major battles. As a larger issue, the 
validation of the as yet untested draftee divisions depended upon this 
battlefield performance as well. 
Each component of the U.S. Army made its World War II debut at 
different times and under different circumstances. The regular army 
first experienced combat in the unsuccessful, if courageous, defense of 
Bataan in the Philippines. The first major combats for the National 
Guard were the embarrassingly prolonged Buna campaign in New 
Guinea and the disaster at Kasserine Pass in North Africa. Draftee 
divisions were to go into their first major battle during Operation 
Diadem, an ambitious Allied offensive designed to break the Italian 
deadlock and sweep the Germans through Rome into the Northern 
Apennines. The first three days of a major offensive are generally the 
bloodiest and most consequential. The experience of the first draftee 
division during the first three days of its first major offensive held true 
to form. 1 
In April 1944, Allied Armies in Italy had been stalemated for six 
months on a line extending from Minturno through Cassino to Ortona 
on the Adriatic coast. Previous efforts to break the deadlock-bloody 
assaults on Monte Cassino, hotly contested efforts to break inland after 
landings near Anzio, and abortive attempts to force the Rapido River-
had accomplished nothing. Now Gen. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, 
the commander of Allied Armies in Italy, envisioned an even greater 
effort involving more than twenty-five divisions supported by two 
thousand guns and the absolute air supremacy of the Mediterranean 
Allied Air Forces. 2 
In Alexander's mind the offensive was to develop as a "one-two 
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punch"-a main attack down the Liri River Valley linking up with a 
second major attack from Anzio to Valmontone. 3 Having thus trapped 
and dispatched a third of Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring's 
Army Group Southwest, the Allies could then pursue the survivors 
through Rome and into Northern Italy. Alexander's plan envisioned 
the British Eighth Army conducting the main attack, closing the en-
circlement, and leading the Allied advance through Rome. 
Alexander's ranking American subordinate and commander of the 
thirteen-division Fifth Army, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, shared much of 
Alexander's vision but was skeptical concerning important details. 
Like Alexander, Clark favored a massive go-for-broke offensive and a 
one-two punch. Unlike Alexander, he did not believe the Germans 
could be trapped merely by seizing such strong points as Valmontone. 
There were too many lesser routes through the Southern Apennines 
for the Allies to enclose the Germans or to pin them neatly against the 
mountains. In Clark's mind it was better to attrite the Germans during 
hot pursuit, presumably in the direction of Rome with the American 
Fifth Army leading. Clark accommodated Alexander's guidance for a 
breakout from Anzio towards Valmontone, but supplemented that 
guidance with additional plans for a breakout from Anzio towards 
Rome. 4 
The appropriate direction of the Anzio breakout was not the only 
strategic particular wherein Clark differed with Alexander. In the 
south, Clark saw the British assault up the heavily defended Liri Valley 
past Cassino as no more likely to succeed than the sanguinary efforts of 
the previous winter. In Clark's view the thinly defended lunar land-
scape of the Aurunci Mountains offered better prospects for success .. s 
Relying on the terrain itself, the Germans tended to defend such 
sectors lightly. Allied troops had discovered on several occasions6 that 
defiladed routes, dead space, and trafficable ridge lines could be made 
to favor the attacker. Defending troops could organize level or modest-
ly rolling terrain into tightly interlocking fields of fire. The Aurunci 
defied such neatly interwoven organization. 
Clark's strongest asset in the case of an Aurunci offensive was the 
four-division French Expeditionary Corps (FEC). The FEC's com-
mander, Gen. Alphonse Juin, was already legendary for his adept 
handling of a colorful mixture of French colonial troops, Moroccans, 
Algerians, North African mountain tribesmen, escaped French pa-
triots, American tankers, and American artillerymen. 7 Insofar as Juin's 
polyglot troops possessed traits in common, they were fiercely eager, 
battle-hardened, and mountain-wise. If anyone could break through 
the Aurunci, it was the FEC. 
General Juin did not, of course, intend to pierce the German 
defenses unsupported. He proposed that others should hold his shoul-
The First Three Days 107 
ders while he himself effected the major breakthrough. 8 To his right, 
British frontal attacks up the Liri would tie down Germans in that 
sector. To his left, attacks by the American II Corps-to seize Mount 
Damiano initially and Spigno ultimately-could serve a similar pur-
pose. Clark concurred with Juin's proposal and committed the II 
Corps' 88th Infantry Division to the objectives recommended by the 
Frenchman. 9 The II Corps' 85th Infantry Division was to make a further 
supporting attack along the coastal road. It was recognized that both 
divisions were composed of green draftees, but the limited objectives 
seemed commensurate with their known abilities. 
At precisely 2300 hours on 11 May 1944, the Italian front from 
Cassino to the sea erupted with the first rounds of the most violent 
artillery preparation since El Alamein. Even before the shelling ceased, 
American, French, British, Indian, Polish, and Canadian assault troops 
stormed out of their foxholes and sangars and into the Gustav Line. 
The 88th Infantry Division's 350th Regiment marked paths forward 
through the darkness with tracer lines--40-millimeter tracers for bat-
talion boundaries, .50-caliber tracers to separate company sectors. 10 
The 350th attacked with its 1st and 2nd battalions abreast, the 1st to 
seize Mount Damiano proper and 2nd to take its somewhat more 
distant appendage, Hill316. When these were in hand, the penetration 
was to be broadened by taking Mount Ceracoli and deepened by 
seizing the village of Ventosa, then Mount Rotondo and Mount Cerri. 
The regiment was also to remain abreast of French units advancing 
along its right flank. n 
The 1st Battalion's attack progressed quickly. Behind a curtain of 
preparatory artillery, Companies A and B advanced abreast through 
the cover of terraces and olive groves. The draftees took few casualties 
initially, largely because German mortars and infantrymen were so 
thoroughly suppressed by the American artillery. German flares sig-
naled their own artillery to fire, but most of this fell well to the rear of 
the rapidly advancing American line. Within forty-five minutes the 
draftees were on the heights, swarming into German positions sec-
onds after the American artillery shifted to deeper targets. Fighting 
became savage. German machine gun "zipper pistols," also called 
"burp guns," barked from the darkness of sangars and dugouts. These 
fires attracted the M-1 s and hand grenades of the Gls in response. In 
places, fighting was so dose that bayonets mattered. 
After a few minutes of violence and confusion, the surviving 
Germans tumbled down the rear slope of Damiano in desperate efforts 
to escape. The draftees, hard on the heels of an earthshaking artillery 
preparation, were too formidable and too numerous for their grey-dad 
adversaries in the 194th Grenadiers. The Americans had taken casu-
alties and had suffered consideable confusion. Company A was com-
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pletely disorganized and Company B was too disorganized to continue 
the attack immediately. Company C, technically in reserve but in fact 
inching around the north face of Damiano towards Ventosa, was pin-
ned down by heavy machine gun and mortar fire from German posi-
tions in the French sector. Nevertheless, the 1st Battalion's attack rated 
as a complete success. In the entire American sector Damiano was the 
single most critical piece of terrain. The 88th had seized it in just fifty-
one minutes. 
The 2nd Battalion's initial attack also combined success and con-
fusion. Companies E and G were scheduled to advance abreast across 
the easterly slopes of Mount Damiano onto Hill316. Company E failed 
to reach the line of departure on time and the battalion commander 
replaced it with his reserve, Company F. Immediately across the line of 
departure both companies encountered a mine field. Company G 
swung well to its right and bypassed the worst of the mines, while 
Company F inched carefully forward through the mine field using 
techniques of infiltration. In the darkness and confusion the two 
companies lost contact with each other. Both encountered heavy resis-
tance when the Germans, no longer suppressed by preparatory artil-
lery, emerged from their dugouts into the face of the American 
advance. Fierce individual battles developed between Germans, disor-
ganized by the intense shelling, and Americans, scarcely less disor-
ganized by mines and obstacles. 
Here S. Sgt. Charles W. Shea won the division's first Medal of 
Honor. His platoon leader and platoon sergeant were casualties; he and 
a few other survivors were pinned down in a mine field by three 
machine guns. Inching carefully past trip wires and trigger plates, Shea 
made it over the lip of the first gun emplacement. Here he "had the 
drop" on four Germans. Three surrendered. The fourth, a diehard, 
went for a grenade and Shea shot him. Shea then inched his way 
carefully to the second machine gun position, where he captured two 
more Germans. The nature of the ground was such that he had to rush 
the last position, and he killed all three of the German occupants when 
he did so. Shea, a hot dog vendor from New York City, had not seemed 
all that likely a prospect as a major hero. In the darkness and confusion 
he rose to the occasion, and his platoon reorganized and continued its 
advance through the breach he had opened. 12 
By 0145, F and G companies had clawed their way forward to what 
they reported as Hill 316. Dawn's improved visibility revealed that 
instead they were in a saddle between 316 and Damiano proper. Heavy 
sniper fire from Hill 316 restricted individual movements and skir-
mishs developed elsewhere when German infantrymen desperately 
attempted to filter out of positions bypassed in the American advance. 
Company E, now under the command of a second lieutenant, finally 
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fought its way forward to the lead companies. At daybreak the bat-
talion commander attempted to reorganize and continue his attack. 
In the 1st Battalion sector, renewed efforts after seizing Damiano 
led to heavy fighting for the village of Ventosa. Companies B and C 
continued the attack. Company A, the most severely disorganized 
during the attack on Damiano, was replaced by K Company from the 
3rd Battalion, then in reserve. Fighting ebbed and flowed in fierce 
individual encounters until dawn, when the Americans finally shoul-
dered their way into the village. The Germans did not retreat far. Their 
71st Division launched a company-scale counterattack against the 2nd 
Battalion's forward elements just before dawn. This attack was re-
pulsed without loss of ground, but it caused General Sloan to become 
increasingly concerned for the security of his right-flank units. Rather 
than expose these units to flank attacks before they recovered from the 
night's exertions, Sloan ordered the 350th to hold and reorganize on 
Damiano until the French came abreast north of Castelforte. 
Once Damiano proper was in hand, the 350th was in a position to 
mop up Mount Ceracoli as well. Here the ground was rough and hilly, 
but nevertheless more suited for tanks than anywhere else in the 
regimental sector, so C Company of the 753rd Tank Battalion led the 
attack. The tankers kicked off at 0540, followed closely by the 350th's I 
Company. The tanks beetled foward against ineffectual opposition, all 
the while blasting Ceracoli with machine guns and 75-millimeter can-
nons. Two tanks hit mines; five threw tracks; one sheared a rear idler; 
and one suffered engine failure. The remainder gained the crest of 
Ceracoli and scattered the surviving Germans. The American in-
fantrymen trailing the advance passed quickly through the tanks to 
sweep the objective. Twenty-five other Germans were killed or 
wounded. On Ceracoli, the Germans, their antitank defenses sup-
pressed or destroyed by artillery and their positions overlooked by 
Americans on Damiano, proved helpless. The action lasted mere min-
utes before the defenders filtered out or surrendered. 13 
Through the remainder of 12 May, the 350th's sector was quiet. 
Units disappeared, or seemed to disappear, as infantrymen sought to 
exploit every shred of cover and concealment. Initial objectives 
achieved, or achieved in part, the battalions reorganized and shuffled 
intermingled units back to the control of parent organizations. Wher-
ever possible, commanders evacuated casualties through the difficult 
terrain to the regimental rear. Some unfortunate casualties-German 
and American alike-could not be reached and endured a day of pain 
and exposure before rescue parties picked a way to them in the gather-
ing darkness of evening. Evening brought a renewal of tactical activity 
as well. With its tactical organization and wire communications re-
stored, the 2nd Battalion inched F Company along Hill 316. The 1st 
· ~ ~~ 
FORMIA N 
+ DIADEM 
II CORPS FRONT 
Scale 1'" = 2,2 00 Yards 
ADAPTED FROM 88th G-3 MAP COURTESY OF COL. DIXIE BEGGS 
The First Three Days 111 
Battalion, also reorganized, straightened its line north of Damiano and 
tied itself into the French front-line trace. 14 
Two counterattacks caused momentary concern. One German 
company attacked F Company and temporarily stalemated the 2nd 
Battalion's advance. On-call mortars and artillery mauled the attacking 
German unit, and F Company resumed its tortuous advance By dawn 
on the 13th, Hill 316 was entirely in American hands. Another coun-
terattack struck Mount Ceracoli. German tank killer teams found and 
exploited a gap in I Company's positions and nearly overran the 
American tanks. Just in time the tankers and infantrymen detected the 
infiltrators and drove them off, leaving nineteen Germans dead and 
three wounded, and taking eleven prisoners. 15 
Daylight on 13 May again quieted the 350th's battlefield. Casual 
sniping occurred along the line, including tanks on Ceracoli leisurely 
blowing up Italian houses-suspected enemy positions-with high-
explosive super ammunition. The Germans, bent on covering their 
eventual withdrawal, shelled the 350th with greater intensity than 
before, but their capability to delay the 350th was weakening fast. 
By 1700 hours the 350th was once again on the attack, this time to 
seize Mount Rotondo. The 1st Battalion, reinforced by Companies K 
and L from the 3rd Battalion, made the main attack, while the 2nd 
Battalion provided fire support from Hill 316. Moving quickly forward 
against weakening German resistance, the attack developed along 
textbook lines. The excitement of the event comes through in for-
tuitously preserved radio transmissions of an anonymous artillery 
observer. As the attack kicked off, the observer pleaded, "For God's 
sake, get some fire on Rotondo. The Krauts are running over it like 
rabbits .... "A little later the transmission was "We're killing plenty of 
Jerries. Keep it up. They're running like hell." Then came the exultant 
"Christ, there go our boys. They are going along just as if they were 
doing a maneuver at Gruber. Right up the side of Rotondo. Yea! Yea! 
We've got Rotondo!" 16 
By the morning of 14 May the 350th Infantry Regiment was firmly 
established on Mount Rotondo overlooking the Ausente Valley. In 
tough fighting the draftees had bested their German adversaries and 
knocked them out of formidable defensive positions-the Gustav Line 
had cracked. The regiment's next order would be to "pursue." 
The 351st Infantry Regiment also attacked behind the violent artil-
lery preparation of 2300 hours, 11 May. The regiment's objective was 
the small village of Santa Maria Infante, a hill town overlooking the 
Ausonia Valley and, more important, the single road providing the 
Germans lateral communications behind the XIV Panzer Corps front. 17 
Like the 350th, the 351st expected fierce resistance, but its terrain 
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was more difficult: rolling countryside whose even slopes offered 
intervisible positions and interlocking fields of fire, precisely the type 
of terrain the Germans characteristically organized into their most 
effective defenses. As if this did not offer the five-hundred Germans of 
the 94th Fusilier Reconnaissance Battalion advantages enough, the 
front in the sector was masked by creeks that impaired off-road move-
ment and, worst of all, confined tanks to a narrow strip along the 
road. 18 
The 351st's plan of attack called for its 2nd Battalion to lead along 
the road from Minturno to Santa Maria Infante. The 3rd Battalion 
covered the right flank and the 1st Battalion remained in reserve. To the 
2nd Battalion's left, the 85th Infantry Division's 338th Infantry Regi-
ment attacked S-Ridge, a long, low series of hills flanking the 351st's 
axis of advance. The 2nd Battalion attacked withE and F companies 
abreast, followed by Gin reserve. Company F advanced on the left of 
the Minturno-Santa Maria Infante road; E Company advanced on the 
right of the road. The battalion plan of attack integrated artillery and 
mortar fires and provided for tanks and engineer support on call. 
Insofar as communications were concerned, the battalion and com-
pany commanders depended upon radio communications supple-
mented by visual contact, marking tape, and marking tracers. 19 
Company F's attack began on schedule, then disintegrated into 
four separate efforts. The platoons dispersed just across the line of 
departure when they came under fire from artillery, mortars, and 
machine guns firing from S-Ridge. One by one radios failed-the 
company commander's was among the first. Once dispersed, the 
platoons never regained their original configuration in the smoke, 
darkness, and confusion. 
Picking separate ways forward through obstacles and mine fields, 
three platoon-sized groups-two of which consisted of squads from 
different platoons thrown together by chance-stalled against for-
midable emplacements along the crest and slopes of Hill 103. In con-
fused and bitter fighting the draftees gave a good account of them-
selves but none of the individual groups proved sufficiently strong to 
work through more than one or two of the machine-gun positions in 
their line of advance. The Germans quickly replaced the fire from 
weapons knocked out with fire from other weapons whose sectors 
interlocked. Without communications, the separate groups of Amer-
icans could neither call for artillery and mortars nor support each 
other's efforts. Indeed, no group knew where the other groups were or 
what they were doing. 
A fourth platoon-sized group from F Company-consisting of a 
squad from the 3rd Platoon, a squad from the 1st Platoon, three 
machine-gun squads from H Company (attached), and the company 
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headquarters led by the commander himself, Capt. Carl W. Nelson-
slipped by the otherwise preoccupied defenders of Hilll03 and pene-
trated to the outskirts of Santa Maria Infante. En route, this contingent 
overran a mortar position and captured fifteen half-dressed and com-
pletely surprised Germans. On the outskirts of Santa Maria Infante, 
Nelson's group came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from 
the S-Ridge and under sniper fire from the village itself. Nelson decid-
ed it would be prudent to dig in until reinforced, so he converted a 
draw and culvert to the west of the village into a miniature strong 
point. 
To the east of the road into Santa Maria Infante, E Company also 
encountered heavy resistance early in its advance. The array of em-
placements that bedeviled F Company on Hill103 extended across the 
road and along a spur that ran perpendicular to the American line of 
advance for five hundred yards. This German strong point in E Com-
pany's sector included no fewer than twelve machine-gun positions 
dug into the hillside or emplaced in the rubble of sturdy Italian farm 
houses. Company E retained its communications-and thus its artil-
lery support and unity of effort-throughout the attack, but, like F 
Company, it also reached a stalemate in a thicket of mines, obstacles, 
and interlocking fires. 
In an effort to restore momentum, the commander of the 2nd 
Battalion, Lt. Col. Raymond E. Kendall, added his own courageous 
feats to those already enacted. When E Company's commander was 
wounded, Kendall came forward and personally led attacks on the 
most troublesome of the machine gun emplacements. He personally 
destroyed a pillbox with bazooka shells and knocked out another 
machine gun with hand grenades. The reinvigorated attack gained 
another hundred years as the infantrymen, inspired by Kendall, re-
newed their roles. The attack stalled again when it ran into yet another 
string of German positions. Kendall himself fell mortally wounded 
when he rounded the corner of a house to throw a grenade and was 
struck in the face by a supporting machine gun seventy-five yards 
away. With Kendall's death, at approximately 0300, the 2nd Battalion 
advance mired in front of the spur. Company G fought through by-
passed German positions to come to the relief of E Company, which by 
now had taken eighty-nine casualties, but G Company also was stop-
ped by the formidable German defenses. 
Company E had requested tank support during its first hour of 
fighting on the spur. After initial confusion, a platoon of tanks from the 
760th Tank Battalion finally rolled down the Santa Maria Infante Road 
at about 0300. 20 The road was known to be mined, so the 35lst's 
antitank company attempted to clear it before the tanks arrived. As the 
tank platoon leader approached the line of contact, an engineer officer 
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advised him that the mine clearance was still incomplete; heavy inter-
ference fires had forced the breaching party to take cover. The tank 
platoon leader decided to take his chances, rolled forward, and lost his 
tank to a tremendous explosion. Even as this platoon leader was being 
evacuated, two other lieutenants, tank liaison officers spurred by 
desperate requests for support, decided to risk sending another tank 
into the mine field. The second tank also hit a mine and exploded. The 
regimental commander of the 351st, Col. ArthurS. Champeny, arrived 
on the scene and ordered the tank platoon sergeant to try again. This 
NCO, eyewitness to the two previous explosions and unimpressed 
with the 88th's mine clearance thus far, refused. Champeny declared 
him "relieved" of his command and after a fierce discussion cajoled 
another of the tankers into yet another attempt. This third tank also hit 
a mine. Champeny called to the rear and requested another tank 
platoon. He also left his supporting engineers instructions to complete 
a path through the mine field before tanks attempted another crossing, 
a course of action the surviving tankers firmly supported. 
At 0420, Champeny fed his 3rd Battalion into the attack. Com-
panies I and K swung wide to the left along the route successfully 
taken by Nelson's contingent from F Company several hours earlier. By 
now the Germans were alert to the dimensions of the Allied attack, 
however, so the path F Company's contingent had followed was no 
longer open. The 3rd Battalion stalled in its turn on the lower slopes of 
the hotly contested Hill 103. At daybreak the battalion found itself 
exposed to machine gun fire from the S-Ridge, still in German hands. 
Throughout the night the Germans had been husbanding the 
resources necessary for local counterattacks. Captain Nelson's isolated 
contingent was their first target. In the late afternoon Nelson came 
under a determined attack supported by self-propelled guns firing at 
point-blank range. All appeared lost until American artillery obser-
vers, soaring high above the battlefield in a light observation plane, 
spotted his predicament and broke up the counterattack with heavy 
concentrations of artillery. These fires destroyed two self-propelled 
guns and scattered the rest. The artillerymen also annihilated a Ger-
man reserve company they caught in an assembly area with a carefully 
coordinated time-on-target (i.e., simultaneous-impact) multiple bat-
talion mission. Mauled by artillery and stubbornly resisted by Nelson's 
infantrymen, the initial German counterattack faltered. 
While the men ofF Company weathered German attacks, tanks 
from the 760th again tried to break through to relieve them. 21 By noon 
on the twelfth the 351st Antitank Company, assisted by heavy sup-
pressive fires on enemy positions, cleared a lane through the mine 
field. A fresh tank platoon rolled through the breach and demolished 
the nearest machine gun positions with point-blank fire. Once the 
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tanks crested the spur, however, they came under heavy and accurate 
antitank fire from Santa Maria Infante. In this exchange the Germans 
knocked out three tanks, after which the rest withdrew. 
At about 1500 yet another tank platoon attempted to batter its way 
through to Santa Maria. These tankers were closely assisted by in-
fantryll.len-by this time intimately familiar with the layout of the 
German positions-who rode on the back decks and pointed out 
targets. Tank-infantry teams knocked out no fewer than twenty ma-
chine gun or sniper positions using this technique. In another duel 
with the German guns, the leading vehicles knocked out the first to fire 
on the advancing column. Unfortunately, this luck did not hold. Other 
German guns opened up and the array of antitank positions again 
proved too tough to break through. The Americans once again retired 
after having lost two more tanks to the stubborn Germans. Another 
tank platoon attempted to bypass the strongest German positions by 
following a trail winding across Reali Creek somewhat to the east ·of 
Santa Maria. The ground proved too soft for the vehicles; all mired. It 
took an engineer company a day and a half to get them out. 
As darkness approached, the Germans again counterattacked. 
Limited visibility concealed them from American artillery observers as 
they assembled and moved forward. Again F Company was the initial 
target. The Germans used a ruse to get close. Six Germans moved 
forward with their hands over their heads shouting "Kamerad," thus 
apparently attempting to surrender. This noisy distraction masked the 
forward movement of the German main body. Company F, by then 
almost out of ammunition and virtually without unwounded person-
nel, sent a contingent from its foxholes to accept the surrender. In a 
single rush the Germans swept through the American position, cap-
turing the dazed defenders before they could offer effective resistance. 
Five enlisted men who pretended to be dead escaped capture. 
Buoyed by success, the Germans moved on to attack the 3rd 
Battalion on Hill 103. This time their luck did not hold. The battalion 
was not in the exhausted condition of the contingent from F Company, 
and no conceivable ruse provided a means of approach. Although the 
initial attacks were hotly contested, American mortars and artillery 
soon swept the Germans back into the protection of foxholes and 
emplacements. 
On the morning of the 13th, the 351st had little to show for two 
nights of exhaustive effort and heavy casualties. Nobody knew how 
badly they were hurting the Germans, nor could they know that the 
German line, unhinged by the successes of the FEC and the 350th to 
the north, could hardly afford to take further such punishment. An air 
of gloom pervaded a meeting between the commanders of the 88th and 
85th infantry divisions as they once again resolved to batter their way 
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forward. 22 They set a renewed attack for 1600. The 351st's boundary 
shifted west to include Hills 109, 126, and 128 on S-Ridge. This gave 
Champeny more room to maneuver and the opportunity to reduce the 
machine gun nests on S-Ridge that had so bedeviled his advance. 
Champeny's plan was to send the 2nd and 3rd battalions once more 
against the objectives in front of them-the spur and Hill 103, respec-
tively-while swinging his 1st Battalion to the left onto S-Ridge. Once 
the 1st Battalion seized Hill 109, it was to advance along S-Ridge into 
Santa Maria. The critical attack on Hill109 would be made by a battalion 
that was altogether fresh and without casualties. 
The 1st Battalion did not attack at the scheduled time. Two thou-
sand difficult meters separated its assembly area from its attack posi-
tion. The battalion commander and his operations and training officer 
were isolated by enemy artillery fire when reconnoitering the assigned 
objectives, and they rejoined their battalion several hours later than 
planned. The route of advance to the attack position took the battalion 
through the knee-deep mud of Peralgia Creek. Heavy machine guns 
and cumbersome ammunition crates had to be manhandled across the 
width of the front. Preparations moved at a snail's pace. 
Mindful of these delays, Champeny requested permission to defer 
his attack time. Sloan concurred with an 1830 attack time, but the 85th 
Infantry Division decided to conduct its attack at 1630 instead. In the 
confused radio traffic that followed, units came to dfferent conclusions 
as to when they were supposed to attack. The 85th's 338th Infantry 
Regiment attacked at 1630. The 351st's 2nd Battalion attacked at 1630. 
The 351st's 3rd Battalion attacked at 1830. The 351st's 1st Battalion, after 
experiencing further delays, did not attack until 2200. The Germans, 
having intercepted at least some of the radio traffic, prepared for an 
1830 attack. 23 
Attacking at 1630, the 2nd Battalion's E and G companies made 
some initial progress. Their attack was assisted by supporting fire from 
tank destroyers on Tufo Ridge, almost two thousand meters south of 
the spur-well clear of the deadly fire of the German antitank weap-
ons. The flat trajectory of the tank destroyers made them ideal for 
penetrating the embrasures of machine gun positions, provided such 
targets could be identified. To mark targets, E Company used .50-
caliber tracers fired from its own positions.24 Tankers on Tufo Ridge 
watched the tracers and followed the line of sight they described into 
the target, then blasted away at the positions thus identified. The 2nd 
Battalion worked its way to the opposite side of the spur, after which it 
became ensnarled in a thicket of machine gun nests invisible to the 
tankers on Tufo Ridge. The battalion knocked out some of these posi-
tions without being able to work through them all. 
Shortly before the 3rd Battalion's attack, the Germans fired a pre-
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emptive barrage with four hundred rounds of carefully hoarded artil-
lery ammunition. 25 When this subsided the 3rd Battalion advanced 
and made some progress knocking out the nearest machine gun posi-
tions. Without the support of the 1st Battalion's attack against S-Ridge, 
however, the 3rd Battalion was again doomed to stalemate in a crossfire 
from its front and flanks-Hills 103 and 109, respectively. 
The 1st Battalion finally attacked at 2200. The Germans, who ex-
pected them earlier, had already exhausted their artillery in a pre-
emptive barrage on the 3rd Battalion and on the not-yet-occupied 
attack positions of the 1st Battalion. One unit from the 338th had 
already mistakenly attacked Hill 109, so the Germans had reason to 
believe they had already experienced the anticipated attack. 26 Benefit-
ting from this surprise and superior numbers, C Company worked its 
way quickly up Hill 109. In the darkness and confusion it initially 
attacked the misdirected contingent from the 338th, which had stalled 
halfway up the slope. These unfortunates quickly identified them-
selves as Americans, so little damage was done and the advance 
continued. At 0300, C Company evicted the exhausted Germans from 
Hill 109 and secured its invaluable crest. 
Company B had remained in reserve. When C Company took 
flanking fire from Hill 131, in the 338th's sector, it crossed the regi-
mental boundary and attacked Hill131. 27 Initially there was considera-
ble confusion as the Germans, mindful of the loss of Hill109, struggled 
to extricate themselves and as troops from 338th and 351st mistook 
each other for Germans in the darkness. Ultimately both the Germans 
and B Company withdrew, leaving the hill to the 338th. 
As 14 May dawned over the Italian battlefields, the 351st at last held 
the piece of terrain that would unlock Santa Maria Infante. The cost 
had been high: 84 killed, 284 wounded, and 93 captured or missing. 
Five of the regiment's nine rifle companies were at half strength or less. 
The Germans also had lost heavily. The 94th Fusilier Reconnaissance 
Battalion lost more than two hundred men in the bitter fighting along 
the direct approaches to Santa Maria, while the equally exhausted 
267th Grenadier Regiment lost almost two hundred more on the slopes 
of S-Ridge. The brutal fact was that the two American fourteen-thou-
sand-man draft divisions, with 10 percent overstrengths for replace-
ments and entire battalions not yet engaged, could afford such losses; 
the thinly spread Germans could not. 28 
The logisticians of the 88th Infantry Division also found them-
selves taxed during the first days of the May offensive. Supplies in all 
classes rose to enormous levels of stockage prior to the attack. Penin-
sular Base Section issued 16,238 tons of ammunition alone in the 
fortnight before D day. 29 In an effort to avoid calling attention to 
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extensive front-line depots, the division's logisticians forwarded most 
of this ammunition directly to the firing units. Mortarmen had one 
thousand rounds stacked by each tube. Artillerymen enjoyed similar 
largesse. In the push for Santa Maria, the 913th Artillery Battalion 
alone fired five thousand rounds. Contrast this with a "major" pre-
emptive strike of the Germans: four-hundred rounds in front of Hill 
103 on 13 May. 
Rations, clothing, fuel, oil, lubricants, engineering items, medi-
cines, repair parts, and major end items also had been prestocked in 
enormous quantities. Only extraordinary circumstances caused Allied 
units to experience supply shortages during the period 11-14 May. 
Indeed, throughout the II Corps sector only F Company of the 351st's 
2nd Battalion-cut off, surrounded, and repeatedly subjected to heavy 
German attacks-ever found itself low on ammunition and medical 
supplies. 30 
Transportation posed more problems than did supply per se, but 
the 88th's advances from 11 May to 14 May were not yet so extensive as 
to make these problems serious. The division was serviced by fourteen 
hundred mules and four hundred muleteers. Railheads existed at 
Teano, Sparanise, and Carinola, and pipelines extended to Mignano 
and Sessa. From these points, routes that had been exercised for 
months extended to the initial attack positions, all of which were 
already well stocked. Several thousand yards more-through difficult 
terrain, to be sure-brought mule trains to the leading American units. 
The flow of supplies was uninterrupted and routine. 31 
Behind the new front lines engineers hastened to improve supply 
routes. Bailey bridges became permanent bridges; mine fields were 
marked, then cleared; goat trails were widened to support vehicular 
traffic; mired tanks were retrieved, then pushed forward along newly 
engineered routes. The front-line infantryman masked a frenzy of 
engineering activity. 32 
Insofar as maintenance was concerned, the 88th found it had few 
new problems to address, largely because vehicles were little-used 
initially and because firing batteries received little in the way of effec-
tive counterbattery fire. There were, of course, small-arms failures and 
small arms damaged or destroyed. Small-arms repair was, for the most 
part, deferred. Men became casualties more quickly than did weapons, 
and replacement troops brought weapons forward with them. Indeed, 
the accidents of combat seemed to increase rather than reduce the small 
arms available to front-line infantrymen. One reads of assaulting 
troops picking up, using, and discarding weapons as if they were so 
many vegetables in an untidy garden. 33 
Only the tankers encountered serious maintenance problems. 
They mired, threw tracks in difficult terrain, lost suspension compo-
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nents to mines and obstacles, and suffered battle damage from anti-
tank rounds. They also suffered routine mechanical failures. Infantry 
commanders became impatient with the array of mechanical diffi-
culties;34 tankers recognized them as the cost of doing business. All 
factors considered, the tankers and their supporting mechanics did a 
creditable job keeping as many tanks as they did in the action. 35 Most 
disabled tanks and many knocked-out ones were repaired in short 
order. Other tanks, even some with relatively minor damage, were 
simply replaced. The Peninsular Base Section depots included replace-
ment tanks in their cornucopia of prestocked supplies. 
Communications difficulties demonstrated a major weakness of 
American support apparatus. Attacking formations were overly de-
pendent on radios, and the radios on hand were unreliable. Some 
radios failed altogether at critical times; others fell victim to the pecu-
liarities of terrain, range, and interference. Units that took the time to 
lay wire enjoyed better communications, although wire presented its 
own special problems. Wire was easily cut by artillery fire, moving 
tanks, or simple clumsiness. Wiremen working their way back along 
the lines to restore communications found themselves bewildered by 
spaghetti snarls of entangled cable. Often it was quicker to lay entirely 
new lines rather than to attempt to restore old ones. This expedient in 
turn increased the total number of lines available to become entangled. 
After the first few days, experience and command attention led to 
improved communications. Commanders established radio relay sta-
tions and radio backup systems. Wiremen. tagged lines where they 
came close to each other and began using the heavier 110 wire instead 
of the more fragile 130 wire. Couriers came to be more carefully and 
frequently used. The 88th would not master its communications for 
some time, but the experiences of the initial hours of the offensive 
spurred emphasis and improvement. 36 
It should not be supposed that communications problems were 
unique to the 88th. All Allied divisions suffered such problems to a 
greater or lesser extent. 37 The Germans, their rear areas and communi-
cations pulverized by artillery and air strikes, suffered even more. The 
88th's commanders could talk to most subordinate and supporting 
units most of the time. German commanders were hard put to talk to 
anybody.38 
During Diadem, American logisticians also saw further problems 
in the exercising of medical care. Casualty cases among the draftees 
benefited from a medical establishment as extensive as had ever been 
mustered. Benefited, that is, after they finally reached a medical facili-
ty. Evacuation schemes involving litter trails feeding into ambulance 
pickup points and clearing stations had been carefully thought out and 
rehearsed. Unfortunately, the sheer difficulties of terrain and circum-
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stance made evacuation difficult. During daylight, casualties stranded 
between the lines suffered extended agonies until darkness concealed 
rescuers from enemy observation. Litter teams came under fire intend-
ed for other targets. Of sixty Italian volunteers who assisted in the 
evacuation of the 351st's casualties near Santa Maria Infante, twenty-
three were killed in action. Medical evacuation probably could not have 
been much improved upon; it was difficult to extricate casualties quick-
ly given the nature of the fighting and the evacuation means avail-
able.39 
Fortunately, the overall division casualty rate for Diadem was low. 
This factor coupled with the on hand overstrength of 1,037 replace-
ment personnel gave appearance of a successful individual replace-
ment operation. But the apparent success of the 88th in replacing 
casualties led to misconceptions with unfortunate long-term con-
sequences. Operation Diadem was not only a test of the draft division, 
but also a trial of the idea of replacing casualties as individuals, in a 
manner analogous to the replenishment of ammunition, spare parts, 
and irreparable vehicles. The division's successes in attacking ever 
wearier Germans with fresh men was misread-and continues to be 
misread-as a validation of the individual replacement system. In fact, 
the system of individual replacement did not work well during the 
actual combat itself. Replacements tended to be confused, frightened, 
and guided rather than led into combat. They often became lost or 
separated from the units they were to fill. They did not immediately 
identify with their new comrades, could not immediately be relied 
upon, and took time to settle in. There was nothing wrong with the 
replacements as individuals; in time they, too, became good soldiers. 
Replacements simply proved not to be interchangeable parts. The 
notion of a draftee division, trained as a unit from the ground up, and 
the notion of a drafted individual replacement, trained and deployed 
without unit identity, were confused in the aftermath of Diadem. The 
validation of one did not necessarily mean the validation of the other. 40 
The momentum of the 88th's attack was maintained not by fresh 
men, but by fresh companies. 41 During sledgehammer blows against 
the Gustav Line, companies wore out and were replaced by others not 
yet engaged. Increasingly weary Germans found themselves attacked 
by new American units on 13 May and again on 14 May. This was not 
because individuals came forward to replace the fallen, but because 
fresh companies attacked in their turn across the same narrow fronts. 
What, then, can one conclude from the first three days of the 88th's 
first big offensive? In the strictest sense, the draftees fulfilled the 
promise of their training. What they had trained well to do, they did 
well. Techniques they had mastered through practicing time and time 
again in training or on maneuvers remained mastered in actual combat. 
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Unfortunately, the converse was also true. One could have predicted 
the strengths of the 88th by analyzing its training program; one also 
could have predicted its weaknesses by reflecting on that program's 
omissions. 
Insofar as the riflemen themselves were concerned, nobody but 
the Germans had reason to complain. Their aggressiveness and deter-
mination were creditable, at times heroic. They moved well within ther 
squads: they alternated moving and supporting by fire, worked for-
ward by bounds through formidable obstacles, rushed enemy posi-
tions after tedious approaches, and executed their most successful 
attacks with parade-ground precision. They seem to have handled 
personal weapons, rifles, pistols, grenades, light machine guns, com-
petently and with effect. If anything, they were criticized for being too 
controlled in their use of weapons, for not being willing to fire blindly 
at targets they could not see. 42 Overall, the 88th's successes were, more 
than anything else, the successes of its riflemen; its failures were not 
failures on the rifleman's part. 
The artillery of the 88th rendered a similarly creditable perform-
ance. The 88th's major training exercises had been exercises of an 
infantry-artillery combination. The proficiency thus gained had been 
sharpened in the two months of Minturno's no-man's-land. Practice 
paid off; dazed German prisoners commented on how closely Amer-
ican infantrymen followed the supporting barrages and on how effec-
tive American counterbattery fire was. German counterattacks were 
repeatedly swept away by hurricanes of American artillery. Whereas 
dismounted counterattacks traditionally had been an integral feature 
of German defensive technique, in the face of accurate, overwhelming 
American artillery the tactic proved suicidal in most circumstances. 
Some of the 88th's artillery actions were brilliant. Cases in point were 
the time-on-target annihilation of a German reserve company, the 
spotter plane-directed destruction of self-propelled guns attacking F 
Company, and the tracer-guided destruction of pillboxes during the 
final attacks on the spur. 4 3 
For a number of reasons, many of which were simply admin-
istrative, the 88th's training slighted the integration of air support and 
tanks as much as it emphasized the integration of infantry and artillery. 
These training omissions manifested themselves on the battlefield. 
There is no evidence that tactical air support made much difference in 
the 88th's front-line action. Indeed, the records reflect that maneuver-
ing units were conscious of air strikes only in a general sort of way-
this despite the fact that not less than one-eighth of the firepower 
assigned to the 88th's attack was to come from the air. It may be that the 
air support available to the Allied Armies in Italy served a useful 
purpose insofar as strategic bombing or interdiction were concerned, 
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but in the much narrower field of vision of the 88th, air support came to 
serve little purpose at all. The technology existed to integrate close air 
support, and close air support had been effectively used by other 
divisions prior to Diadem. The 88th's underutilization of air support 
seems to have resulted from a preference for the familiar, a preference 
to use artillery to get the same job done. 44 
Tanks were somewhat better integrated into the division's attack 
than close air support, largely because of frenzied preparations after 
the division was in Italy. The tank-infantry training had not been 
extensive, however, and coordination proved to be far from smooth. 
The 760th Tank Battalion's preferred method of support was for tanks 
to trail infantry by a considerable distance, then to rush forward when 
suitable targets were identified. This technique requires masterful 
timing and reliable communications, attributes the 88th did not enjoy 
around Santa Maria Infante. Tanks arrived well after the 351st's attack 
stalled and plowed into a mine field the 351st had not yet cleared. From 
that inauspicious beginning the 351st's commanders ordered, cajoled, 
or browbeat the tankers into the teeth of a fully prepared enemy. The 
successes the tankers did have were testimony to courage and tech-
nical competence, not to imagination or tactical finesse. 
On Mount Ceracoli the tankers had more luck, largely because 
German defenses had already been unhinged by the seizure of Da-
miano. Ceracoli was a well-executed, if minor, secondary attack. Even 
at Ceracoli, however, infantry and tanks were not fully integrated. In 
the consolidation, tankers and infantrymen each assumed the other 
was securing the ground masking the tank positions. In the confusion 
this ground remained unsecured and became the avenue of approach 
for a German counterattack that came within a hair's breadth of suc-
cess. 
One wonders how many lives would have been spared if tanks had 
been fully integrated into the first rush of the 88th's attack. The state of 
the art was illustrated by the 1st Armored Division's clockwork attack 
out of Anzio two weeks later. Armor represented more than a third of 
the firepower available to the 88th's attack. Employed late and largely 
frittered away, this firepower proved of little consequence on the 
immediate battlefield. 45 
Another handicap during the 88th's attack was faulty communica-
tions. Radios were not altogether reliable, nor did they always have the 
necessary range. Wire communications, while more reliable, were 
cumbersome and likely to be cut. Messengers were slow and often 
killed or wounded. These were technical problems that were not then 
and have not yet been fully resolved. 46 Commanders can improve their 
chances, however, by developing backup systems and previously 
agreed upon visual or acoustic signals. The Army Training Program did 
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not emphasize techniques of battlefield communication, nor did the 
training of the 88th. Units went into the attack trusting their radios. Too 
often the result was confusion-each squad fighting its own little war. 
The 88th did learn from its experiences and eventually mastered tac-
tical communications as far as was then possible. During the learning 
period of 11-14 May 1944, however, the division suffered some hard 
knocks. 
Concerning logistics, one must conclude that the 88th was pre-
pared to support itself to the limits of the technology of the time, for it 
never lacked with respect to a class of supply or a logistical activity. In 
light of the redundant mule and truck transportation establishments, 
one might argue that too many men were given over to logistical 
activities. If so, this did not leave too few riflemen available to fight the 
Germans, even though 50 percent of the division's personnel were 
given over to logistical activities. Only 40 percent of a comparable 
German division's personnel were thus used, but German rifemen 
were less well supported and far fewer in number than their Allied 
opponents. 
An overall assessment of the 88th's first three days in its first big 
offensive must give the division high marks. In bitter, confused fight-
ing the draftees penetrated some of the sturdiest defenses of the 
Gustav Line. Indeed, a recent and respected quantitative study identi-
fies the 88th as Diadem's highest-performing Allied division. 47 Despite 
deficiencies in their preparation, the draftees proved adequately pre-
pared to accomplish their doctrinal mission: to close with and destroy 
the enemy in extended ground combat. The War Department verdict 
concerning the performance of the 88th was, in fact, highly favorable. 
Alas, the effectiveness of the draftees' performance was not imme-
diately apparent. The War Department verdict would come only after 
several weeks of hindsight. On May 14 assessments remained con-
fused. General Clark, somewhat removed from the fighting and not 
altogether conscious of its severity, had hoped to clear Sante Maria 
Infante by noon on the twelfth. In his disappointment he contrasted 
the successes of the "veteran" FEC with the frustrations of the "green" 
85th and 88th. At the time, Clark did not know of the scantiness of the 
opposition in the face of the French, or of the strength of the defenses 
in the face of the draftees. 48 
The draftees themselves did not yet have a complete picture. Their 
sense of accomplishment or failure depended upon where they were. 
Some elements of the 350th had experienced easy successes, whereas 
others had been roughly handled. To the 351st, corpse-strewn hillsides 
around Santa Maria Infante initially smelled more of failure than of 
victory. The draftees of the 349th had not yet participated in their first 
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battle at all. The verdict of 11-14 May is more clear in retrospect than it 
was to men at the time. One draftee could triumphantly cheer, "Yea! 
Yea! We've got Rotondo!" while another, with equal conviction, stared 
at the stump that had been his arm and sobbed, "We got the hell kicked 
out of us. "4Y The facts were not yet clear. Only more fighting and 
greater success could bring them into focus. 
8 _____ _ 
Mintumo to Rome: 
The Pursuit 
Even as the 350th Infantry Regiment consolidated Mount Rotondo and 
the 351st inched cautiously from Hill 109 toward Santa Maria Infante, 
Allied chieftains shifted their attention from the immediate battle to 
wider vistas. Now breached in three places, the Gustav Line was but 
the first of a series of defensible traces separating the Italian southern 
front from coastal plains leading to Anzio and Rome. Of the other 
traces, the Germans had developed two-the Dora Extension, three 
miles behind the Gustav Line, and the Hitler Line, twenty miles to the 
rear of that-into formidable positions. 1 The Germans had long since 
proven themselves masters at improvisation, so the danger existed that 
they might redeploy enough units into the Dora or Hitler lines to once 
again halt Allied armies. 
The Germans had uncommitted reserves. Anxiety concerning sea-
ward flanks had caused Field Marshall Kesselring to retain sizeable 
forces to cover the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts. Of these forces, four 
divisions-the 3rd, 29th, and 90th panzer grenadiers and the 26th 
Panzer-were first-rate, capable of significantly influencing the course 
of the battle. Kesselring now knew that the attacks on the Gustav Line 
represented the Allied main effort, so he could afford to divert these 
reserves to his southern front. A race of sorts developed as the German 
commander tried to cobble survivors and reserves into yet another line 
while Allied columns attempted to penetrate the most defensible traces 
before the Germans effectively manned them. 2 
In this race for position, the mountain-wise French Expeditionary 
Corps was the first out of the blocks. Having overrun Mount Majo on 
13 May, the French threatened to push up the Liri River Valley on to 
Highway 6. Sensitive to the trafficability of the Liri Valley, Kesselring 
reinforced against this threat first. The 90th Panzer Grenadier and 20th 
Panzer divisions settled piecemeal into the path of the French drive. 
Meanwhile, Generals Clark, Juin, and Keyes prepared to exploit 
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through the thinly defended Aurunci Mountains. The Germans had 
reinforced elsewhere because they considered the terrain in the Au-
runci too rough for the movement of major units. Allied commanders 
saw opportunity rather than obstacle in the crags and gorges, however. 
Here the Fifth Army would sweep on through the German defenses. 
Here the 88th Infantry Division would prove its mettle. 
The 88th Division renewed its attack early on 14 May. 3 By 0900 the 
351st Infantry Regiment, to its surprise, walked virtually unopposed 
into Santa Maria Infante. While the 351st mopped up Santa Maria, the 
as-yet uncommitted 349th Infantry Regiment passed through and led 
the advance across the Ausonia Valley. In quick succession the fresh 
regiment pushed the Germans off Mount Bracchi, Capo D' Aguo, and 
Mount Cirta. The somewhat wearier 350th advanced alongside the 
349th toward Spigno. Early on the fifteenth the 351st, after a day of 
rest, passed through the 350th and seized Spigno itself. 
The seizures of Spigno and Mount Cirta compromised the fortifica-
tions of the Dora Extension, the first of the defensible traces to the rear 
of the Gustav Line. The German 94th Infantry Division, battered by 
three days of fierce fighting, had suffered a near absolute breakdown 
of tactical communications. Leadership losses, the destruction of wire 
lines, bombings and shellings of key headquarters, and the fluid 
tactical situation all contributed to German confusion. On two separate 
occasions units from the 88th overran artillery batteries caught totally 
unaware by the pace of the American advance. One enterprising 
American captured by the Germans took advantage of the general 
confusion and convinced his captors they themselves had just been 
surrounded and should surrender. 4 He paraded them off, twenty 
docile "krauts" led by one swaggering GI. As the German 94th Infantry 
fell apart, surrender became contagious and prisoners of war-two 
thousand of them-soon overflowed the division's prisoner-of-war 
cages. 5 In part, Germans surrendered to Americans out of a fear of 
falling into the hands of the bloodthirsty North African groups of the 
French Expeditionary Corps. Resistance forward of the Aurunci 
Mountains faltered, then collapsed. 
Once captured, Spigno became a gateway into the Aurunci. From 
the village, goat trails meandered into the Petrella Massif. Throughout 
15 and 16 May, French and American troops poured through the 
village and up a tortuous road into the escarpment. 6 Guided by local 
peasants, the 351st led the 88th toward the village of ltri, an important 
junction of Highway 7 with the Germans' main lateral route, Highway 
82. 
Early on the eighteenth the 351st was in a position to cross the ltri-
Pico road and seize Mount Grande, the height overlooking Itri. Here 
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the Germans temporarily checked the American advance with a hastily 
assembled force of tanks and self-propelled artillery. The 351st was so 
far ahead of the main body that it could communicate only by a tedious 
radio relay system from mountaintop to mountaintop. The regiment 
had also outdistanced the range of supporting artillery. It needed 
artillery to break the ltri position, but artillery could not follow the 
route along which the infantry had advanced. Fortunately, the 85th 
Infantry Division also had been making progress along the more 
passable coastal road. Sloan's artillery trailed the 85th's advance until it 
was again within range of the 88th's forward units. On the morning of 
the nineteenth artillery near Maranola was within range of the 351st, 
near ltri. The 351st attacked to seize Mount Grande while the 349th 
cleared ltri itself. 
General Keyes then directed Sloan to form a motorized task force 
and rush Fondi, a village the Germans had developed into a key strong 
point on their Hitler Line. A race developed between the 88th Infantry 
Division and the theretofore uncommitted 29th Panzer Grenadier Divi-
sion, the latter ordered by Kesselring to Fondi on the nineteenth. 
Unfortunately for Keyes's plans, one could not readily make mecha-
nized flying columns out of leg infantry units that were already com-
mitted. The narrow streets of Itri became a hopeless snarl of 
misdirected tanks, engineer vehicles, trucks, and self-propelled artil-
lery. 7 South-bound units debouching from the Aurunci north of ltri and 
north-bound units debouching from the Aurunci south of Itri collided 
in the tiny village and further complicated a monumental traffic jam. 
Fortunately for the 88th, its leading regiment did not await 
motorization. Deftly bypassing the chaos at ltri, the 349th skirted the 
mountains surrounding the town and marched on along Highway 7 
towards Fondi. Battalions passed through each other in turns to assure 
that fresh troops always led the advance. Brushing through light 
resistance, the 349th reached Fondi a little after noon on the twentieth. 
Here German resistance stiffened. A mixed bag of tanks, self-
propelled artillery, and infantrymen from the 94th Infantry Division 
clung tenaciously to Fondi while awaiting imminent relief from the 
29th Panzer Grenadiers. The 349th's I Company deployed abreast on 
Highway 7 in the face of heavy fire while a platoon of tanks, recently 
extricated from the snarl at Itri, added weight to their attack. 
The attack of I Company faltered in the face of heavy resistance. 
The 3rd Battalion commander correctly diagnosed that the weight of 
the German defenses was directed down Highway 7. In a textbook 
maneuver he fixed the Germans' attention with I Company, while the 
remainder of his battalion worked its way through hills overlooking the 
town from the northeast. Once set, this spirited flanking attack poured 
down the slopes to make short work of the German defenders, then 
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swept on through Fondi itself. The 88th had broken through the Hitler 
Line. 
Having secured Fondi, the 349th moved rapidly on to Mount 
Passignano, a dominant feature a mile north of the village. This posi-
tion anchored the 88th even more firmly inside the Hitler Line. Denied 
Fondi, elements of the newly arriving 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, 
moving south on Highway 7, reconcentrated around Terracina. Thus, 
the 88th found itself positioned between the arriving German reserves 
and the German line of resistance through Pico, Portecorvo, and Aqui-
no. This separation of the German reserves from the German main line 
of resistance left the 88th with nothing but the battered remnants of the 
94th Infantry Division to its front. 
The 88th moved forward into the vacuum its success had created. 
The 350th assumed the lead and pushed along the spine of Mount Alto 
towards the village of Roccasecca del Volsci. Roccasecca overlooked an 
important lateral route between the Liri Valley and the coastal plain. Its 
seizure would establish the Fifth Army on terrain clear of the lunar 
landscapes of the Aurunci and Ausoni mountains. Encountering scat-
tered resistance and accounting for more than one hundred Germans 
captured or killed at a cost of thirty American casualties, the 350th 
secured Roccasecca as light failed on the twenty-second. At dawn on 
the twenty-third, the regiment found the view from its newly won 
positions breathtaking. Spread panoramically beneath it was what 
appeared to be the entire German army-troops, tanks, trucks, trail-
ers, mule trains-moving east and west along the valley floor. With 
some exaggeration, one American officer boasted that he could have 
ended the war in Italy if he had had sufficient artillery support avail-
able at that point. Col. James C. Fry, commander of the 350th, consid-
ered it imprudent to move off his commanding height onto the valley 
floor, but the regiment inflicted some damage when it opened up with 
the mortars and machine guns it had laboriously borne through the 
mountains. Surprised, the Germans made several ineffectual attempts 
to dislodge the 350th. 8 
Fry's advance had created a salient ten miles into the German rear 
and captured terrain overlooking an important lateral route of com-
munications. Once the 88th's artillery drew within range of the 350th, 
the valley would become nothing less than a death trap for German 
troops and vehicles. German positions to the south and east of Roc-
casecca were no longer tenable. 
Another development added to the German troubles on 23 May. 
The Anzio beachhead exploded as VI Corps hurled itself into the 
German Fourteenth Army. 9 The Third Infantry Division attacked to-
wards Cisterna behind a wall of artillery fire while the First Armored 
Division clipped through the German lines to Highway 7 with a clock-
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wise combination of artillery, breaching charges, smoke, mounted 
attacks, and dismounted mop-ups. The First Special Service Force 
began its spectacular assault up Mount Arrestina10 while the 45th, 
36th, British 1st, and British 5th infantry divisions engaged the Ger-
mans they found to their front. 
Soon both sides were taking appalling casualties all around the 
beachhead. The Germans suffered more and could afford fewer. With 
daylight on 25 May, patrols from VI Corps' 36th Engineer Regiment 
linked up with a patrol from II Corps' 91st Reconnaissance Squadron. 
Shortly thereafter, officers from the 88th's G-2 (Intelligence) sat down 
to tea with the commanding general of the British 5th Division, the unit 
the 88th had relieved when it first arrived in Italy. One hundred 
twenty-five days after the Anzio landings, Allied forces in Italy had at 
last linked up. 11 
Despite their deteriorating situation south of Rome, most German 
units fought on tenaciously. In many cases shorn of leadership, or, 
more accurately, of effective communications with that leadership, the 
Germans instinctively defended their immediate positions. Rapid 
American advances bypassed German units that were still combat 
effective. The result was confusion when trailing American echelons 
collided with bypassed German positions or with German units at-
tempting to work their way back to friendly lines. 
In the case of the 350th, only the 1st and 3rd battalions glided easily 
through to Roccasecca. 12 Trailing to the left rear of the 1st, the 2nd 
Battalion stumbled upon a considerable body of Germans entrenched 
on favorable terrain near the village of San Biagio. The outcome was a 
five-day running battle as the Germans skillfully retired from position 
to position while the 2nd Battalion used artillery and flanking maneu-
vers with equal skill to extricate them from the successive positions 
they occupied. From 21 May to 25 May the 2nd Battalion killed 72 
Germans and suffered 19 dead and 69 wounded. Another 198 Germans 
were captured during the course of this advance. Of these, a large 
number surrendered when the 2nd Battalion linked up with the 3rd 
Battalion sweeping rearward from Roccasecca to close a trap. The 351st 
and 349th infantry regiments also encountered resistance when they 
cleared the terrain forward to the 350th's positions. The Germans 
wiped out a mule train and a radio relay station before Sloan re-
established secure overland communications with Fry. 
The fighting acquired a confused quality; combat, combat support, 
and combat service support elements found themselves jumbled to-
gether by terrain and circumstances. Germans were everywhere. One 
battalion commander was killed; one was wounded; and one escaped 
capture by playing dead while his boots were stolen. One intrepid 
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muleteer was captured by nine Germans, who in turn were bypassed 
by American combat units. The muleteer then persuaded his captors to 
surrender-and to lend him a weapon so that the capture might appear 
creditable as he herded them down to the American lines. Persistence 
and numbers paid off. By the twenty-sixth the 88th's rear areas were in 
order, and the division prepared to continue the advance. 13 
Developing strategic considerations diverted the division to a 
mission other than continuing the advance, however. The Allied Armi-
es in Italy commander, General Alexander, had envisioned the VI 
Corps breaking out to Valmontone and trapping the retreating German 
Tenth Army. General Clark had thought such a clean-out entrapment 
unlikely; he preferred to drive on Rome and destroy German forma-
tions by the pace of his pursuit. Alexander acquiesced, and in effect 
allowed Clark to treat Valmontone as a peripheral, rather than princi-
pal, objective. Alexander did not, however, transfer the right to use 
Highway 6 from the British Eighth Army, now trailing the French 
Expeditionary Corps by some distance, to the American Fifth Army. 
This forced Clark's divisions into an increasingly narrow frontage. 
Somebody had to fall out of the race for Rome. On 28 May, Clark 
pinched the 85th and 88th infantry divisions out of their sector of the 
front and brought the FEC abreast of VI Corps for the drive on Rome. 
The two draftee divisions were given missions to mop up the Lepini 
Mountains and the Anzio beachhead area. 14 
Whatever might be concluded from the draftees' performance in 
the first three days of Diadem, one could not avoid being impressed by 
their performance from 14 May to 28 May. 15 They outmaneuvered and 
outfought the Germans time and again. The division lanced through 
two successive defensive lines before the Germans could effectively 
defend them. Even the much-touted French colonials found them-
selves trailing the American advance through dusty Italian villages. 
A number of factors accounted for the increasingly visible Amer-
ican success. The fluidity of the exploitation following the breach of the 
Gustav Line suited the draftees' training and temperament. There is 
little doubt that the battle-hardened British, French, Poles, Indians, 
Canadians, and even the Americans of VI Corps endured the appalling 
casualties necessary to breach the Gustav Line more philosophically 
than did the somewhat shaken draftees. Only time and experience 
would inure the 88th to losses on that scale. Once the Gustav Line 
broke, however, traits other than stoicism became the most important. 
Fourteen May began a week of furious marches punctuated by sweep-
ing maneuvers and sharp, decisive engagements that could have been 
lifted bodily from the Camp Gruber scenarios. Frenzied artillery re-
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locations also had been practiced repeatedly. Even the 88th's clum-
siness with respect to tanks was in part offset by the speed with which 
those available were thrown into action. 16 
Nontactical factors further improved the 88th's tactical perform-
ance. Of these factors, one was physical fitness. Throughout their 
training and, in particular, during the last weeks before the offensive, 
the draftees benefited from a process of selection and exercise that left 
them among the most finely conditioned soldiers in the world. Cer-
tainly it left them in better shape than the Germans of the 71st and 94th 
infantry divisions, who had had little opportunity for exercise 
throughout the long Italian winter. Several American successes seem 
to have developed simply because the draftees covered ground more 
quickly than their opponents. 17 It remains unclear how many other 
successes, or how many stragglers and bypassed formations, de-
veloped because Germans were fatigued and Americans were not. 
The 88th also frequently replaced leading formations, whereas the 
Germans seldom enjoyed such a luxury. One after another, fresh 
companies, battalions, and even regiments assumed the lead. Artil-
lery, carefully surveyed into its firing positions, assisted infantrymen 
in land navigation during the rapid advance. In the tortured terrain one 
hill often looked like another to the struggling infantrymen, who often 
were unwilling to expose themselves to snipers in order to get a better 
view. With a quick radio call they could get a marking round from the 
artillery, set for a precise six-digit location from which the infantrymen 
could orient. In the low-casualty environment of exploitation, the 
experimental individual replacement system could be made to work. 
Whereas contingents of individual replacements only added to the 
confusion during the breakthrough of the Gustav Line, long marches 
and low casualties during the exploitation afforded platoon sergeants 
and squad leaders the opportunity to integrate new men effectively. 
Even the most severely depleted companies of the 351st regained 
former levels of combat effectiveness. 18 
As the pace of the 88th's advance accelerated, the demands upon 
its transportation establishment increased as well. The division's single 
abortive attempt to create a mechanized flying column has already 
been discussed. Although that effort ran afoul of restricted terrain and 
the infantryman's traditional heedlessness of keeping vehicles out of 
each other's way, trucking was used effectively to facilitate internal 
movements within the division areaY' Some units coming out of rest 
cycles trucked forward to catch up with leading elements, while others 
sped by truck from one point to another behind the lines to keep up 
with the developing tactical situation. Of little tactical use in the front 
lines, trucks were of considerable value behind the lines. 
Trucks played an even more important role in logistics, for they 
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continued to forward supplies from as far away as the Peninsular Base 
depots in Naples. They replenished mind-boggling artillery expen-
ditures and were the prime movers for the artillery pieces them-
selves.20 Other supplies-rations, ammunition, engineer supplies, 
medical supplies, spare parts, petroleum products, even replacement 
troops-had to be trucked forward in enormous quantities. In Italy, as 
elsewhere, the redoubtable two-and-one-half-ton truck, or "deuce-
and-a-half," proved an important instrument in the American success. 
The truck, however, was not the dominant instrument of the 88th's 
logistical effort. That distinction belonged to the fourteen hundred 
mules plodding dutifully along in the wake of the American advance. 
Where the road and the truck ended, the mule took over. One must 
search hard for a logistical environment as challenging as that master-
ed by the division's muleteers. 21 The terrain alone was formidable. 
Quartermaster officers lamented that the goat trail behind Spigno was 
the steepest they had ever seen. In places the route barely admitted the 
passage of a man, much less a mule. Time and again mules plunged off 
cliffs to premature deaths. 
As if terrain were not problem enough, muleteers often were not 
altogether sure where they were going. 22 The American advance 
meandered rapidly forward along paths of least resistance. Units took 
their orientation from key terrain features, but the easiest routes be-
tween those features proved to be anybody's guess. Muleteers in turn 
had to guess which of several possible routes the units they were 
seeking had followed. Another piece of guesswork was to anticipate a 
unit's logistical needs. Mule trains departed from staging areas hours 
and even days before they reached the units they supported. 23 By the 
time the trains arrived, the needs of the units might well have changed. 
Only rations could be predicted with reasonable accuracy. Finally, 
there was the problem of Germans. If a slowly moving mule train 
happened upon a bypassed enemy formation, it became a prime target 
for die-hard Germans. Several mule trains were attacked, and one 
forty-mule train was wiped out. 24 
Given the poorly known terrain, the uncertain locations and needs 
of supported units, and the presence of Germans, the task of the 
muleteers was akin to trying to paint a mural on the side of a moving 
train. The draftees did, however, come up with expedients that helped 
somewhat. Advancing units marked their trails with C ration litter. 
(The Germans had no C rations.) Rather than trying to find supported 
units directly, mule trains began to go forward to agreed-upon ren-
dezvous points. There, representatives from supported units met 
them and guided them forward. Logisticians shepherding the mule 
trains increasingly insisted that ranking representatives from the sup-
ported units should traffic daily between units and mule-train staging 
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areas. This improved the timeliness and detail of logistical information. 
At times, mule trains gained security from individual replacements 
moving with them or from trailing units moving to the rear of the 
leading elements. Radios (SCR 300s) were issued to the muleteers in an 
effort to give them some possibility of remaining in communication 
with friendly combat elements. 25 
The support and security of the mule trains, and thus of the 
division's logistical establishment, required more resources, thought, 
and effort than the division's planners had originally anticipated. At 
one point the 88th had one regiment forward and two struggling to 
keep supply lines open. 26 The division's engineers hurriedly blasted 
jeep trails through mountains, bulldozed rubble out of villages, and 
cleared away ever-present mines and booby traps. The price paid for 
security was necessary and had its rewards. Ambushes were thwarted 
or turned around. One spectacular shoot-out developed into a credita-
ble American victory when F Company, 350th Infantry, counter-
marched to the rescue of a ninety-mule train and soundly defeated the 
Germans who had ambushed it. 27 Throughout this confused period 
the leading elements of the 88th Infantry Division remained in supply. 
Medical evacuation proved as challenging as did supply forward. 28 
Rapid advances through rough terrain rendered evacuation a long and 
difficult process. At one point, thirty additional litter bearers served in 
each battalion to support requirements logarithmically increased be-
cause the same number of casualties now had to be manhandled ten 
times the normal distances. In this effort, as at Santa Maria Infante, 
Italian volunteers proved invaluable. 
The medical situation was further complicated by a widespread 
failure on the part of troops to use their halazone tablets, now more 
necessary than ever since they were on the march and drawing water 
from wells and springs rather than from mess teams. Attacks of diar-
rhea reached epidemic proportions. Instead of being hospitalized, the 
unfortunate victims were counseled on the value of halazone; they 
seldom made the same mistake twice. 
The maintenance of communications during the advance also 
proved challenging. Radios were no more reliable than earlier, of 
course, but they came to be better used. The division continued its 
experiment of arbitrarily assigning numbers and letters to terrain fea-
tures, a system now institutionalized in the army's use of target refer-
ence points and checkpoints. This abbreviated system reduced the 
length of radio transmissions and thus the probability of electromag-
netic interference. Because letters and numbers are easier to hear and 
understand than words, messages in terms of letters, numbers, and a 
few key words proved more likely to survive the vagaries of static and 
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distance. The use of code also reduced the possibility that eavesdrop-
ping Germans might garner useful information. 29 
Commanders also gave more thought to the development of radio 
nets and radio relay stations. Radio teams deployed in such a manner 
as to provide backups in the event of mechanical failure. Typically, the 
cumbersome yet powerful SCR 284 was located on prominent terrain 
near the tail of a regiment, while less-powerful SCR 584s and SCR 300s 
branched forward in a network of relays to the leading elements. 
In addition to wire and radio communications, the division made 
considerable use of pyrotechnic signaling devices (smoke and flares), 
couriers, and liaison officers. Artillery spotter planes proved par-
ticularly handy for delivering operations orders and critical correspon-
dence. The planes would circle a leading element while displaying a 
previously agreed-upon panel identifying important correspondence. 
The command group on the ground, usually including the regimental 
commander, then fired an agreed-upon pyrotechnic that marked its 
location. The plane would make a low run over the position thus 
marked and drop the correspondence out its window. 
All factors considered, the 88th seems to have developed its com-
munications to the limits technology would allow during the weeks 
following the breach of the Gustav Line. 3° Communication problems 
had so dominated the first several days of the offensive that they 
received a command emphasis, which in turn led to more effective 
communications. 
By 28 May the 88th Infantry Division numbered among the high 
achievers of the Allied Armies in Italy. 31 It had an impressive combat 
record and had proven its ability to support itself in the field. General 
Clark's decision to write it out of the script for the race on Rome was an 
unfortunate necessity; the Fifth Army front was too narrow to get all its 
divisions on line. Clark could hardly favor the newly arrived draftee 
divisions over the veterans of the VI Corps or the FEC in a race for the 
honor of reaching Rome first. 
The mop-up of the Lepini Mountains proved confused and phys-
ically taxing, but not particularly bloody. 32 Companies and battalions 
marched back and forth over the broken terrain and experienced a 
sharp little firefight here or accepted a docile surrender there. The 
Germans had by no means given up, but most knew their time had run 
out south of the Alban Hills-perhaps, some must have suspected, 
south of Rome as well. After three days of patrols, skirmishes, prisoner 
sortings, and rest, the 88th was once again consolidated into assembly 
areas and available for further assignments. 
As circumstances would have it, this happened none too soon, for 
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the sweep toward Rome ran afoul of an unexpectedly stubborn Ger-
man defense. 33 Despite Allied advances along their flanks, and their 
own evacuation of Cassino, Germans in the Liri Valley continued to 
contest the British Eighth Army's advance. By 30 May a combination of 
formidable terrain, blown bridges, and German tenacity had opened a 
twenty-five-mile gap between American and British units. What was 
worse, the Germans seemed to have put together a tenable defensive 
line running through the Alban Hills. Through 29 and 30 May the VI 
Corps advance decelerated in the face of increasingly stiff resistance. In 
Clark's view the best answer seemed to be to flank the Alban Hills with 
a push down Highway 6. This could be done only if the British, well to 
the rear, gave up their preemptive right to the use of Highway 6. 
On 31 May, Alexander finally released the stretch of Highway 6 
between Rome and Valmontone, the point at which the Fifth Army 
debouched upon Highway 6, to the use of the Fifth Army. 34 As a 
proviso, Alexander added that if it became necessary for the Eighth 
and Fifth armies to make a joint attack-that is, if the British caught 
up-the original boundary would be restored. 
Clark's plans matured quickly. General Keyes's II Corps was to 
reorganize, pulling together the 3rd Infantry Division, the 85th Infan-
try Division, the 88th Infantry Division, the 1st Special Service Force, 
and Task Force Howze, a tank-heavy configuration built around the 
13th Armored Regiment. Keyes intended to seize Valmontone on 1 
June, then turn west and advance along Highway 6 with the 85th on 
the left, the 88th in the center, and the 3rd on the right. Task Force 
Howze was to lead the 88th's advance. 
Even as these plans matured, another development reinforced the 
Allied hand. Enterprising patrols from VI Corps' 36th Infantry Divi-
sion (Texas National Guard) discovered a gap in the German defenses 
that exposed a key terrain feature, Mount Artemisia. 35 Unknown to 
the Americans, the gap was an accident resulting from Artemisia's 
location on the boundary between the I Parachute Corps and the 
LXXVI Panzer Corps. During the night of 30 May, the 36th Infantry 
Division poured three regiments through the narrow gap, then fanned 
left and right to seize the entire ridge line. This brilliant attack un-
hinged the German position in the Alban Hills. 
After preliminary shuffling on 31 May, the Fifth Army attacked 
along its entire front on 1 June. Fighting continued to be hotly con-
tested, but the Germans now knew that Rome was lost. Rear guards 
fought on to maintain a continuous front and to buy time for an orderly 
retreat across the Aniene and Tiber rivers. 
Redeploying from the Lepini Mountains, the 88th was not available 
for the initial attacks on 1 June. By the time it entered the battle the next 
day, Valmontone had fallen and the German rear guard was badly 
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shaken. The battalions of the 349th Infantry Regiment were attached to 
the depleted 3rd Infantry Division and the tank-heavy Task Force 
Howze. The 350th and 351st trailed Howze along Highway 6. Howze 
led until stopped by strong antitank positions ten miles east of Rome. 
Here the 88th's infantrymen finally caught up. In a sharp, well-coordi-
nated tank-infantry assault, the Americans turned the Germans out of 
their position. 
The tank-infantry pattern repeated itself as the 88th skillfully ex-
pelled the Germans from one hastily occupied position after another 
along the course of Highway 6. The 88th had arrived at precisely the 
right time. With the Germans reeling and all other American units fully 
committed, the 88th's fresh battalions weighed heavily in this final 
push. The draftees seemed to be everywhere in a general stampede 
toward Rome. Two battalions of the 349th leapfrogged along the 
Aniene River with the 3rd Infantry Division. Battalions from the 350th 
and 351st reinforced Task Force Howze and the 1st Special Service 
Force. Sloan ordered the 350th to attack through the 351st. The com-
mander of the 351st agreed that would happen as soon as the 350th 
caught up with him, then redoubled his efforts to reach Rome first. 36 
The air was electric with a sense of victory. Everywhere the draf-
tees pushed ahead with growing strength and confidence. No longer 
facing the German 71st or 94th infantry divisions, the 88th now swept 
along, among others, the famed Hermann Goering Division. Dazed 
prisoners reinforced the draftees' self-esteem with laudatory com-
ments that Sloan quickly publicized throughout the division. One 
prisoner cited the 88th's daring; another noted the effectiveness of its 
artillery. Yet another attributed the 88th's success to flawless individual 
marksmanship. The Gis added one feat after another to their inventory 
of anecdotes. At a hastily established roadblock Pfc. Asa Farmer made 
seven bazooka rockets count for as many fleeing German vehicles-
two half-tracks, a light tank, four jeeps, and sixty prisoners. Sgt. Paul 
N. Eddy personally killed five and captured eight from the Hermann 
Goering Division while knocking out three machine-gun nests. Eight 
division military policemen, allegedly rear-echelon types, captured 
eighteen German prisoners when on a hastily organized patrol. It all 
seemed so easy that the Gls joked about how quickly the Nazi "super-
men" had turned into mere "krauts."37 
Every unit in the Fifth Army strained to be the first to enter Rome. 
The VI Corps faced well-organized opponents who, of all the German 
divisions, were freshest and best positioned. Resistance in the corps' 
sector remained stiff and the VI Corps fell behind. Clark's reallocation 
of the avenues of approach to Rome had given the FEC a wide arc to 
travel. Having farther to go and finding themselves embarrassed by 
the very shortages of heavy equipment, in particular tanks, that had 
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proved such an advantage in the Aurunci, the French also fell behind. 
This left the race to the II Corps. The 3rd Infantry Division, exhausted 
by two weeks of continuous fighting to seize Cisterna and Valmon-
tone, moved slowly. The terrain in front of the 85th was more taxing 
than that in front of the 88th, and the 85th had fought a day longer. The 
1st Special Service Force was a hair's breadth from Rome when it 
collided with a determined German rear guard near the suburb of 
Centocelle. Task Force Howze's powerful column also stalled in a traffic 
jam caused by the size of its vehicles, the narrowness of the suburban 
streets, a misoriented artillery battery, and crowds that collected 
around a throng of newspaper correspondents attempting to cover the 
entry. 
While all this was happening, the 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance 
Troop threaded its way neatly between the embattled 1st Special Serv-
ice Force and the logjammed Task Force Howze. Once clear of both 
columns, the tiny contingent debouched upon a main east-west road, 
the Via Prenestina, and sped toward Rome. At 0715 on 4 June, trans-
missions from the 3rd Platoon of the 88th Reconnaissance Troop 
crackled with the news: the 88th Infantry Division was into Rome-and 
first! 38 
The fall of Rome was a welcome climax to a hard-fought battle. It 
did not end the war or the Italian campaign, and it was overshadowed 
by D day in Normady two days later. It did represent a major victory for 
the Allies after ten months of frustrating and brutal combat on the 
Italian peninsula. Much remains controversial about Diadem and its 
aftermath. Was General Clark right in focusing on Rome? Could the 
Allies have bagged the German Tenth Army instead? Who really was 
the first into Rome? 
Clark thought Rome important for psychological reasons, and was 
certain no scheme of maneuver could bag an entire German army in 
the porous Italian landscape. The experience of the 88th seems to 
support his opinion. Fighting over relatively narrow frontages, Ger-
man and American units frequently bypassed each other in the con-
fusion of terrain, battle, and darkness. Although the 88th could and 
did secure every road junction in its sector, it could not hope to entrap 
all the small German contingents filtering out under the supervision of 
battle-wise, company-grade leadership. When the Allies inflicted dis-
proportionate losses on the Germans, they did so by the pace of their 
pursuit more often than by entrapment. 
As Clark had anticipated, the capture of Rome did have important 
psychological effects. The final race for Rome electrified the entire Fifth 
Army. Every unit covered itself with glory at very little cost. Success 
intelligently publicized is the surest stuff of morale. 39 All units in the 
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Fifth Army were strengthened by virtue of their success. The 88th in 
particular assumed a new stature. The draftees had performed credita-
bly in the assaults on the Gustav Line, even better in the exploitation 
that followed, and magnificently in the final race for Rome. The 88th's 
claim to have been the first into the city still provokes disputatious 
howls of rage from the veterans of other units;40 what really mattered 
was that the draftees themselves believed they had been first. From 
that point they thought of the 88th as the best division in Italy. 41 Axis 
and Allied leadership alike came to agree that it was among the best. 
Could the capture of a few hundred more prisoners per regiment have 
meant as much to the morale of the unit as that triumphal prossession 
through frenzied, cheering, almost uncontrollable crowds? 
With the capture of Rome, the 88th came of age. It would fight as 
well in other battles-on the Arno, in the Apennines, along the Po, and 
through the Alps. It would fight, take losses, lose its edge, rest, retrain, 
and fight again in a cycle that continued until the end of the war. All of 
these later battles and cycles were of great importance. It was the events 
of May and June, however, that were particularly held by the nation's 
leadership, the War Department, the newspapers, and the draftees 
themselves to have proved the mettle of the draftee division. The 
toughness of the 88th Infantry Division was no longer a question. 42 
9 _____ _ 
Rome to the Alps-and Beyond 
The performances of the 88th and 85th infantry divisions during the 
final battles for Rome provided striking vindication of the draftee and 
the draftee division. By the hour of this triumph the value of the draftee 
had ceased to be much of an issue-individual replacements and the 
suspension of voluntary enlistments had filled most divisions with 
conscripts well before June 1944---but all-draftee divisions had until 
then remained unproven. One lesson from Diadem was clear: small 
cadres of professionals had, in fact, been able to mold masses of 
American conscripts into proficient, modern fighting organizations. In 
time, the War Department labeled the initial successes of the 88th and 
85th as "the first confirmation from the battlefield of the soundness of 
our division activation and training program." Other confirmations 
were to follow. 1 
Although the capture of Rome was a climax for the 88th and 
provides the climax for this study, it was not the last of the division's 
experiences. It should be useful to survey the 88th's subsequent opera-
tions and to discuss parallels between the experiences of the 88th and 
those of other draftee divisions. It may also be instructive to estimate 
the extent to which the postwar army has exploited-or failed to 
exploit-the lessons provided by its most recent conscripted divisions. 
Field Marshall Kesselring's loss of Rome was a defeat, not a rout. 
With great skill and some daring he maneuvered to regain a continuous 
defensive line north of Rome and salvaged much of his army group 
from the wreckage. 2 Fresh German units from northern Italy rein-
forced his lines in the face of the now somewhat overextended and 
increasingly weary Allied columns. Within a week of Rome's capture, 
Generals Alexander and Clark realized that pursuit of Kesselring 
would have to be systematic rather than headlong. 
As if Kesselring did not present problems enough, Allied efforts in 
Italy now stood in the shadow of the Normandy landings. Senior 
Allied commanders knew that a major fraction of their military resources 
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would soon be diverted to France. Clark's Fifth Army was to lose its VI 
Corps, including the veteran 3rd, 36th, and 45th infantry divisions, 
and the French Expeditionary Corps. Clark elected to continue his 
advance with these units during June, while pulling the units he was to 
retain in Italy out of the line. 3 Thus, when the VI Corps and the FEC 
withdrew to refit and retrain for the invasion of southern France, he 
would at least have some fresh units with which to continue his pursuit 
of the Germans. 
On 10 June the 88th Infantry Division withdrew from Bassanelio, 
following a creditable advance of fifty-six miles in eight days, to a rest 
area in the Alban Hills. After a few days of recuperation and ceremony, 
General Sloan launched himself on yet another of his retraining efforts. 
The affectionately critical draftees adjudged Sloan to have been even 
more uncompromising a pedagogue than ever during this period. 
Sloan had reasons for his rigor. He was afraid his men would grow 
cocksure or stale resting on their laurels. The division had lost 134 
officers and 1,844 enlisted men-killed, wounded, or missing-during 
Diadem. Replacements for these losses were already in the ranks; thus 
almost a fifth of Sloan's riflemen were new to the division. The replace-
ments had received individual training in the United States, but Sloan 
thought his units needed intensive training to settle their new men in. 
While in the Alban Hills, Sloan found yet another reason for rigorous 
preparation; he suffered the first attacks of a severe, undiagnosed, and 
ultimately debilitating dermatitis. As disease began to swell his limbs 
and wrack his body, he suspected that his next battle with the 88th 
would be his last. 4 
After a week given over to rest, reorganization, resupply, and 
medical rehabilitation, the 88th retrained in accordance with a memo-
randum exhaustively entitled "Training in the 88th During Reorgan-
ization Period Subsequent to the Minturno Through Rome Drive." In 
effect, this was a miniature version of the Army Training Program, 
progressing in maneuvers from squad through battalion scale. The 
training included half-hour blocks of close-order drill and platoon-size 
orientation classes, both designed to make new men feel they were part 
of the team. Ten hours a week went to physical training, including road 
marches of five hours length. Division engineers constructed elaborate 
assault courses of up to ten square kilometers each, through which 
units of up to a battalion in size maneuvered. These courses were 
realistic live-fire facilities and required a commitment of training am-
munition, supervision, equipment, and time comparable to similar 
training in the United States. The 88th's infantry units undertook a 
great deal of rigorous training in a very little time, most of it designed as 
a rehearsal for their next attack. If the performance of new men indi-
cated they had not integrated quickly enough, they fell into a special 
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program for "backward men." This somewhat punitive retraining fea-
tured the denial of pass privileges to the slow learners and the require-
ment that veterans from platoons in question give up their own pass 
privileges to teach it. Thus, recruit and veteran alike had incentive for 
integrating new men quickly and showing well during the various field 
exercises. 5 
Sloan's principal purpose in retraining may have been the integra-
tion of replacements into his infantry companies, but he also wanted to 
polish skills that had eroded during combat and to improve tactical 
doctrine. Largely because of fatigue, carelessness, and casualties 
among junior leaders, the 88th's sharpness with respect to patrolling, 
night operations, and communications techniques seems to have erod-
ed. To reverse those trends, Sloan prescribed complex and demanding 
night patrols as a dominant feature of the field problems, and also 
called for a day without telephones. The night patrols quickly honed 
the 88th's infantry squads back into the shape Sloan wanted. These 
patrols were also an excellent device for training junior leaders and 
allowing them to gain the confidence of their men. Sloan's day without 
telephones forced communications over radio nets carefully monitored 
by the signal battalion commander. Careful scrutiny polished the nets 
while emphasizing a command insistence upon improved communi-
cations. Insofar as improving doctrine was concerned, officer classes 
focused upon the "employment of attached units"-tanks and tank 
destroyers-reorganization upon the objective, breaching techniques, 
artillery control measures, and "soft spot tactics." When the 88th 
rotated back into combat, it benefited from four weeks of careful 
preparation for that event. 6 
Some observers consider the 88th's next battle, from Volterra to the 
Arno River (8 July to 25 July 1944), the best it ever fought. The Germans 
had finally stabilized their front on defensible terrain some twenty-five 
miles south of the Arno. A key position in their defenses was an ancient 
Etruscan hilltop fortress, Volterra. On 8 July the 88th seized Volterra 
with a textbook combination of heavy suppressive fires and engineer 
breaching parties, closely followed by assaulting infantrymen. Extraor-
dinarily effective artillery-delivered smoke did much to compensate for 
lack of cover in the gently rolling terrain approaching the citadel. The 
88th's reserve regiment, the 351st, passed quickly through the gap at 
Volterra to inflict another stunning defeat on the Germans near 
Laiatico. Here the Germans suffered 250 casualties and lost 400 pris-
oners in desperate efforts to extricate themselves from a closing trap, 
and the 3rd Battalion of the 351st earned the Distinguished Unit 
Citation for particularly outstanding efforts. The 88th's rupture of the 
defenses around Volterra forced the Germans to abandon their de-
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fenses south of the Arno. It was well conceived, well coordinated, and 
well executed. 7 
By this time the men of the 88th had come to speak of themselves as 
"Blue Devils." The nickname came from the Germans, who had taken 
to identifying these troublesome opponents by the color of their shoul-
der patch. 8 With an exercise of that logic which allows the translation of 
an opponent's opprobrium into a compliment, the draftees developed 
the epithet "blue devils" into a nickname. Sloan had always been 
disappointed that his division had no nickname. Indeed, he had tried 
several times to develop one, including the ill-fated effort to promul-
gate "Ranger" Division. The draftees had not liked that one; perhaps it 
sounded too military. Now that Sloan despaired of a nickname, the 
draftees found one they liked, and it stuck. 
The campaign to close to the Arno (8 July to 25 July 1944) cost the 
88th Infantry Division 142 officers and 2,257 enlisted men killed, 
wounded, or missing. Again the division needed a break in the action 
in order to rest and retrain. This time the 88th's hiatus lasted seven 
weeks, largely because of strategic shufflings of units as the invasion of 
southern France launched itself and General Alexander redeployed 
within Italy to favor a push along the Adriatic Coast. The 88th used this 
period to good effect, training with its usual intensity and rotating 
units through recreation centers as well. Medical authorities evacuated 
the ailing General Sloan in August, so the training period was of special 
value to the new division commander, Maj. Gen. Paul W. Kendall. 
Kendall was an obvious choice. He had been with the division since 
Camp Gruber as Sloan's assistant division commander, and had long 
since earned the respect of all ranks. Sloan recovered sufficiently to 
chair committees working for the War Department, most notably one 
concerned with awards and decorations, but he never returned to 
Europe. He retired to Weaverville, North Carolina, in 1946, where he 
lived happily as a gentleman farmer until his death, at age eighty-five, 
in 1972.9 
The Germans made good use of these seven inactive weeks as well, 
absorbing replacements, retraining, and rushing ahead with the de-
velopm2nt of a heavily fortified "Gothic Line" along the tortuous 
North Apennines. When the Fifth Army once again attacked, it at-
tacked into the teeth of well-prepared units in formidable defenses. 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Army's renewed drive began auspiciously 
enough. American units quickly seized key terrain features with clock-
work combinations of infantry, engineers, artillery, and, where possi-
ble, tanks. Committed on 21 September, the 88th compromised strong 
German defenses on Mount Frena with a brilliant flanking penetration, 
then moved quickly on to secure one hilltop after another. Of these, the 
most savagely contested was Mount Capello, where the 2nd Battalion, 
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351st Infantry, won the division's second Distinguished Unit Cita-
tion.10 
Kesselring had held substantial reserves back while diagnosing the 
locations of the main Allied efforts. Having identified these, he 
launched major counterattacks on his assailants, who were already 
somewhat disorganized because of the costs of their advances. On 28 
September elements of four German divisions hurled themselves 
against the 350th Infantry Regiment's exposed holdings on Mount 
Battaglia. For seven days this embattled regiment beat off one attack 
after another in fierce close-quarters fighting. "Battle Mountain" be-
came a symbol for GI toughness; heroism abounded. Capt. Robert E. 
Roeder's G Company was the linchpin of the defense during the early 
hours. Roeder was everywhere, encouraging men and giving direc-
tion, until knocked unconscious by a shellburst. Recovering con-
ciousness but bleeding badly, he propped himself against a wall and 
picked off one German after another until a mortar shell killed him. 
T.Sgt. Manuel V. Mendoza, severely wounded and scorched by a 
flamethrower, held off a company until relief arrived. S.Sgt. Raymond 
0. Gregory and Pfc. Cleo Peck ran out of grenades and continued the 
battle by rolling boulders out of their commanding positions. Pfc. Felix 
B. Mestas doggedly hung on to his BAR (Browning automatic rifle) 
position and killed twenty-four Germans before they, in turn, killed 
him. 1st Lt. Edmund D. Maher killed four paratroopers with his 
bayonet. T.Sgt. Beni Mazzarella, on seeing the strongest Kraut attack of 
all overwhelm the castle on the crest, without orders picked up a 
handful of grenades and charged the castle. Pitching grenades like 
apples, he killed six invaders and wounded more. When the 350th was 
finally relieved, on 2 October, it had earned yet another Distinguished 
Unit Citation and had suffered 50 percent casualties-including all but 
one of its company commanders. Captain Roeder was awarded the 
Medal of Honor posthumously. 11 
Snow, fog, mud, and rain worked hardships upon the 88th's 
Apennines offensive as autumn shaded into winter, but the most 
pressing dilemma for the division was its casualties. As losses 
mounted, replacements pumped forward into units-some having 
flown in from as far away as England and France to redress the 
extraordinary personnel losses of the Gothic Line fighting. In its earlier 
campaigns the 88th had had an opportunity to rest and retrain every 
several weeks. The North Apennines offensive ground the division 
through seven long weeks of fierce combat and through more than six 
thousand casualties. The individual replacement system did not work 
out particularly well; it added more to lists of casualties than to lists of 
accomplishments. For the first time the division seems to have suffered 
more casualties than it inflicted. Units, depleted of combat-experi-
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enced personnel and restocked with whatever individual fillers were 
available, dutifully, if clumsily, attacked one hill after another at appall-
ing cost. Well-executed German counterattacks whittled the division's 
gains and bedeviled its flanks in the jumbled terrain. The 88th pain-
fully led the Fifth Army Advance to within nine thousand yards of the 
Po Valley before a masterful German counterattack wiped out its lead-
ing company at Vedriano. That ended the offensive; the next order 
from Fifth Army headquarters was to stop and dig in. 12 
Swallowing their disappointment, Clark, Kendall, and other 
American commanders undertook a conscious program of unit rest, 
rotation, and retraining. Again elaborate complexes in rear areas re-
produced the combat environments units were expected to encounter 
during their next offensive. 13 Units trained intensely when in rear 
areas and patrolled extensively when once again at the front. During 
bitter winter weather the 88th sharpened its tactical skills at all levels of 
command. When spring returned to the North Apennines, the 88th 
was once again at a peak. 
The Germans numbered the 88th among the most dangerous 
Allied units in Italy, and surmised that its location would define the 
Fifth Army's main effort. Shortly before its offensive of 15 Aprill945, 
the Fifth Army played an elaborate shell game, shuttling units of the 
88th around the breadth of its front so that the Germans would identify 
it in a variety of locations. Not particularly confused, the Germans 
settled their strongest defenses squarely in front of the actual location 
of the 88th, south of Bologna. In their efforts to contain the 88th 
Infantry Division, the Germans may have outsmarted themselves, 
however. If the 88th was the most dangerous American division in 
Italy-an immeasurable suggestion-its sister divisions were not far 
off its mark. While the 88th clawed its way through strong defenses 
near Monterumici, a newly arrived division, the draftee lOth Mountain 
Division, lanced through a more lightly defended sector and de-
bouched into the Po Valley west of Bologna. When the Germans 
struggled to extricate themselves from this closing trap, the 88th and its 
flanking divisions refused to let them get cleanly away, and the with-
drawal became a rout. The Fifth Army broke into the Po Valley on a 
broad front, seven divisions on line.I4 
The Germans hoped to hold successively at the lines of the Po and 
the Adige rivers or, failing in those efforts, to withdraw through the 
Brenner Pass past Verona and Bolzano. They moved too slowly for the 
hard-marching draftees. The lOth Mountain crossed the Po on 23 
April, followed shortly by the 85th and within thirty-six hours by the 
88th. These crossings reflected the careful integration of engineers and 
bridging equipment into the Fifth Army plans. Once across the Po the 
lOth, 85th, and 88th raced through sporadic opposition to be the first to 
Rome to the Alps 147 
close the door into the Alps at Verona; the 88th won by a hair's breath. 
Meanwhile, bridging and ferrying across the Po had advanced far 
enough to support the crossing of armored vehicles. Working fran-
tically, the 88th's engineers restored a railroad bridge in Verona suffi-
ciently to get armored vehicles across the Adige as well. The 350th 
Infantry Regiment quickly closed to Vicenza riding vehicles of the 
752nd Tank Battalion and the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion, then 
seized the town in house-to-house fighting. The Germans were now 
trapped in the Po Valley with the defensive lines of the Po and the 
Adige hopelessly compromised. 15 
On 28 April the 88th received orders to shift its axis of advance back 
into the Brenner Pass. Shadowy fears of a Nazi "National Redoubt" in 
the Alps prompted Allied chieftains to penetrate this fastness as quick-
ly as possible. 16 The 88th did, in fact, encounter stiffening resistance as 
it closed on the SS headquarters at Bolzano; for a few anxious days the 
National Redoubt seemed a possibility. No one could be sure that this 
was the final offensive, the knockout blow. Then, on 2 May, the 
German army in Italy had had enough; it capitulated in the first of the 
mass surrenders that marked the disintegration of the Wehrmacht. On 
4 May the 88th linked up with the southward-bound 103rd Infantry 
Division, another draftee division, from the American Seventh Army. 
Three days later Germany surrendered unconditionally. The Blue Dev-
ils' war was over. 
It is doubtful that any modern armies, including those of the 
Wehrmacht at its height, could have outclassed the American Fifth 
Army of April1945. The Po Valley campaign reflected masterful combi-
nations of men, machines, maneuvers, and momentum. The several 
branches and services integrated themselves into one textbook opera-
tion after another, and a formidable opponent as numerous in person-
nel and with formidable defensive advantages disintegrated within 
eighteen days. The overall losses in the Po Valley campaign were 16,747 
for the Allies to 67,000 for the Germans, which is not to mention the 
million who surrendered on 2 May. 17 The Fifth Army accomplished its 
final mission so well that retrospectively it seemed it must have been 
easy. It could have been otherwise. 
The premier instruments of the Fifth Army's success were its 
battle-hardened, yet rested and retrained, divisions. Of these, none 
was more highly regarded than the 88th Infantry Division. In the 
fighting from Volterra to the Alps, the 88th deepened the lessons it had 
learned and the teamwork it had developed during the drive on Rome. 
Despite cycles of attrition and renovation, the division became ever 
more formidable as the war progressed. 
The ability to coordinate artillery and infantry always had been a 
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strength of the 88th. Extensive training in the United States had been 
reinforced during the efforts to provide fire support to patrols at 
Minturno. Proficiency continued to improve during the race for Rome, 
a race marked by frenzied artillery relocations to keep infantry 
spearheads under a protective umbrella of supporting fire. In the 
records of the battles for the Arno, one reads accounts of forward 
observers adjusting single artillery rounds to knock out individual 
machine gun nests. Such discrimination represented masterful use. 
Massive artillery preparations are not without effect, but weB-en-
trenched defenders tend to emerge from them with much of their 
capability intact. Infantry close on the heels of preparatory shelling are 
likely to encounter determined pockets of resistance despite the most 
massive of preparations. At this point the well-directed artillery round 
is a priceless asset. 
This precise use of artillery implies adequate communications. 
One striking aspect of a read through combat orders and related 
material generated by the 88th's several headquarters is the in-
creasingly sophisticated attention given to tactical communications. Is 
The 88th could not resolve the technical limitations of its equipment, 
but it could and did give attention to improving procedures. Radio 
relay stations, wired replacement of wireless communications as ad-
vances progressed, standard pyrotechnic signals, abbreviated codes, 
independent primary and alternate systems, detailed communications 
paragraphs in operations orders-all became increasingly familiar as 
communications techniques. Several techniques developed in the 
88th-the use of checkpoints instead of place names on the radio, for 
example-are now accepted as doctrine. 
Engineers proved as critical as artillerymen during the breach of 
prepared positions. Mine fields were a pervasive component of Ger-
man defenses throughout the Italian campaign; they had embarrassed 
the 88th's first offensive in several ways. The unbreached antitank 
mine field before Sante Maria Infante had separated attacking in-
fantrymen from armor support in the initial rush, and thus it had 
doomed the 351st Regiment to a grinding three-day battle. Elsewhere, 
infantry units, attempting to maneuver around mine fields, had be-
come widely separated if they sought opposite shoulders of the same 
field, or congested if they gravitated into the same narrow channels. 
This latter possibility proved the most damaging, because openings 
that did exist were covered by enemy fire and units were already in 
echelons on narrow fronts anyway. Mine fields played a much less 
prominent role in the 88th's race towards Rome, so the problems they 
presented did not again receive detailed attention until the hiatus 
before the Arno offensive. 
In part, the problem of mine fields was a training problem. The 
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Army Training Program stressed maneuver, and was somewhat super-
ficial in the time given over to actually breaching prepared positions. 19 
Commanders were taught that their first step upon encountering a 
mine field was to attempt to bypass it. Only engineers and a few special 
units received serious training in breaching mine fields; even these did 
not go through as much of the tedium of detecting, probing, digging, 
and disarming during training as they might have. In the first days of 
Diadem attempts to bypass mine fields shuffled units of their own 
narrow sectors into someone else's, and breaching expertise often was 
not present where needed. 
General Sloan debriefed entire companies after Diadem and came 
to several conclusions with respect to mine fields. First, companies 
should not leave their sectors in efforts to bypass obstacles. Leading 
companies would attempt head-on breaches when they encountered 
mine fields; gaps that did materialize would be exploited by bringing 
companies up from the rear rather than by shifting leading companies 
sideways. Second, every assaulting company should have personnel 
skilled in breaching. If engineers could be provided to lead, they 
would, but commanders were expected to develop genuine breaching 
talent within their own units. To this end, each infantry platoon 
organized and trained its own breaching team; one team leader, one 
assistant leader and radio operator, two bazooka teams of two each, 
two flamethrowers, three pole and satchel demolition men, and five 
support and wire-cutting specialists. Finally, artillery should be inte-
grated into breaching efforts on the finest possible scale, and all per-
sonnel should be thoroughly briefed on the German's pervasive use of 
mine fields and booby traps. 20 Sloan's careful attention to breaching 
techniques paid off handsomely during the attack on Volterra. Combat 
engineers led the way through impressive obstacles and drew ac-
colades from the infantrymen as instruments of the division's suc-
cess. 21 From that time on practical exercises in breaching obstacles and 
clearing mine fields were an important component of training and 
retraining efforts. This type of training involved a great deal of tedium, 
but it proved to be time well spent. 
Engineer construction also proved critical to the success of the 
88th. Supply routes were constantly in need of attention, particularly 
in the aftermath of lengthy advances. Throughout ~he Italian campaign 
the support the 88th's front-line infantryman received from his engi-
neers was creditable, at times brilliant. Cases in point are a resupply 
route engineers blasted out of the side of a mountain to support the 
flanking move on Mount Frena, and bridging feats across the Po and 
the Adige during the race to the Alps. 22 
Successful engineering efforts facilitated the integration of ar-
mored vehicles into the 88th's tactical operations. The use of armor was 
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not always practical in Italy, but over time frequent attachment led three 
independent battalions-the 752nd Tank, 760th Tank, and 805th Tank 
Destroyer-to become members of the division "family." This associa-
tion proved invaluable when the 88th at last broke free of the Apen-
nines and raced across the Po Valley. The crossing of the Adige and the 
assault on Vicenza involved classic combinations of armor, infantry, 
artillery, and engineers operating in a coordinated effort. 
Transportation also achieved state of the art within the division as 
the war progressed. Transportation problems proved doubly perplex-
ing because the worst of the fighting took place in tortuous terrain and 
because the Germans methodically disabled ports, rail lines, and 
bridges as they withdrew northward. Engineers rehabilitated bridges 
with dispatch, but advances often left the division at extended dis-
tances from a usable port or railhead. In the fighting to close to the 
Arno, the 88th received supplies from as far away as Naples; in the 
early stages of the Apennines fighting, from ports near Rome; and in 
the drive across the Po Valley, from railheads on the southern side of 
the Apennines. In this sprawling logistical environment the dual 
nature of the 88th's truck and mule establishment served the division 
well. Trucks sped supplies extended distances over marginal roads to 
rendezvous points at which mules took over. Some writers have sup-
posed that the elaborate truck fleets of America's World War II infantry 
divisions were instruments of tactical mobility. 23 In the 88th they were 
not. The division's infantrymen made their advances through the time-
honored technique of "picking 'em up and laying 'em down." Trucks 
could shift units behind the lines, but their principal use was the 
replenishment of the tons of supplies a division consumed in a day. 
Fully two-thirds of the 88th's truck assets were given over to replacing 
artillery expenditures alone. 24 Thus, trucks had far more to do with 
sustaining firepower than they had to do with mobility per se. 
It was a good thing that the 88th's use of and support of artillery 
was well developed, because the division never did enjoy any par-
ticular luck using tactical air strikes. Part of the problem was-and 
remains-technical. Aircraft are limited in the time they can spend 
aloft and in the ordnance they can carry, so they cannot provide the 
luxury of working through successively smaller target errors until they 
finally hit the precise target the ground commander wants. Another 
portion of the problem stemmed from training and preference. The 
88th had not trained with air units while in the States; during training it 
had relied exclusively upon artillery for indirect fire support and had 
brought artillery-infantry cooperation to about as fine an edge as it 
could have achieved without combat. Once overseas, commanders 
continued to prefer the familiar and to rely upon artillery, a reliance 
that proved well placed as long as artillery was in range. Even massive 
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air strikes yielded disappointing results. On 15 Aprill945, for example, 
765 heavy bombers and 200 medium bombers raised a great deal of 
dust and smoke, yet did little substantive damage to the entrenched 
defenders fiercely contesting Monterumici. 25 When leading elements 
outdistanced their artillery-the ideal time to rely upon air support-
effective strikes and effective coordination could not be readily con-
jured up. Indeed, during the drive on Verona the 88th's leading ele-
ments were shot up by friendly pilots who assumed that anyone so far 
north of the Po had to be Germans. One of the first casualties was the 
air-ground radio operator desperately trying to turn away the attacking 
planes. Air strikes along German lines of communications had consid-
erable effect in Italy, but for close support only one type of aircraft ever 
seems to have been of much immediate value to the 88th: the light 
spotter planes used by artillery forward observers to identify and call in 
artillery targets. 26 
The vagaries of the personnel replacement system presented an-
other array of problems to the 88th Infantry Division. As has been 
discussed, the War Department considered the successes of the 85th 
and 88th during Diadem as vindication of an experimental system in 
which individual replacements moved forward into units still in con-
tact. An illusion that the system had succeeded dominated the War 
Department throughout the war, despite the fact that commanders at 
the division level and lower repeatedly expressed a preference for unit 
rotations rather than individual replacement. 27 The prolonged fighting 
in the North Apennines almost destroyed the 88th as an effective 
organization. Individual replacements did not work out well until they 
had had the time to settle in, and the fatigue prolonged fighting 
rendered ineffective those veterans still in the line. 
Shocked by the erosion of their units, regimental commanders 
experimented with such replacement techniques as rotating battalions, 
timing offensives to allow for unit rest periods, and organizing replace-
ments into small units sent forward as packages. Ultimately these half-
measures failed. The only effective remedy was to call off the offensive 
altogether and to rest and retrain the entire Fifth Army. The rude fact 
was that only unit rotation could sustain prolonged combat, and the 
United States had not raised a sufficient number of battalions, regi-
ments, or divisions to rotate them through a continuous major battle. 28 
War Department planners excused America's relatively modest contri-
bution of ground combat units by extolling the virtues of an individual 
replacement system that was to keep those units at full strength-even 
when in combat-indefinitely. The virtues of that individual replace-
ment system were more apparent than real. 
It should be noted that casualties did not wear evenly across the 
88th Infantry Division. Artillery, quartermaster, ordnance, and head-
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Table 7. 88th's "Old-Timers" as of 1 July 1945, by Unit Type 
Raw number Percentage 
Infantry regiments (3) 2,020 17 
Artillery battalions (4) and DIY ARTY 968 38 
88th Recon Troop 82 51 
313th Engineer Battalion 210 30 
313th Medical Battalion 88 17 
88th Quartermaster Company 122 60 
Headquarters Company 119 99 
88th Military Police 32 18 
Division total 3,900 24 
SOURCE: Derived from "Only 3,900 Old-Timers remain from 15,000 Who 
Started at Gruber," The Blue Devil, newsletter of the 88th Infantry Division, 
14 July 1945. 
quarters units took relatively few casualties; these deteriorated more 
from fatigue than from fatality during prolonged combat. Engineer, 
signal, and medical units exposed some personnel far more than they 
did others. Even in the rigors of the North Apennines fighting, artil-
lery, headquarters, and logistical units remained intact, albeit weary. 
Only infantry units beneath the regimental level suffered debilitating 
casualties. An indication of the relative personnel stability of units by 
type can be gained from Table 7. The table depicts the relative numbers 
and percentages of "old-timers," men assigned to the division prior to 
1 January 1943 who were still with the 88th on 1 July 1945. 29 Keep in 
mind that Table 8 reflects personnel losses from all causes, not neces-
sarily casualties. Also note that although virtually all of the division 
headquarters company had been with the division since Camp Gruber, 
not all of them had been assigned to the headquarters company 
throughout. 
Retraining efforts during interludes in combat were essentially 
crash programs to weld individual replacements, the products of thir-
teen weeks of individual training in the States, into the veteran infan-
try units. Given adequate support from the division's relatively 
undamaged logistical apparatus, some time for rest, and intensely 
supervised small-unit training, the infantry battalions regained combat 
readiness in less than a month every time the division pulled out of the 
line. The rest of the division was again ready for combat well before the 
infantry battalions completed this frenzy of retraining. An optimal 
cycle for the division seems to have been two or three weeks in combat 
followed by two or three weeks of rest and retraining. In part by 
accident, the 88th Infantry Division approximated this optimum 
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throughout the Italian campaign, except during the near-crippling 
autumn of 1944. The 88th sustained its creditable reputation over time 
by virtue of what was, in effect, a unit rotation system. The War 
Department's cherished individual replacement system could not be 
made to work without a program for rotating units out of combat as 
well. 
Of the ninety divisions with which the U.S. Army fought World 
War II, thirty-seven were draftee infantry divisions. 30 One might rea-
sonably question the extent to which the experiences of the 88th 
Infantry Division reflected those of the draftee divisions taken as a 
whole. A cursory comparison suggests that there were some dif-
ferences and a great many parallels. 
The 88th Infantry Division was uncommonly fortunate with re-
spect to personnel stability during its training in the United States. 
This fact above all else accounts for its being the first of the draftee 
divisions shipped overseas. It has been suggested that four-fifths of the 
training time lost to American units while in the United States was lost 
because of personnel turbulence. Sandwiched in its activation between 
the most frenzied period of mobilization and the bloodiest demands for 
combat replacements, the 88th was spared the worst of this turbulence. 
This relatively stable condition was for the most part fortuitous, al-
though that good fortune was improved upon by the expediency with 
which the 88th negotiated its training cycle and by wise decisions made 
by the division's leadership on several occasions. Other divisions 
generally took far more time to assemble the team with which they 
finally deployed. Contrast the 88th's record of sixteen months between 
activation and deployment with the average time requirement for 
draftee infantry divisions, twenty-two months; this despite the short-
ening of divisional training cycles from twelve to ten months for later 
divisions. 31 
The logistical experiences of the draftee divisions seem to have 
been strikingly similar. The first of these divisions was activated in 
March 1942, the last in August 1943. National mobilization was in all 
cases far enough along that the new units had ample food, clothing, 
fuel, shelter, and ammunition. They also had the table of organization 
equipment they actually needed to support training, although most 
were short of their full authorizations until well into 1943. The equip-
ment that was available was distributed evenly throughout the new 
divisions initially, so at any given time all enjoyed about the same 
equipment posture unless on major maneuvers or declared deploya-
ble. The divisions activated in 1943 were better off than earlier divisions 
with respect to percentages of authorized equipment on hand, and 
they benefited from the logistical lessons learned during 1942. The 
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divisions of 1943 had ordnance light maintenance companies and 
adequate automotive spare parts from the outset, and did not suffer the 
logistical cadre reshufflings experienced by their predecessors. On the 
other hand, the divisions of 1943 received hand-me-down training 
equipment from the earlier units, so they were not altogether without 
maintenance headaches. The logistical experience of the 88th seems to 
have approximated that of the other draftee divisions; all seem to have 
been relatively well off insofar as supply and support were con-
cerned.32 
As divisions moved overseas, each in turn faced deterioration in 
training standards as personnel and equipment trickled for extended 
periods along rail lines and across oceans to distant destinations. 33 
Once a division deployed, its personnel situation stabilized; this could 
be a mixed blessing, because divisions departed with greater or lesser 
numbers of last-minute fillers who had not trained with their new 
units. Theater commanders overseas were justifiably concerned about 
the battle-worthiness of the newly arriving divisions; they attempted to 
stand them down for a two- or three-week training program overseas 
or to give them a month's experience in a quiet sector before sending 
them to major operations. Some divisions, such as the 88th, had the 
benefit of both a training stand-down and a tour in a less active sector. 
Of thirty-seven draftee infantry divisions, eleven spent a month or 
more in England, then shipped to France; one stopped briefly in 
England, then had a month in a quiet sector in France; twelve went 
directly to France and spent a month in quiet sectors; three trained 
several weeks in North Africa, then spent several weeks in quiet 
sectors in Italy; one went directly to Italy and spent six weeks in quiet 
sectors; three went to the Pacific and trained several months, although 
the training of one of three was badly broken up; and one went to 
Hawaii and trained for the rest of the war without fighting at all. Of the 
thirty-seven divisions, only five did not receive some kind of major 
retraining experience overseas. These included the ill-starred 106th, 
sent to a "quiet sector" that ended up in the path of the German 
Ardennes offensive of late 1944; the 75th and 76th, whose retraining 
experiences were cut short when they were hastily thrown against the 
shoulders of the Bulge; and the 92nd and 93rd, black units committed 
piecemeal rather than as divisions, with predictable consequences. 34 
The importance of a gradual initiation to combat-of a "warm-
up"-should not be underestimated. 35 Divisions with both a retraining 
period overseas and a tour in a quiet sector seem to have done the best 
of any during their first major battles. 36 Those with lengthy tours in 
quiet sectors but no retraining program did almost as well, and those 
with neither retraining nor tours in quiet sectors fared least well. 37 The 
importance to the 88th of the Magenta training and of the tour of March 
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1944 in the line at Minturno has already been stressed. The division 
refreshed itself on the Army Training Program and then gained consid-
erable combat experience at the small-unit level while diagnosing and 
working out a number of training deficiencies. Tours in quiet sectors 
seem to have been of equal value to other divisions. 
A comparison can be made, for example, between the 99th and the 
106th infantry divisions during the first days of the Ardennes offen-
sive. By December 1944 the 99th had trained briefly in England, had 
had a month of combat experience in low-casualty environments, and 
was considered prime for a major offensive undertaking. Deployed 
alongside the 99th, the 106th had come almost directly from the United 
States, without significant retraining in England, and was just begin-
ning to sort itself out in the quiet Ardennes. Both divisions found 
themselves in the path of the German offensive. The 99th fell back on 
its haunches, then very creditably held the northern shoulder of the 
Bulge until help arrived; the 106th folded in a little more than a day. The 
106th was more exposed, to be sure. Among other differences between 
the two divisions, however, one must number the previous combat 
experience of the 99th. 
One reason that tours in relatively quiet sectors seem to have been 
of even more value than retraining programs overseas was that the 
army training programs, for all their comprehensiveness, did have 
weaknesses. Retraining overseas refreshed units on the army training 
programs while carrying forward their deficiencies; combat experience 
allowed units to diagnose and overcome those deficiencies. The army 
training programs focused upon individual skills and upon large-scale 
offensive maneuvers in which the integration of the several arms and 
branches took place at the company level and above. It was not until 
Minturno that the 88th really wrestled with a highly discriminate use of 
artillery, with the intricacies of breaching mine fields and obstacles in 
depth-with or without engineer support-and with the complexities 
of maintaining communications in a hostile environment. The 88th 
never trained with tanks or air support in the United States, and it had 
only a superficial exposure to them prior to Diadem. Army training 
programs had not utterly neglected air support, tanks, mines, com-
munications, or the discriminate use of artillery; the practical training 
stressed other things, however, and units first tend to reproduce their 
training when in combat. 
It is significant that the training deficiencies cited represent tasks 
that are crucial when rupturing prepared defenses. Mine fields and 
obstacles msut be breached so that carefully integrated teams of tanks 
and infantry can roll forward-with infantry facilitating the advance of 
tanks and tanks providing direct fire support to infantry. After initial 
bombings and shellings the advance no longer requires massive artil-
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lery preparations; it requires carefully directed rounds into precisely 
the right troublesome positions; for example, machine-gun nests. This 
entire clockwork combination of infantry, armor, engineers, and artil-
lery is utterly dependent upon effective communications as the battle 
develops. 
Rupturing a defensive line is the most challenging of military 
operations. The draftee divisions of World War II came out of the Army 
Training Program lacking with respect to some of the intricacies in-
volved. Unfortunately, most were called upon to break through pre-
pared defenses early in their careers. All divisions had initial troubles 
putting line-breaking routines together; those without practical experi-
ence in quiet sectors had more. 38 The fighting in the bocage of Nor-
mandy, for example, required the apotheosis of combined arms 
coordination at the lowest levels of command; inexperienced units 
fresh from England could not quickly conjure the necessary skills. 39 
Their clumsiness contrasted with the greater efficiency of such veteran 
units as the 1st, the 9th, and the 82nd. Divisions that spent some time 
in combat prior to their first attempt at rupturing defensive positions-
for example, the 88th, the 102nd, or the 104th-generally had more 
success in their initial efforts. 
Once the battlefield broke open into mobile warfare, the Army 
Training Program came into its own. Virtually every draftee division 
had its Fondi or its Roccasecca, its moments of glory when hard-
marching columns outmaneuvered their German opponents and 
swept them from critical objectives into prisoner-of-war compounds. 
Deprived of formidable defensive positions, German units of 1944 and 
1945 were generally inferior to their American counterparts.40 German 
soldiers were not only less numerous, they were also less physically fit, 
less experienced as marksmen, less thoroughly trained, less well 
equipped, less well supported, and less able to make a combination of 
arms work for them. 41 German counterattacks often proved suicidal;42 
the best the Germans could hope for from the mobile battlefield was to 
escape from it with enough strength to man yet another line of pre-
pared defenses. 
Despite defensive advantages and masterful leadership at the 
highest levels, the Germans in Italy lost 536,000-killed, wounded, 
and missing-to the Allies' 312,000.43 Other indications of German 
deterioration included an increasing tendency to surrender in groups 
when in less than desperate circumstances, the repellent policy of 
retaliating against dependents and relatives of soldiers who surren-
dered, and the 25,000 Wehrmacht servicemen ultimately shot for des-
sertion. On a number of occasions, most notably during the battle of 
Aachen, the discipline of line infantry units was maintained by ter-
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rorist campaigns directed against them by the 55 and other Nazi 
fanatics. 44 
Mobile warfare allowed the American army, including its draftee 
divisions, to use material advantages to best effect. Truck fleets sped 
supplies of all types over extended distances to support advancing 
units; in particular, trucks made possible the replenishment of mind-
boggling expenditures of artillery ammunition and fuel over the wid-
ening gaps that separated divisions from railheads or ports. Tanks 
bypassed pockets of resistance to strike at more vulnerable-and crit-
ical-targets deep in the enemy rear. Planes may have had severe 
limitations insofar as close support was concerned, but on the mobile 
battlefield free-lance air strikes did much to disrupt enemy troop 
movements and resupply efforts. Behind stable fronts, Germans could 
move during limited visibility and avoid aerial interdiction. When the 
fighting broke into a war of movement, time proved too critical to allow 
the wait for fog or darkness. 45 
A statement that American units fared better than German units 
during mobile warfare deserves qualification. The Germans concen-
trated what personnel and equipment advantages they did have into a 
relatively few units that could make a difference in a narrow sector, as at 
Cassino, or in a spearhead, as in the Ardennes offensive. These elite 
units-panzer, panzer grenadier, and parachute divisions-stood in 
stark contrast to the infantry divisions that constituted the bulk of the 
German army. 46 American divisions did not demonstrate such extreme 
variations with respect to equipment, personnel, training, support, or 
capability. The Germans did have a superior personnel replacement 
system, and this muted American superiorities that might otherwise 
have been more obvious. 
The Germans raised more than three hundred divisions during the 
course of the war and did their best to rotate units out of the line as a 
means to provide rest, retraining, and replacement. 47 Even severely 
depleted units tended to have leadership and logistical cadres still 
intact, so there were always experienced divisional bases to build upon. 
The Germans gained impressive successes by ruthlessly holding the 
line with increasingly depleted units, in the meantime building others 
back up to acceptable levels of manning, training, and capability. The 
reserve built up for the Ardennes offensive is the most dramatic il-
lustration of the process. Manteuffel's Fifth and Dietrich's Sixth panzer 
armies were probably as good as any the Germans ever fielded. 48 The 
usual German achievement was more modest: plugging a crumbling 
line with fresh divisions that were not yet capable of a wide range of 
operations but were capable of defending their own positions. 4'~ 
The American individual replacement system, bastard stepchild of 
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a paucity of units, yet "verified" by the 85th and 88th infantry divi-
sions, did not work so well. Weary units remained in contact far too 
long. Bewildered replacements became casualties themselves before 
they trained into their units, often before they even arrived in those 
units. The divisions, draftee and otherwise, that fought in the North 
Apennines and in northern France suffered the worst ravages of pro-
longed conflict without relief. In France some divisions never saw a day 
out of combat from the point at which they were first committed. 
Highly regarded divisions, such as the 1st Infantry Division in the 
Hiirtgen, rendered themselves "somnambulate," and newly arriving 
divisions could find themselves more efficient than the veterans of 
many campaigns. 50 Despite their inexperience and training deficien-
cies, green divisions had one advantage over the exhausted survivors 
and confused replacements comprising veteran divisions engaged in 
prolonged conflict: they were still units. 
The damage done by sending forward individual replacements 
rather than units was uneven. Local commanders, such as Clark after 
Rome and Kendall in the Appennines, did what they could to rotate 
units out of the line. France had its quiet sectors and the pulse of 
combat could create rest and retraining periods for divisions. In the 
Pacific, frenzied fighting cleared one island or another, after which 
came a considerable lull while preparations for the next operation 
matured. North Africa, Sicily, and Italy prior to the Apennines saw 
American divisions alternating weeks of intense conflict with weeks 
of relative quiet. The Sixth Army Group's campaign from Southern 
France through Bavaria was somewhat more episodic in the demands it 
placed on units than was the fighting farther north. In these cases an 
accidental alternation between intense combat and rest and retraining 
provided benefits similar to those provided by a conscious policy of 
unit rotation. 51 
It should be noted that in infantry divisions somewhat more than 
94 percent of all casualties came from subordinate infantry units. 52 
Artillery, engineers, and other supporting arms and branches came 
through the fiercest fighting relatively unscathed. Thus, it was easier to 
sustain high standards of cohesion and training in supporting units 
than in infantry battalions. American artillery, for example, trained to 
high standards of technical competence in the United States, suffered 
relatively few casualties overseas, and remained unexcelled on the 
battlefield throughout the period in which the draftee divisions fought 
their way. 
The 88th Infantry Division departed notably from the "normal" 
experience of the draftee division in a few ways. It enjoyed relative 
personnel stability during its training in the United States; it had a 
lengthy "warm-up" overseas featuring both a training stand-down and 
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a tour in a quiet sector; and it fought in episodes alternating weeks of 
combat with weeks of renewal, the North Apennines excepted. With 
respect to these factors, the 88th's experience was more like that of the 
most celebrated of the regular army divisions, specifically the 1st, 3rd, 
and 9th infantry divisions, than it was like that of the bulk of the 
divisions that followed it overseas. 5 3 
Combat experience is a perishable characteristic. Within a decade 
of war's end few veterans are left below the battalion level, and none 
remain in the rank and file. The expertise that remains is drawn more 
from what leaders have read than from what they have experienced. 
Concepts and techniques developed in the crucible of war appear in a 
body of postwar literature, and that body becomes the basis for future 
military preparation. The experience of the World War II draftee divi-
sions influenced the postwar development of the U.S. Army. Although 
most of the lessons to be learned from them were learned, some seem 
to have been overlooked. 
Led by the 85th and 88th infantry divisions, the draftee divisions of 
World War II irrevocably laid to rest a century and a half of controversy 
concerning the value of conscripted soldiers. By the hour of the 88th's 
triumph, the fall of Rome, this had ceased to be much of an issue, 
however. Individual replacement and the suspension of voluntary 
enlistment had filled the ranks of all divisions with draftees well before 
the great victories of 1944. The further vindication of the draftee un-
doubtedly had some influence on mobilization planners and did exhil-
arate the public, but since World War I even Uptonians had been 
satisfied with American conscripts as individual soldiers. 54 
The 88th and its sister divisions also laid to rest controversy con-
cerning the value of all-draftee formations; tiny cadres of professionals 
had been able to mold masses of erstwhile civilians into proficient 
fighting organizations. This triumph was more to the point: America 
did not need enormous armies in times of peace to efficiently field 
enormous armies in times of war. 
The draftee divisions' initial performances reflected the success of 
an Army Ground Forces training program that was at once the most 
massive and the most centralized in history. Although technological 
developments such as films, innovative training equipment, electronic 
communications, and air transportation contributed to the degree of 
centralization possible, the heart of the centralizing process was the 
detailed, structured, and unit-specific Army Training Program (ATP). 
In pyramidal fashion, service schools trained cadremen who trained 
subordinates to train troops, all in accord with the ATP. Mass publica-
tion provided copies of the ATP to trainer and trainee alike; every man 
could know where he stood on the "checklist." Checklist training has 
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prospered in the aftermath of World War II success. Whether the ATP 
of the 1940s and 1950s, the ORT (Operational Readiness Test) of the 
1960s, or the ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) of the 
1970s and 1980s, the basis of collective training within the army con-
tinues to be a single, comprehensive document for each type of unit. 
This dictates training tasks, the conditions under which they are to be 
accomplished, and the standards against which performance is to be 
measured. 55 
Postwar training literature addressed the shortcomings of the 
World War II ATP with respect to such items as the integration of tanks 
and infantry or the coordination of close air support. After World War 
II, additional inadequacies surfaced as the army encountered or imag-
ined new situations; these in turn led to further revisions in training 
literature.56 Re-editing has amended substance without disturbing the 
centralizing premise that an army-level staff composed of personnel 
with line experience can identify unit training needs and develop 
detailed programs to address those needs. Training in the army con-
tinues to run from the center, as it did during World War 11. 57 
The draftee divisions could not have trained in the States, much 
less deployed overseas, without impressive logistical achievements. 
Despite occasional miscarriages, the sophistication and scale of Amer-
ican logistics remain unparalleled. World War 11-vintage shortcomings 
with respect to logistical manning, maintenance organization, spare 
parts stockage, and off-road transportation have been revolutionized 
by new technologies and new techniques. ss Since the Truman admin-
istration, a policy of "creeping," or continuous, mobilization has sus-
tained relatively high levels of material readiness; contracted deliveries 
have been spaced over years and have been guided by follow-on 
contracts to replace worn or obsolescent equipment. 59 Insofar as the 
army is concerned, logistical controversy centers not so much on 
whether material superiority could be achieved in a future war as on 
whether it would be achieved during the initial battles of such a war. 
The U.S. Army may have less equipment than it would need in the 
early stages of a major war, but it has more than it effectively mans. 
Harkening back to the Uptonian premonitions of a rabble in arms and 
the mobilization disorders of 1940 and 1941, postwar logisticians de-
veloped a doctrinal principle labeled "material precedence."60 A two-
edged sword, this principle dictates that one should have the materials 
of war on hand before mustering units to use them. Adherence to this 
principle has supported the efforts of those who have made continu-
ous mobilization work for thirty years; it has also led us to arrays of 
equipment brought together and then manned, or partially manned, 
regardless of the vagaries of personnel strength. This was not the 
experience of the draft divisions; their organizations established and 
Rome to the Alps 161 
trained at full personnel strength regardless of the vagaries of equip-
ment availability. Material precedence subordinated personnel prece-
dence, and the American army characteristically handled things better 
than it handled people. 
The greatest weakness of the U.S. Army during World War II was 
its turbulent personnel system, at home and overseas. The 88th was 
fortunate enough to avoid the worst excesses of this turbulence but, 
ironically, it set a battlefield precedent that "validated" individual 
replacement analogous to the replenishment of fuel or spare parts. As 
World War II ended, an individual point system based on such factors 
as time in service, time overseas, decorations, and dependents man-
aged the redeployment of soldiers from Europe. The British solicited 
the use of the 88th, a unit they held in high esteem, to establish an 
American presence in the vicinity of Trieste. The 88th they received 
was a division whose faces had changed; soldiers had rotated, if units 
had not. Through several years of occupation duty in Italy, Yugoslavia, 
and Austria, years punctuated by civil strife and sporadic Yugoslav 
guerrilla forays, commanders of the 88th wrestled with personnel 
turbulence as much as they did with operational concerns. Sheer 
entropy guaranteed that units had some portion of their assigned 
strength in transit all of the time. This had serious implications for 
cohesiveness and morale, and for the maintenance of consistent train-
ing standards. 61 
The administrative convenience of individual replacement soon 
infected the army at large. Commanders attempting to train units 
found their efforts frustrated by unremitting hemorrhages of trained 
personnel. Soldiers rotated through the Korean and Vietnam wars like 
so many passengers on a bus. In these wars newly arriving units, 
trained in the United States or elsewhere, fought well enough initially. 
Once the entropy of the personnel system set in, however, standards of 
cohesion and training inevitably dropped. Soldiers, not units, rotated 
from divisions training without fighting in the United States, Ger-
many, and elsewhere to units fighting without training in Asia; and 
vice versa. 62 
It is true that the demands of modern combat cannot be sustained 
without the replacement of individual casualties. Techniques for ac-
complishing this vary, however. One can send partially trained replace-
ments forward into units hotly engaged. One can also hold 
replacements until units return from the front lines, then weld a team 
out of replacements and veterans with whatever training time is avail-
able. During the latter part of World War II, the U.S. Army adhered to 
the first technique unless local commanders found or fell into a way 
around it. The systematic use of the second technique would have 
required more units-some forward, some back-than America's mo-
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bilization had made available. The second technique also seems to have 
been, as the Germans demonstrated and some American analysts 
suspected, the more efficient in the long run. 63 
Modern warfare is increasingly demanding of the front-line units 
that participate in it; it seems that units will need to be relieved ever 
more frequently. However, the postwar army has been even less atten-
tive to unit rotation than was the army of World War II. During the 
Korean War, units rarely enjoyed training stand-downs; during the 
Vietnam War they had virtually none. 64 Training exercises outside of 
the combat theaters or in peacetime naively carried units through one 
mission after another as if they would never need to be replaced. 65 
Rather than anticipating extraordinary demands for new units, post-
war mobilization planning has focused almost exclusively on the active 
and reserve components, the equivalent of the regular army and Na-
tional Guard of World War II. Like their predecessors prior to each of 
the world wars, modern planners are unenthusiastic about cutting new 
units from whole cloth. 66 The 88th Infantry Division was the ultimate 
product of a great deal of prewar thought. For all their deficiencies, the 
mobilization plans of the 1930s were more sophisticated with respect to 
new divisions than those of a more recent vintage. 
It is not difficult to envision a crisis in which the United States 
would require ground forces greatly in excess of its present means. 
This suggests that Americans might once again fall back upon one of 
their more curious national traits, the ability to conjure proficient 
combat units out of an unmilitary people quickly. Under those circum-
stances the factors that made the 88th Infantry Division outstanding-
the carefully trained and organized cadre; the relative personnel sta-
bility; the well-thought-out, albeit lengthy, training program; the unex-
celled logistical wherewithal; the conscious retraining and warm-up 
overseas; and the episodic combat laced with retraining efforts-would 
once again merit professional and public attention. 
Like so many historical issues, the issues associated with manning 
the American army have evolved without ever having been resolved. 
Questions (for example, whether to have a regular army, whether to 
render that regular army expansible, whether to have conscription, 
whether to have conscripted divisions) have been answered without 
Americans ever having achieved a final blueprint describing how the 
United States can best remain a nation of free people in a troubled 
world. The experience of the World War II draftee divisions was re-
freshing; it demonstrated that masses of citizens could be welded into 
proficient modern fighting organizations in reasonable periods of time, 
that the United States need not endure enormous armies in times of 
peace in order to field enormous armies in times of war. 
Rome to the Alps 163 
Despite overall success, American mobilization for World War II 
was not without significant flaws. The army's handling of personnel, 
training, logistics, and doctrine encompassed experiences that should 
carry the label "how not to" as well as those meriting the label "how 
to." Nations are not soon likely to grow beyond the use of armed force. 
Americans should understand how they have defended themselves in 
the past in order that they may more effectively defend themselves in 
the future. Within its corner of American history, the 88th Infantry 
Division offers considerable insight towards the development of that 
understanding. 
APPENDIX! ______________________ _ 
Cumulative Personnel-Induced 
Training Time Losses 
(Infantry Divisions Only) 
Each of the letter entries on the accompanying figures represents a keyed 
annotation of a personnel disturbance War Department authorities credited 
with the loss of a month's training time. For more details on training time lost as 
a function of personnel lost, see the Memorandum of General McNair to the 
Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, 7 March 1944, National Archives, MMRB 
(353/206). The key to the figures is as follows: 
X. One X for every month of training lost because of a one-time stripping 
of greater than 50 percent. 
5. One 5 for each month of training lost because of stripping of greater than 
20 percent but less than 50 percent. 
T. One T for every month served solely as a replacement training center. 
0. One 0 for every month the subject division underwent the OCS/ AGCT 
"raid" or mass officer stripping. 
A. Four A's if the division was caught in the great ASTP/AGCT "raid." 
D. One D for every month lost in excess of the time loss attributable to 
personnel turbulence. 
Note that of the numbers assigned to divisions, numbers 1-25 were re-
served for Regular Army; 26-45, for National Guard; and 60 and greater, for all-
draftee divisions. 
If we assume pre-1941 divisions should have been ready for embarkation 
within four months of Pearl Harbor, 1941 and 1942 divisions should have been 
ready for embarkation within sixteen months of activation, and 1943 divisions 
should have been ready for embarkation within fourteen months, 78 percent of 
the total time lost by infantry divisions between activation and embarkation can 
be credited to personnel turbulence. 
For some examples to assist in reading the figures: 
1. The 26th Infantry Division, a 1941 division, has eighteen letters on the 
chart, indicating it took eighteen months more than it should have (16 + 18 = 
34 months total) to embark. Of these eighteen months, twelve were lost 
because of OCS or officer stripping (O's); four were lost when the division was 
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delayed enough to be caught in the ASTP/AGCT raid (A's); and two were lost 
for reasons other than personnel turbulence (D's). 
2. The 100th Infantry Division, a 1942 division, has eight letters on the 
chart, indicating it took eight months more than it should have (16 + 8 = 24 
months total) to embark. Of these eight months, two were lost because of 
stripping greater than 20 percent but less than 50 percent (S's); four were lost 
when the division was caught in the ASTP/AGCT raid (A's); and two were lost 
for reasons other than personnel turbulence (D's). 
Figure Al-l. Training Time Losses, pre-1941 Divisions 
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Figure A1-2. Training Time Losses, 1941 Divisions 
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Figure Al-3. Training Time Losses, 1942 Divisions 
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APPENDIX 2------------
The Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: 
Colonel Dupuy Reconsidered 
The casual student of World War II does not need to read much to be exposed to 
a pervasive adulation of the Wehrmacht. Testimonies of German proficiency 
are generally reinforced by comparisons wherein other armed forces, includ-
ing those of the United States, appear unfavorably. This might have come as a 
surprise to the World War II Gls who herded "kraut" prisoners by the thou-
sands after every major European battle the American army fought. How 
many of our soldiers reviewed the parades of docile prisoners and thought they 
were looking at men better than themselves? 
The current inflated image of Hitler's armies is complex in its origin. Like 
most mythologies, it contains some truth; the Germans were outstanding 
when in their prime and were formidable throughout World War II. The British 
and French exaggerated German capabilities, however, too often explaining 
their own ineptitudes in terms of German genius. I German prisoners, once 
they recovered from the shock of capture, added their own apocryphal stories 
suggesting prowess and expertise2 American humor widened the distance. 
Sad Sack, Beetle Bailey. and Bill Mauldin portrayed the American soldier as a 
lovable nincompoop without providing a similar service for the Germans. 
Immediately after World War II, a historiographical bias set in. German 
sources available to English-speaking authors were dominated by official rec-
ords and the testimony, and later memoirs, of captured German officers.3 
American sources were much broader, featuring monumental bodies of corre-
spondence, anecdotes, interviews, and oral testimony from soldiers of all 
ranks. The lower in an institution one descends, the more inchoate its activities 
may appear. Postwar America had no lack of veterans with a pet story illustrat-
ing martial miscarriages. Many of the veterans' stories were humorous; some 
were not. Debacles such as Buna, Kasserine, and the Rapido engaged the 
attention of print media and historians. It is true that German botches also 
received some publicity, but many of these were conveniently blamed on Hitler 
alone and were generally of less interest to the American public. 
Studies appeared favoring those who had a point to prove or an axe to 
grind. S.L.A. Marshall's famous Men Against Fire, for example, stimulated the 
acceptance of "Train Fire" infantry exercises by suggesting that most American 
"Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy and the Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: A Reconsidera-
tion." Military Affairs, January 1986, pp. 16-20. 
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infantrymen spent World War II cowering in the bottom of their foxholes; Basil 
Liddell Hart vented his pique on Allied leaders who did not share his elevated 
impression of himself; behavioral scientists, simply by their choices of subjects, 
created candid documents hazardous when quoted out of context. 4 The 
cumulative effect of all this has been relative images skewed to favor the 
German soldier over the American. This condition is not at all ameliorated by 
the fact that a significant fraction of the public buying World War II books 
consists of enthusiasts who collect Nazi memorabilia, construct plastic pan-
zers, and energetically seek to be the German player in hex-grid war games. 
It is ironic that a focus for this adulation of the Wehrmacht is a distin-
guished World War II veteran and prolific military historian, Col. Trevor N. 
Dupuy. His Numbers, Prediction, and War represents a promising effort to refine 
the analyses of battles wherein numbers of troops and weapons are known.s 
With sufficient ventilation in and criticism from the academic community, this 
work could evolve into a useful historical tool. Now it simply demonstrates the 
intellectual intimidation wrought when complex calculations are unleashed 
upon a liberal arts community. Books have emerged based uncritically upon 
Colonel Dupuy's "proof" of German superiority as a launch point for further 
enlargements of the Wehrmacht. 6 The extraordinarily exact calculation that one 
German had the "score effectiveness" of 1.55 Americans has become a power-
ful arrow in the quiver of Wehrmacht enthusiasts. The purpose of this text is to 
reconsider the numbers that have given Colonel Dupuy his results. 
Colonel Dupuy's comparison of German and American units emerged 
from an analysis of seventy-eight selected engagements during 1943 and 1944. 
His historical data seems valid; one would be hard put to fault the careful and 
exhaustive enumeration of troops, weapons, and circumstances. Unfor-
tunately, the sample itself is misleading. It scrambles together different types of 
units, disproportionally overrepresents panzer and panzer grenadier divi-
sions, and features the American as the attacker in almost all cases. 
Within Colonel Dupuy's seventy-eight battles, a number of different types 
of units appear: British infantry divisions, British armored divisions, American 
infantry divisions, American armored divisions, American corps, German 
panzer divisions, German parachute divisions, German corps, and German 
armies. Theoretically, Colonel Dupuy's "operational lethality index" (dis-
cussed below) offers the means of making these different types of units com-
parable. Until his "Quantitative Judgment Model" is perfected, however, it 
seems best to break comparisons out by unit type-to avoid comparing" apples 
and oranges," as it were. Screening out the British because they are different, 
and omitting corps because they are not standard units, Colonel Dupuy's 
sample includes thirty-nine engagements pitting American and German divi-
sions against each other. Remembering that Colonel Dupuy's "score effec-
tiveness" came out as 1:1.55 in favor of the Germans, it may be instructive to 
break out his computations by unit type (see Table A2-1). 
These are Colonel Dupuy's own results. The gradient in German effec-
tiveness from a high with the panzers to a low with the infantry is what one 
might expect. The Germans tended to concentrate personnel and equipment 
advantages into thf '~most mobile divisions. 7 In the thirty-nine engagements, 
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Table A2-1. Score Effectiveness Comparison by Division Type 
German 
German panzer German 
panzer grenadier infantry 
U.S. armor 1:1.76 1:1.30 
U.S. infantry 1:2.40 1:1.97 1:1.25 
thirteen featured panzer divisions; eight, panzer grenadier divisions; and 
eighteen, infantry divisions. The German army of 30 July 1944 had 27 panzer, 
12 panzer grenadier, and 142 infantry divisions (not counting mountain and 
parachute divisions). This is not to mention the 29 static divisions German 
commanders regarded as their least potent units. Based on these proportions, 
Colonel Dupuy's sample overrepresents panzer divisions at 224 percent and 
panzer grenadier divisions at 323 percent; it underrepresents infantry divi-
sions at 58 percent. The American sample is better balanced; the ten armored 
and twenty-nine infantry divisions in the sample are roughly proportional to 
the sixteen armored and forty-nine infantry divisions deployed to Europe. 
Thus the American army at large is, in effect, compared with the best of the 
German army. 
Another disproportion does even more damage to Colonel Dupuy's analy-
sis than his selection of divisions. Of the thirty-nine engagements pitting 
American and German divisions against each other, the American is the at-
tacker thirty-six times. This introduces the question of whether anything in 
Dupuy's analysis favors the defender. The answer is yes. 
Numbers, Prediction and War approaches the task of weighing units against 
each other by two routes. The most easily understood of these is score effec-
tiveness, computed as 
SEr = .001 x Sr x Vr x Ur 
Case represents the number of casualties inflicted on 'the enemy; Sr is 
friendly force strength, discussed below: vf is a friendly vulnerability factor, 
discussed below; and Uris a friendly posture factor. The value of Ur represents 
the advantage accrued by different operational circumstances. According to 
Colonel Dupuy, if the attack is 1.0, the hasty defense is 1.3, the prepared 
defense is 1.5, the fortified defense is 1.6, and the delay is 1.2. 
These values seem low for all postures except the attack. Few battalion 
commanders' careers would survive the assertion their battalion could hold off 
only a battalion and a half from prepared defensive positions. It is true that the 
attacker can turn flanks or concentrate favorable odds upon a specific point, but 
that is a measure of command and control rather than of the intrinsic strength 
of the defense. On a reasonably narrow front a defender of comparable ability 
and mobility can force his attacker into frontal assaults. The battles of Colonel 
Dupuy's sample generally feature such narrow fronts. 
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Table A2-2. Alternative Values of Ur 
Hasty Prepared Fortified 
Attack defense defense defense Delay 
Col. Dupuy 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.2 
Traditional 1.0 3.0 6.0 
ORSA 1.0 1.3 2.5 3.8 2.2 
Blast vulnerability 1.0 3.2 7.1 
Numbers, Prediction, and War does not explain how the values of Ur were 
derived. The most persuasive indictment of its choices is that of hundreds of 
accomplished analysts who have attempted, for one reason or another, to 
reflect the relative advantages of a defender, none have come up with figures as 
low as Colonel Dupuy's. Traditional rules of the thumb, verified by experience 
as planning factors and still taught at command and general staff colleges, 
assert that one needs a three-to-one advantage in effective combat power-not 
necessarily numbers of troops-at the point of decision to overcome a defender 
in prepared positions.K Another set of Ur equivalents has emerged from the 
much-refined equations of such seminal theorists as Bradley A. Fiske and F. W. 
Lanchester. 9 These mathematical models are the stock in trade of the Opera-
tions Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA) community. 10 A third source of 
equivalents for Colonel Dupuy's Ur comes from assessments of relative vul-
nerability. These originated with the designers of fortifications and are now 
most widely used by nuclear targeting planners. For circumstances in which 
the governing effect with respect to casualties is blast-as opposed to radiation 
or thermal effects-parallels with World War II can be drawn. That which 
protects against blast protects against direct and indirect conventional fires as 
well. II Table A2-2 summarizes alternative values for Ur insofar as the several 
schools of analysts have developed them. 
Given the information in Table A2-2, one can recompute score effec-
tiveness for each of the thirty-nine engagements and rework the comparisons 
of Table A2-l. In each of the cells of Table A2-3 the first entry is derived from 
traditional, the second from ORSA, and the third from blast vulnerability 
values for Ur. Where a school of analysts proposed no alternative values of Ur, I 
used Colonel Dupuy's. As a point of interest, of the thirty-six American attacks, 
fifteen were against fortified defenders, four against prepared defenders, nine 
against hasty defenders, and eight against forces involved in the delay. 
The most important point made by Table A2-3 is not so much specific 
values as it is the demonstration of how radically choices of Ur alter the results. 
Virtually any analyst except Colonel Dupuy would take the same data and rate 
the Germans far lower than he did. All factors considered, the ORSA equiv-
alents of Ur are probably the most comprehensive, time-tested, and reliable. 
They have been used with considerable success to reflect past battles and 
predict future ones.I2 Colonel Dupuy takes some pains to establish that his 
Quantitative Judgment Model (QJM) gets a better "fit" with respect to his 
chosen battles than does the ORSA standardized computer model, ATLAS. 
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Table A2-3. Score Effectiveness Comparisons by Division Type, Alternative 
Ur Values 
U.S. armor 
U.S. infantry 
German 
panzer 
1:1.38 
1:1.23 
1:1.37 
1:1.81 
1:1.44 
1:1.80 
German 
panzer 
grenadier 
1:1.11 
1:1.14 
1:1.08 
German 
infantry 
1:0.64 
1:0.74 
1:0.61 
1:0.94 
1:0.89 
1:0.92 
This seems to be a result of QJM steps 9c and 10, which allow the analyst to 
review results, identify discrepancies, and go back and change parameters in 
such a manner that historical results are more nearly achieved. It seems no 
accident that Numbers, Prediction, and War labels one of its subchapters "Fudge 
Factors." 
Colonel Dupuy's equation for score effectiveness contains V1 and Sr as 
multipliers that might correct the skew caused by too-low values for Ur. Values 
for V1 come from a complex formula: 
Vr = 1 - [N X uv X N5.Tsr) X vy X Vr]/ruSf 
According to Colonel Dupuy, this formula for the "vulnerability factor" has 
"resulted from considerable experimentation with World War II data." It seems 
Yr is more the derivative of curve-fitting than it is the representative of a specific 
theoretical concept. The values for Uv, V Y' V" and ru are parameters for 
posture vulnerability, air vulnerability, amphibious vulnerability, and terrain 
posture. In the mind of this author, the tabular values chosen for these in 
Numbers, Prediction, and War, like the values chosen for Up favor the defender as 
score effectiveness is calculated. Theoretically, values for V r could range widely 
enough to offset the too-low values for Ur. Colonel Dupuy established a 
minimum V1 at 0.6, however, thus limiting the range of that parameter. In the 
selected battle analyses not even the ranges possible are achieved, and V r does 
not moderate U1 significantly. 
Another value contributing to the calculation of score effectiveness is 
friendly strength (Sr)· In some respects S1 is the most important of Colonel 
Dupuy's contributions, for it allows one to compare units with different com-
positions and equipment. The basis for the comparison is Operational Le-
thality Indices (OLI) computed for each weapon. OLis are multiplied by factors 
representing the effects of terrain, weather, or situation. The total of all the OLls 
in a unit is the force strength, S (Sr for friendly force strength). 
The concept of totaling OLis seems simple enough, but the numbers 
chosen to represent specific weapons cause problems. Colonel Dupuy derives 
his OLis from Theoretical Lethality Indices (TLis) based on the rate at which 
weapons would inflict casualties on 100,000 arrayed one per square meter 
throughout a one-kilometer square. The OL!s developed through Colonel 
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Table A2-4. Score Effectiveness Comparisons by Division Type, ORSA Ur-
Assumption of Artillery/Air OLI Reduced by Half 
German 
German panzer German 
panzer grenadier infantry 
U.S. armor 1:1.05 1:0.63 
U.S. infantry 1:1.22 1:0.97 1:0.76 
Dupuy's analysis give far more weight to firepower than they do to discrimina-
tion, and they do not allow for the fact that dispersion erodes the effects of 
indirect or automatic-fire weapons far more rapidly than it erodes the effects of 
direct-fire weapons or weapons capable of aimed single shots. This results in 
curious relationships. A single lOS-millimeter howitzer, for example, is worth 
1,288 Springfield rifles. A World War II fighter-bomber is worth 2SO machine 
gunners. A one-megaton nuclear airburst is worth 4,63S,900 men armed with 
late-nineteenth-century rifles-a point that might well have been lost on Chair-
man Mao. Colonel Dupuy's computations of Sr do allow for weapons degrada-
tions due to terrain, weather, or situation, but the basic illogic remains. A lOS-
millimeter howitzer under unfavorable circumstances is worth 820 riflemen 
under favorable circumstances. 
It seems obvious that Colonel Dupuy's OLls rate artillery and air support 
far too highly. If German and American units had had equivalent proportions 
of such firepower available, this would do little damage to comparisons. 
Americans typically had higher proportions of both assets in their inventories, 
however. This makes American strength calculate too high and thus makes 
their score effectiveness too low. Without quibbling about how many riflemen a 
howitzer is actually worth, let us assume Colonel Dupuy's figures for artillery 
and air support arc at least twice as high as they should be. Working back 
through Colonel Dupuy's sample, we can estimate American force strengths 
are overrated by at least 15-30 percent and German force strengths by at least 
S-1S percent. The easiest way to adjust this imbalance seems to be to multiply 
through the German results by about 0.85. Applying that multiplier to our 
ORSA Ur-derived figures, one comes up with Table A2-4. 
Table A2-4 may represent an improvement over Table A2-1, but it is not 
really satisfactory. It implies a precision its subject does not warrant. Combat 
units do not really achieve a score effectiveness of .76; they fight better than, 
about the same as, or less well than their adversaries. Table A2-S translates 
Table A2-4 into appropriate imprecision. In each of the cells of Table A2-S, the 
first entry is the number of engagements wherein-according to the calcula-
tions that led to Table A2-4--Americans outclassed Germans. The second entry 
is the number of engagements wherein they did about the same, calculated as 
having been within 10 percent score effectiveness of each other. The third entry 
in each cell is the number of engagements wherein Germans outclassed Amer-
icans. 
Table A2-S suggests that the effectiveness of American armor and German 
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Table A2-5. American "Victories" I Ties I German "Victories" 
German 
German panzer German 
panzer grenadier infantry 
U.S. armor 4/0/3 21110 
U.S. infantry 2/014 3/2/3 10/2/2 
panzers and the effectiveness of American infantry and German panzer gre-
nadiers were roughly equivalent. American divisions, armor and infantry, 
outclassed German infantry divisions by a wide margin, and American infan-
try was not at its best when faced by German panzers. These assessments track 
with the narratives of sober historians. Because infantry divisions constituted 
such an overwhelming proportion of the German force structure, American 
divisions clearly were more efficient overall. 
Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy's painstakingly acquired historical data is an 
invaluable contribution. Appropriately analyzed, it offers convincing evidence 
that American divisions of 1943-1944 were more efficient than their German 
counterparts man for man, weapon for weapon, and asset for asset. This opens 
a new paradigm. A conventional explanation for American World War II 
victories has been overwhelming quantitative advantages. Colonel Dupuy's 
data suggests quantitative advantages were not sufficient to offset the difficulty 
of assigned missions, and Americans summoned up a qualitative edge as well. 
Perhaps German excellence was the artful choice of positions defensible by 
mediocre divisions. 
An assumption of American superiority suggests a search for cause. At 
this point let me suggest some questions. How far off their prime, if at all, were 
the Germans of 1943-1944? To answer this, one must balance degradation due 
to combat losses against advantages gained from combat experience and in-
stitutional reform during the period 1939-1942. Was the elaborate, lengthy, and 
centralized American divisional training program ultimately superior to the 
somewhat feudal German counterpart? Did the large body of publications 
associated with stateside training lend themselves to ad hoc retraining over-
seas? How much of an advantage was American equipment standardization? 
American doctrine was balanced with respect to operations, logistics, and 
administration, whereas German doctrine focused narrowly on operations 
alone .13 American logisticians were more numerous, influential, and likely to 
be decorated than their German counterparts.14 To what extent did better 
logistical support translate itself into greater combat efficiency? What was the 
best compromise between the overly elaborate German replacement system, 
which did not survive long, and the underdeveloped replacement system with 
which Americans first went to war? Were the techniques for integrating re-
placements that ultimately emerged in such outstanding American divisions as 
the 3rd, 30th, and 88th Infantry optimaJ? 15 What was the overall effect of the 
rivalries and animosities, at times descending to sabotage and murder, that set 
German officers and officials against each other? What was the effect on 
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ordinary units of the German habit of concentrating personnel and equipment 
advantages into elite units? Second-rate status can become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, particularly if one is used as cannon fodder. As Medal of Honor 
rosters attest, ethnic minorities have always numbered among America's best 
soldiers. Why did the Germans not have similar luck with such fillers as 
German-speaking Alsatians or Czechs? 16 This is not to mention allies. Who 
fought for them as well as Poles or Free French did for us? Perhaps there is some 
advantage in fighting for freedom and justice against racism and tyranny. The 
German knew he was hopelessly outnumbered. Whose fault did he think that 
was, and how did his conclusion affect him? 
The mythology of German combat superiority is deeply rooted. It will be 
some time before it has been objectively reconsidered. Insofar as that mythos is 
reinforced by Numbers, Prediction, and War, I hope this text justifies such 
reconsideration. Colonel Dupuy has done invaluable research and innovative 
thinking. His contribution should initiate debate, not close it. To his assessment 
of why he and his comrades-our fathers and grandfathers-won World War 
II, I would like to propose an alternative. I believe they won because, man for 
man and unit for unit, they were tougher than their adversaries. 
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July 1942. See David Irving, The Trail of the Fox (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977), 190-91. 
2. My favorite example of such nonsense is the German antitank gunner cited in 
Stuart H. Loory, Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine (New York: Random House, 
1973), 39. 
3. The best single collection of source materials originating with Germans is probably 
the twenty-four-volume World War II German Military Studies (New York: Garland, 1979). 
4. S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War 
(Giouchester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1947); Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The German Generals 
Talk (New York: W. Morrow, 1948); behavioralists often quoted out of context include Eli 
Ginzberg et. a!., The Ineffective Soldier: Lessons for Management and the Nation (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration 
in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 (1948), and S.A. Stouffer 
et. a!., Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 
1947 -1950). 
5. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, Numbers, Prediction, and War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1979). 
6. See, for examples, Martin Van Creveld, Fighti11g !'ower: German and U.S. Army 
Performance 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), and Colonel Trevor N. 
Dupuy, A Genius for War: The Germa11 Army and General Staff 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); see also Max Hastings, "Their Wehrmacht Was Better than Our 
Army," Kansas City Star, 26 May 1985, 10. 
7. Handbook on German Military Forces (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of-
fice, 1945), TM-E 30-451. 
8. Classroom instruction in P316, Division Tactics, CGSC 1985; see also Dupuy, 
Numbers, Prediction, and War, 11-12. 
9. Robert Walter Samz, Towards a Science of War Through Some Mathematical Concepts of 
Macrocombat (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1970), 30-91. 
10. I drew the ORSA values in Table A2-2 from the chart of ATLAS curves appearing 
in James G. Taylor, Lanchester Models of Warfare (Arlington, Va.: Operations Research 
Society of America, 1983), vol. 2, 523. Setting the force ratios at one to one, one can use 
Fiske's equations to solve for the relative advantages of the defender. 
11. Field Manual10I-31-3 (Nuclear Planning Data), (Washington, D.C.: DA; 1984). 
12. Samz, Towards a Science of War. 
13. Van Creveld, Fighting Power, 28-34. 
14. Ibid., 42-61, 151-55. 
15. John Sloan Brown, Wi1111illg Teams: Mobilizatio11-Rclated Correlates of Success ill Amer-
icall World War II Infantry Divisions (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: Combat Studies Institute, 
forthcoming in 1986), 120-160. 
16. E.g., see J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper 
Colophon, 1970), 131-213. 
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Christopher Buckley, The Road to Rome (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1945), 
is a contemporary account somewhat more narrow in scope. Col. Trevor N. 
Dupuy, Numbers, Prediction, and War (London: MacDonald and James, 1979), 
brings a massive database and the latest instruments of quantitative analysis to 
bear upon Diadem and other twentieth-century battles. 
The breakout from the Anzio beachhead and the final assaults upon 
Monte Cassino were crucial to the overall success of Diadem. Histories of these 
operations offer random discussions of the 88th Infantry Division. The best 
history of Anzio is Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble that Failed (Phila-
delphia: Lippincott, 1963). Christopher Hibbert, Anzio: Bid for Rome (New York: 
Ballantine, 1971), Ernest Tidyman, The Anzio Death Trap (New York: Belmont, 
1968), and W. Vaughn-Thomas, Anzio (New York: Holt, 1961), are also useful. 
Charles Connell, Monte Cassino: The Historic Battle (London: Elek, 1963), and 
Rudolf Bohmler, Monte Cassino (London: Cassel, 1964), reconstruct that battle 
from both the Allied and the Axis points of view. 
When one narrows the focus from the larger issues of conscription, mobi-
lization, and the campaign in Italy to the 88th Infantry Division in particular, 
one encounters a radical reduction in the volume of published material avail-
able. Many of the books cited above mention the 88th by name, and most 
discuss developments that directly affected the division, but only Delaney 
gives the division consistent attention. For the period before the division's 
deployment in Italy, one must rely upon special collections, the memories of 
participants, and archival materials in order to add any dimensions to those 
developed by Delaney. For the period after the 88th's arrival in Italy, collec-
tions, memories, and archival materials may be supplemented with published 
unit-level accounts, unit combat journals, diaries, and logs. 
The collections-other than those in the National Archives-that have 
proved most useful in this study have been Maj. General John E. Sloan's 
personal papers (an inheritance from General Sloan, my grandfather); Col. 
Dixie E. Beggs' personal papers; the Lieutenant Colonel King papers; the 
United States Army Historical Research Center, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; The 
Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) of the Command and General Staff 
College, Fort Leavenworth, Ks.; the United States Army Armor School Library, 
Fort Knox, Ky.; and the United States Army Infantry School Library, Fort 
Benning, Ga. General Sloan's papers include personal correspondence, imple-
menting instructions, and other materials not subject to filing; a selection of 
official documents subject to filing, and thus available elsewhere; and news-
paper and magazine clippings collected by his wife and daughter (my grand-
mother and mother). Colonel Beggs, the division G-3, maintained a personal 
file of the operations orders, training publications, and correspondence gener-
ated by the division overseas. This material proved particularly useful in 
reconstructing the fight-train-fight cycle of the 88th in Italy. 
The Combined Arms Research Library has complete copies of divisions 
monthly after-action reports, for the 88th and virtually all other divisions, 
throughout the war. CARL does have a filing system all its own; I have entered 
the CARL number in certain notes as appropriate. The Armor School Library 
has a depository for the battle records, logs, journals, diaries, etc., of armored 
units in World War II. These proved invaluable in reconstructing the activities 
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of the independent tank and tank destroyer battalions supporting the 88th. The 
Armor School Library also provided the Lieutenant Colonel King papers, a 
consolidation of the official documents that directed the new divisions during 
their activation and training. The Infantry School Library's holdings were 
helpful insofar as infantry units were concerned; its collection of tables of 
organization proved particularly useful. The United States Army Historical 
Research Center has accumulated personal papers from all periods of Amer-
ican military history. It was there that I came across Captain John W. Appel's 
enlightening study of psychiatric stress in combat in World War II. 
Of the documents drawn from the National Archives, a few have been so 
important to this study as to merit special mention. Insofar as the rest are 
concerned, the glossary of" Abbreviations and File Numbers" preceding the 
notes section should be of assistance to those seeking information over and 
above that already provided by the notes. In the cases of documents that 
originated within a staff action of the 88th Infantry Division but that also fall 
under a topic area of the War Department Decimal File System (Washington, D.C.: 
The Adjutant General of the U.S. Army, 1943), I have entered both the staff 
action of origin and the file number in my notes. Two series of Army Ground 
Forces letters were particularly important in the activation and training of the 
new divisions: AGF letters (subject: cadre personnel for new divisions) and 
AGF letters (subject: training directive effective ... ). These series spanned 
several years as Army Ground Forces updated and republished original docu-
ments. Preparation for Overseas Movement (War Department, 1 February 1943, 
WD 370.5) dominated the operational and logistical activities involved in mov-
ing the new divisions overseas. Three wartime publications provided contem-
porary strategic overviews: Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States 
Army (1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945) to the Secretary of War; memorandum for the 
chief of staff, U.S. Army (subject: report of Army Ground Forces activities), 
from the commanding general, Army Ground Forces, 10 January 1946; and The 
Advance on Rome, a restricted-distribution pamphlet prepared by the G-3 Sec-
tion of Headquarters, Fifth Army, shortly after the fall of Rome. 
The memories of participants have been invaluable in reconstructing the 
experiences of the 88th Infantry Division. In tapping this source I have been 
greatly assisted by my father, Col. Horace M. Brown (General Sloan's aide 
during the formative period of the division, then an officer in the division's 
artillery) and by Mr. Claude W. "Doc" Waters (then a rifleman in the 88th and 
now a successful businessman and also editor of the quarterly publication The 
Blue Devil, whose dedication and leadership have meant so much to the 88th 
Infantry Division Association). These two individuals proved splendid sources 
in themselves and introduced me to equally knowledgeable and cooperative 
veterans from several corners of the division's experience: Col. Dixie Beggs, 
then G-3 of the 88th Infantry Division; Maj. Harvey R. Cook, then special 
services officer of the 88th Infantry Division; Col. Robert J. Karrer, then inspec-
tor general of the 88th Infantry Division; Brig. Gen. John J. King, then a rifle 
company commander in the 88th Infantry Division; Mr. William N. Partin, then 
an officer in the 88th's Quartermaster Company; Dr. Paul Richmond, then 
division surgeon of the 88th Infantry Division; and Col. Peter L. Topic, first an 
artillery battalion executive officer, then the G-4 of the 88th Infantry Division. 
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These men graciously wrote detailed responses to my inquiries; several shared 
diaries, photographs, and written memorabilia as well. Veterans from outside 
the division also provided useful details: Maj. Gen. John M. Lentz, then the 
training officer of Army Ground Forces; and Maj. Gen. James C. Smith, a 
veteran of three wars who has been instrumental in developing COHORT, the 
Army's current effort to achieve personnel stabilization. Veterans of the 88th 
regularly contribute articles and photographs to The Blue Devil; my notes cite 
several of these articles. Finally, mention should be made of my own memories 
of conversations with my Grandfather Sloan, a grand old man with whom I was 
very close. 
A number of published accounts discuss the experiences of the 88th in 
Italy. Maj. Gen. James C. Fry, Combat Soldier (Washington: National Press, 
1968), provides a readable narrative of his experience while commanding the 
350th Infantry Regiment. The Blue Devil "Battle Mountain Regiment" in Italy 
(Kensington, Md.: 88th Infantry Division Assoc., 1977), is a unit history of the 
350th in Italy. The 88th Infantry Division Association has typed and published 
the regimental battle logs of the division's three infantry regiments: History of 
the 349th Infantry Regiment, 88th Infantry Division; History of the 350th Infantry 
Regiment, 88th Infantry Division; and History of the 351st Infantry Regiment, 88th 
Infantry Division. Small Unit Actions (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, 
War Department, 1946 ), is a collection of interview-based case studies compiled 
for the purposes of instruction; it includes a detailed reconstruction of the 351st 
Infantry Regiment's attack on Santa Maria Infante. Two of the division's artil-
lery battalions produced unit histories: the 337th Field Artillery in We Left Home 
(Milan: S.R. Grafitalia, date unknown) and the 338th Field Artillery in Direct 
Support (].E. Sloan Papers). 
The 88th also figures in the records left by other units such as Paul L. 
Schultz, The 85th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Infantry 
Journal Press, 1949). The German experience with the 88th is described in The 
[German] XV Panzer Corps War Diary, The [German] 7lst Infantry Division War 
Diary, and The [German] 94th Infantry Division War Diary, all in the World War II 
German files of the Modern Military Records Division (National Archives). The 
French units on the 88th's right flank during Diadem are discussed in Marcel 
Vignera, Rearming the French (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, 1957). Items of direct interest to the 88th figure in a number of special 
studies: Land mine and Countermine Warfare, Italy 1943-1944 (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1972); Ordnance in the Mediterranean Theater of 
Operations (undated World War II pamphlet provided by the U.S. Army Armor 
School Library); and Charles M. Wiltse, The Medical Department: Medical Service 
in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, 1965). Finally, some of the 88th's most honored veterans are 
treated in The Medal of Honor of the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1948). 
This study has been most attentive to the cadre of the 88th Infantry 
Division, yet I hope it has done some justice to the draftees themselves. There 
are books that have the front-line soldier himself as an object of study. The most 
famous of these is probably S. L.R. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of 
Battle Command in Future War (Glouchester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1947). John 
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Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Men in World War II (New York: Charles 
Scribners Sons, 1980) is more recent, and is excellent, as is Combat World War II, 
edited by Don Congdon (New York: Arbor House, 1983). Some of this type of 
material appears in Studs Terkel, The Good War: An Oral History of World War II 
(New York: Pantheon, 1984), but Terkel's sketches do not focus on combatants 
per se. A contemporary narrative that described to infantrymen of the time 
what they were supposed to be trying to do appeared as Infantry in Battle 
(Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1939). A more modern analysis is 
provided by John A. English's excellent A Perspective on Infantry (New York: 
Praeger, 1981). 
Col. Trevor N. Dupuy's Numbers, Prediction, and War (London: MacDonald 
and James, 1979) yields valuable insights and does much that is useful. It 
develops statistics to depict what I believe is an inflated image of the 
Wehrmacht, however, and a consequent diminishment of the American sol-
dier. See appendix 2. Dupuy's study has assumed a central role in arguments 
disparaging the performance of American units during World War II. In my 
mind, the most notable of these occur in Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for 
War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1977); Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army 
Performance 1939-1945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Max 
Hastings, Overlord: D-Day, June 6, 1944 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). 
Hastings confronted the issue directly with his inflammatory "Their 
Wehrmacht Was Better than Our Army," Kansas City Star, 26 May 1985, 1D. In 
the face of this criticism, there has not been much in the way of organized 
resistance. Even such a sober historian as Russell F. Weigley has expressed his 
doubts in the excellent Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and 
Germany 1944-1945 (Bloomington: Indian Univ. Press, 1981). 
Less inflated estimates of the German soldier appear in Charles Whiting, 
'44: In Combat from Normandy to the Ardennes (New York: Stein and Day, 1984) 
and Brian Harpur, The Impossible Victory: A Personal Account of the Battle for the 
River Po (New York: Hippocreme, 1980). Charles MacDonald's A Time for Trum-
pets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: Morrow, 1984) leaves 
one feeling proud of the American soldier. Whiting, Harpur, and MacDonald 
seem good sources; they actually fought the Germans themselves. Unit histo-
ries appear from time to time that recount battles from the perspectives of the 
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